December 5, 1914. 
LAND AND WATER 
very small Russian forces left in that neighbour- 
hood — that is the small Russian segment III of the 
last plan — while in front of the Russian middle 
segment II should remain enough Germans to con- 
tain that also. This unexpected and rapid move- 
ment of the Germans along the railways parallel 
to the frontier may be compared to the use of 
cavalry against infantry in the old battles that 
w€re fought upon a restricted front of a few hun- 
dred yards. The Germans and Austrians were 
not more numerous than the Russians ; they were 
already less numerous, but having a superior 
mobility their mimbers were, as it were, doubled — 
they could come suddenly in force upon a weak 
part of the enemy's front before that weak part 
could be strengthened; and as the defensive can 
always hold up the offensive with numbers much 
inferior, they could depend upon the comparatively 
small numbers left opposite segment I to hold up 
that main Russian force while segment III of the 
Russians was being overwhelmed by the newly- 
arrived and perhaps unexpected German masses 
at X in the north. 
• If these newly-arrived and unexpected masses 
at X could destroy the hopelessly inferior Russian 
opponent at III, the main Russian force at I would 
no longer threaten Silesia (S) or Cracow, which 
is the key to Silesia. Russia would have enough 
to do to save herself, for Warsaw, the capital of 
Russian Poland, would be occupied, the Russian 
line of communication (3) would be destroyed, the 
same fate would shortly overwhelm the Russian 
line of communication (2), and (I) would be left iso- 
lated, with victorious enemies in its rear. 
Note at this point that the German un- 
expected and rapid concentration by railway in, 
and advance from, the north between the Vistula 
and the Warta Rivers, put the Russians into a 
situation which the Germans had indeed calculated 
beforehand, but which also, like all strategical 
situations, contained an indeterminate factor, that 
is, an element of luck, or at any rate of something 
not calculable. 
When the small Russian northern flanking 
force III found itself suddenly faced by an over- 
whelming German force (X), it was, as the Ger- 
mans well knew, dependent upon its own line of 
communications (3). The Germans also knew that 
the whole strength of the Russians, the simplicity 
of their plan, consisted in keeping quite separate 
these three lines of communication, leaving their 
three armies independent one of the other, and 
trusting to their perpetual power of reinforce- 
ment in aid of any one of the three armies should 
it be specially threatened. The German gamble 
lay in .staking everything upon the impossibility of 
the Third Russian Army III, small in numbers 
comparatively, being able to reinforce itself 
sufficiently quickly — in which case it would 
be overwhelmed; or, in the alternative, of its 
being compelled to call upon the Southern Rus- 
sian Army I, then threatening Silesia, to come to 
its aid — in which case there was an end to the Rus- 
sian attempt upon Silf^sia and upon Cracow. 
In other words, the Germans in striking sud- 
denly at X against the small Russian force III, 
hoped they would leave that smaller Ru.ssian force 
with the choice of three courses equally disa.strous 
to the Russian plan of campaign, and equally ad- 
vantageous to Germany: (1) They might call up 
reinforcements from the south from the First Rus- 
sian Army I, and by doing so relieve the pressure 
upon Cracow and upon Silesia. There was no 
railway for transporting the troops, the change 
of front would be laborious and only to be made 
with great loss of time, and if the Russians 
did do this the German unexpected attack fro^ 
the north would have had its full effect in saving 
Silesia. ■ (2) The Third Russian Army III might 
forgo aid from the south and might try to 
get up reinforcements from the east along its 
own line of communications, and depending upon 
its own depots. (3) In the worst case of all for 
the Russians the Russian Third Army III might 
bo refused aid from the south — ^that is, from the 
First Russian Army I — might not get up its re- 
inforcements in time even to hold the Germans, 
and might be overwhelmed; in which case the 
great German masses would advance straight on 
Warsaw. This would so imperil the whole Russian 
scheme that the main Russian force in front of 
Cracow at (1) would have to give up its attempt, 
and the Russian plan of campaign woald have 
failed. 
Upon the action between the Vistula and the 
Warta, then, depended everything that was to 
come. The Third Russian Army III was so weak 
that it was bound to give way at first before the 
newly-arrived and enormous German masses at X. 
The Russians at III were taken thus by surprise 
more than a fortnight ago. What should they do? 
Should they call up aid from I, thp great Russian 
masses in the south, or should they depend upon 
their own reinforcements along the line of com- 
munications (3)? And, if so, would those rein- 
forcements arrive in time ? 
The Russian commanders determined in the 
first place not to weaken that main soiithern force 
of theirs, threatening both Cracow and Silesia, and 
necessary in its numbers to effect any real decision 
in the Eastern campaign. They gave to their 
second body, II, the order and the task of prevent- 
ing a further advance of the German Armies op- 
posed to them. As to their third army. III, they 
gave the order to retire before the great masses of 
the enemy behind the line of the River Bzura and 
its marshes, there to await reinforcements, which 
could only proceed along their owti line of commu- 
nications (3), and which would yet, it was hoped, 
be sufficient to save the situation at last. 
In other words, the Russians determined to 
neglect this very serious menace of the newly-ar- 
rived German masses upon their north, to go on 
uninterruptedly in their plan of campaign in the 
south against Cracow and Silesia, and to leave the 
northern Russian Army III to save itself with its 
own resources. 
What followed is exceedingly interesting 
merely as a detail of military history, let alone ais 
the critical point in the present phase of a cam- 
paign which concerns all our own future and that 
of Europe, with which we are bound up. When 
the great advance began it came with, let us say, 
500,000 Germans against perhaps 200,000 Rus- 
sians or less, and struck them between the Rivers 
Warta and Vistula, not quite three weeks ago. 
The Russians retired towards the River Bzura, in 
the upper angle of which lies the large town of Lodz, 
and the middle course of which between the towns 
of Lowicz and Lenczyca is marshy, and, therefore, 
afl'ordsan excellent obstacle. The Russians perhaps 
intended under these circumstances, though neces- 
sarily losing heavily in the retreat (which the Ger- 
mans have dignified by the name of the Victory of 
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