LAND AND WATER 
November 28, 1014, 
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PLAN OF THE GOEBEN TO SCALB (FROM "nCHTING SHIPS"). 
See Kej to sbcding of Amiour below. 
hit in return. The levstafi's casualties are given as four 
cflicers and twenty-nine men killed, one oflicer and twenty- 
four men •founded. This is a conceivable result for a lucky 
ehell in tho lightly protected battery amidships — but it is still 
suggestive of more hits than one. Probably the censor deleted 
tiie middle word out of " one eerious hit." 
Bo that as it may, however, this is a very light casualty 
list -when we remember that, theoretically at any rate, the 
Goeben's guns were able to penetrate all the side armour of 
the levstafi at 8,000 yards. IncidcntaUy, the Gotbens belt 
was invulnerable to the Russian guns. 
The Russians continued to fire at and hit the Gochen till, 
at the end of fourteen minutes, she had h.id enough of it, and 
made off. Pursuit by the slow Russian ships was, of course, 
out of the question. They followed her as long as they could, 
but that cannot h.-ive amounted to much. 
So ended this first big-ship action of the war, and the first 
battle in wEich a "Dreadnought" has been engaged with 
battleships. 
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8 ; 9 i K) i II i C2 ! e t M 
IEVSTAFI.Q 
PLAN OF IKVSTAl'I TO SCALE (FEOM "FIGHTING SHIPS ")k 
See Key to shading ol Armour below. 
The first poi-nt that strikes one is the excellence of the 
Russian gunnery. At eight thousand yards a certain amount 
of initial missing is to be expected — it took the crack Gerra.nii 
gunneryship three salvos to pick up the range of our Cooii 
Rey to shading ofArmouv ' 
wm ixm wm?^ w^, Dumi ^ mm 
Jlinch ^ineh ^inch finch iinch 3tnch liinch 
The above Key is for reference to the Armour Plating of the 
two above Warships. 
JIopc in the battle of Chile. The Russian flagship, however, 
hit at once. 
The levstafi is believed to be fitted with that Pollen system 
of file control which the British Admiralty some time ago 
declined to adopt. If so, it is a remarkable testimonial to the 
■jstem. 
Too much should »ot be made of the bad shooting of the 
Gotten. We have to remember that the Russians got in th* 
fill-important first blow; also that they had the advantage of A 
ihip or ships in action which were not being fired at. 
The Gocbeii's eggs were all in one basket. This gave het 
an enormous advantage in the matter of concentrating fire 
on any particular ship, and had she not been hit first, we 
might have had an illuminating example of that. Even so, 
however, the un-hit ships were probably twice as valuable for 
hitting purposes as if they had been under fire. This battle 
has demonstrated tho dangers of " all the eggs in one basket." 
It by no means follows, however, that the next big-ship aetion 
will not lead to a contrary result. 
For tlie rest, I am greatly inclined to doubt whether the 
Goclen was really seriously hurt. The Russians claim to have 
put two of her turrets out of action ; but it may well be that 
these only jammed. The Russian guns could not penetrate 
the turrets at 8,000 yards under battle conditions, while it 
is known that, the hydraulic gear for working German turrets 
is of an unsatisfactory design. The Goeben probably sustained 
iheavy damages in her secondary battery amid- 
Jiips, and it is pos.sible that she found herself 
running grievously short of ammunition. But 
had she been hit really badly, she would not have 
been unable to get away as she did. " Incom- 
petence " is the only possible explanation of her 
defeat. By every theory of naval warfare, eh© 
should have won, and won easily. 
* * » ♦ 
Tho Russians have (or had) a system whereby 
officers were the integral portion of a big gun's 
creVr. Along these lines they once at least stag- 
gered Togo off Port Arthur by remarkably good 
(though Just ae unlucky) shooting at what were 
then considered impossible ranges. At 12,000 
yards the Ketvizan dropped two shells, one just 
ehort of the Fuji and one just over, at the first 
attempt. 
That was with tjie old Russian Navy — a very 
inTerior article to the new one. Several weeks 
ago I suggested in these notes that the Germans 
had hopelessly under-estimated the value of the 
new Russian Navy. 
THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY. 
On Monday, the ICth, the N.D.L. Berlin, armed liner, 
■was interned at Trondhjem, which she had reached on tlie pre- 
vious day — presumably from Bremerhaven. She is not a fast 
vessel, her nominal speed being but 18 knots. Still, had she 
got clear, she would probably have done a good deal of mis- 
chief before being run to earth. 
The nominal cause of internment was a machinery break- 
down — a possible, but none too probable, explanation. It is 
a good deal more likely that she found British cruisers in the 
way of her proposed activities. Incidentally, one may remark 
en the circumstance that she got so far as she did without 
being intercepted. Probably she was at large before the North 
Sea was made a closed area. 
The action of the Chilean Government, which has now dis- 
covered the accuracy of a statement made by the Times corre- 
spondent in that country — a statement to the effect that tho 
Paoifio corsairs were secretly using Chile as a base— will con- 
siderably curtail the operations of the Scharnhorst group.. 
^ 
SS3 
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