December 5, 1914 
LAND AND WATER 
rough estimate cf losses in certain particular 
actions based upon the dead whom they have 
counted after an advance, or the probable loss of 
their enemies' oftensive where it has failed, and 
Kieasured against the losses of their defences in 
proportion. As for the bulk of the casualties, they 
must remain, entirely in the dark, so far as the 
French and Russian forces are concerned. But it 
so happens that they had some indication of the 
British casualties which was afforded them by a 
statement made in the House of Commons, admit- 
ting somewhat over 50,000 casualties up to a par- 
ticular date. It was undoubtedly upon this state- 
ment that the subsequent estimate was based. 
That estimate officially published in Germany, 
partly for foreign but mainly for German consump- 
tion, gave 90,000 British casualties, 750,000 
French casualties, and 1,100,000 Russian casual- 
ties. All these figures were exaggerated, but 
particularly those of the French and the Russians, 
and it is not difficult to judge by what method the 
figures were arrived at. 
The British casualties to a certain date were 
taken as from the first day of active hostilities, 
August 22, and according to this public admission 
in the House of Commons. A rule of three sum 
worked out on the basis of this public admission 
would give somewhat mider 90,000 men up to the 
actual day of the publication in Germany. As a 
fact, those figures were exaggerated, as I have 
said, because the heavy fighting was included in 
the first admitted number, and there came a long 
lidl between that moment and the moment at which 
the German official estimate was published. But 
still the German estimate was only out by some 10 
per cent, or so. The exaggeration for the French 
and Russians was very much greater, and evidently 
depended upon the same system, for there is the 
same coincidence between the English proportions 
and the date. A rule of three sum was apparently 
worked out. " If we risk putting down 90,000 for 
the English casualties up to such and such a date, 
then the EngUsh in the field nimabering about one- 
eighth of the French in the field, or at any rate in 
the fighting line, we may safely put down the 
French at over 700,000. We will make it a round 
number and call it 750,000." That number is 
widely wrong, but it can hardly have been arrived 
at in any other fashion. Precisely the same method 
gave the corresponding Russian figure, which is 
almost certainly equally exaggerated, of 1,100,000. 
Not the least wise of the things the French com- 
manders have ordered in this war, often against 
the desires and in spite of the grumbles of the poli- 
ticians, has been this strict and severe censorship, 
extending even to a silence upon the number of 
guns and prisoners captured and the absence of 
public casualty lists. 
THE MARCH UPON EGYPT. 
THE papers have printed during the last 
few days several hints, originating pre- 
sumably from alien sources, to the effect 
that an advance upon Egypt in force 
was intended and actually had begun. 
The figures quoted amount to the equivalent of two 
army corps. The commander-in-chief of the ex- 
pedition was mentioned by name, and the southern 
route which is safe from attack from the sea was 
particularly mentioned in connection with a piece 
cf news that is almost certainly false, to wit, that a 
light railway had already been laid through the 
first half of its 150 miles; as far, that is, as lh« 
Wells at El Nakl. 
Now, if such an attack matures, there are 
certain points about it which are clear from the 
beginning. In the first place, it is evident that no 
large force, certainly not so large a force as 80,000 
men, can cross the 150 miles of desert along the 
southern route witlrits single scanty water supply 
midway, unless it has ample artificial or mechani- 
cal provision of water. Sufficient petrol transport 
would give this ; a light railway by the time it was 
built would also give it, but no very large force 
cculd advance without some such aid by the 
southern route. The number of camels that would 
be required, for instance, for an expedition upon 
this scale, would be too great to make the use of 
them alone feasible. 
Along the northern route from El Arish ti 
Kantara, Avhich is thirtv miles shorter and a little 
better provided with water, there is the appre- 
ciable difficulty that the early part of the road is 
just commanded from the sea, and the greater 
difficulty that the supplies of water would not 
furnish any considerable force ; only mechanical 
transport could here again jDermit of a really large 
body advancing upon Eg>'pt. 
In other words, the expedition will hardiy 
take place until either light railways have been 
built and properly guarded, or, especially in the 
case of the southern route, until, if that were pos- 
sible, a sufficient petrol transport had been accu- 
mulated. It would be a tremendous business, 
because there is no really possible going for such 
vehicles until the plateau above Akaba is reached. 
Still, it is conceivable, with a sufficient sum of 
money, sufficient organisation, and sufficient time 
at the disposal of the enemy. 
But whatever happens the force which has 
crossed the desert, whether by the northern or the 
southern route, and dependent for its water supple 
on mechanical transport, will reach at the end of 
the journey a very formidable obstacle unknown to 
former invaders of Egypt in the shape of the Suez 
Canal, and, on the eastern side of the Canal from 
which the hostile force would approach, there is 
no sufficient supply of fresh water. In other words, 
the obstacle is one which would have to be carried 
fairly soon if it were to be carried at all. 
This being so, let us examine the nature of that 
obstacle. 
The Suez Canal is — 
(a) An obstacle which cannot be tinned. It 
stretches fi'om sea to sea. It must be ])ierced or 
the assault on it must confess defeat. 
(h) An obstacle formidable throughout its 
length and in parts — nearlya third — quite irapassaljle 
to an army. It is for two-thirds of its length an 
ohstacle equivalent to a broad river and deep, but 
an obstacle without any strong current through it 
to make difficult pontoon work. 
(c) An obstacle capable of dynamicaUy power- 
ful and hiijldy mobile defence^; for it will carry 
ships of war. These can carry guns of a power 
superior by far to anything the land forces can 
bring against them — that is potver. They can also 
move up and down the line as no such defences can 
on land. That is raohility. 
Such are tlie three main advantages of this 
obstacle for the defensive. But there are others. 
U* 
