LAND AND WATER 
December 5, 1914. 
councils. And tliat would imply increased daiujer to us 
from small raids along the lines suggested in previous notes. 
The seriousness of tlie possibility of these is underestimated 
by the nation, except along the East Coast, where alone 
people seem to jiave realised the chances of being personally 
involved. It is in this matter tiiat tlie danger is greatest — 
not in the damage likely to accrue, but from sudden and panic 
over-estimation of those damages. on the part of that great 
section of the British public which has still totally failed to 
realise that we are involved in the greatest war the world 
has- ever known. A thousand years or so ago our shores 
were continually raide<l by Saxons, and later by Danes, 
without any save those immediately concerned being any the 
wiser, and later on there were few towns on the Southern 
Coast which at one time or another were not raided by the 
French without any disturbance of the national equanimity. 
The news did not travel instantly like news travels to-day, 
nor was there existing any analogy to the non-military civilian 
population of to-<lay. 
The German military mind has undoubtedly contemplated 
invasion on a consideiable scale, which so long as we effectively 
command the seas is an impossible proposition. The German 
naval mind, on the other hand, contemplates small raids de- 
signed to do as much damage as possible, but chiefly designed 
for moral effect on football crowds and the like — i.e., to panic 
the civil population generally. 
The deliberate destruction by a Gennan submarine of 
two small steamers in the Channel is perhaps not so purpose- 
less as some have been inclined to imagine. It is clearly 
designed to have a moral effect, and the selection of small 
vessels would aid to that end as indicating an intention to do 
the last possible ounce of mischief. 
It need not, however, alarm us — it may, indeed, be a 
8»bject for congratulation. Torpedoes cannot be spared for 
indiscriminate destruction of anything except big game. One 
of the limitations of the submarine is that its torpedo supply 
is small. Gunfire must be resorted to, and that, of course, 
entails exposure on the surface. It also suggests things 
happening to hostile submarines from small fry with guns 
sent out to attract their attentions. 
On Thursday, November 26th, the British pre-Dread- 
nought battleship Bulwark suddenly blew up in Sheerness 
Harbour, the result being utter and immediate annihilation. 
The enemy, it is understood have already claimed this as a 
submarine success of theirs. While it is just possible that 
a torpedo penetrating the side and exploding in a magazine 
could have produced the result, it is wildly improbable that 
any hostile submarine could have penetrated Sheerness Har- 
bour without detection. It is infinitely more probable that 
th© Bulwark blew up on account of one of those mysterious 
internal accidents which in the past have puzzled all the 
experts. 
Be these things as they may, however, the main point is 
that the loss of the Bulwark has no material effect on the 
fighting value of the British Fleet, and terrible though the 
result was, it must be regarded as a side issue of the war. 
There is not a fragment of reasonable evidence that the 
enemy had any hand whatever hi the matter. 
Indeed, common sense should have dictated a telegram of 
sympathy, such as we would probably have sent to the Germans 
had they accidentally lost a ship in similar circumstances. 
The extravagant claim to have produced the result is merely 
likely to react on Germany. The days when material success 
was to be achieved by fairy tales passed away long ago. 
The biggest factor in the present war is undoubtedly 
psychology, but to be effective it must have a sound scientific 
ba.sis. The old nonsense of " the bogey men " is hopelessly 
obsolete. So obsolete, indeed, that if the Germans persist in 
their claim they will create a moral defeat for thcmsekes 
«ilt of the Bulwark disaster. 
THE BALTIC. 
The Baltic situation remains unchanged. The Germans 
by a series of minor operations off Libau are endeavouring to 
draw out the Russian Fleet. These endeavours have been 
unsuccessful, and two Germans— a cruiser of the Hertha class 
and tlie obsolete battleship Kaiser Wilhelm dtr Grosse—sire 
reported sunk, the latter by a mine. Neither vessel is any 
appreciable loss to the German Fleet, the Hertha being of 
about the status of our Hawke, and the Kaiser Wilhelm der 
Crosse ijuite inferior to any old battleship in either our Navy 
or tlio Russian Navy. However, the incidents may have 
some moral value well in excess of the material result, as 
helping to bring home to the Germans the disappointments 
of tliat attrition theory on which they rely. 
For the rest, somewhat undue attention has been drawn 
to the fact that the German bombardment of Libau merely 
resulted in the destruction of some of the civil population. 
We may have our own ideas as to the morality of such prcH 
ceedings; but since the Germans have their own views, to 
discuss matters of this sort is futile. I must yet once again 
reiterate that psychology ia the keynote of this pai'ticular 
war". 
There is an absolutely authenticated case of a German 
officer who, having ciit off both the hands of a Belgian male 
b.iby, four years old, then deliberately with the end of his 
cigar burned off its nose and lips ! We regard horrors of this 
sort as horrible wauton drunken atrocities ; but we probably 
err badly accordingly. This horror was no more wanton than 
the sudden destruction of harmless civilians at Libau — it was 
all part of a preconceived plan^a plan to terrorise the civilian 
population into demanding that their naval and military 
forces should surrender. It is a new idea in warfare — new 
at least for a thousand years, except where absolute savages 
have been concerned. But there is a certain effectiveness 
about it. In any case it exists, and we have to njeet it as 
best we can. 
The point we have to consider is whether sea coast dis- 
tricts and invaded countries can stand it or whether the 
horror of it all will drive the people into abject surrender. / 
Tho attempt to bombard Yarmouth chanced to be as unsuc- 
cessful as the bombiirdment of Libau was otherwise. But in 
both the German idea was obviously exactly one and the 
same. It is no more wanton destruction than was Louvain — 
all are, or appear to be, part of a definite scheme for Germain 
victory. 
It is outside the scope of these notes to consider the 
matter beyond the naval aspect of affairs. But I greatly doubt 
whether the second sea bombardment of Libau will advantage 
the German Navy any more than did that atrocity on a help- 
less Belgian baby assist the German military advance oa 
Calais. 
THE HIGH SEAS. 
So far as the High Seas are concerned the most important 
item to record is that the West Coast of America is in such a 
bad way for local trade that suggestions have been made to 
tlie President of the United States of America for a joint re- 
quest for a "neutral zone" in connection with tJie Amcrioan 
continent genci'ally. 
Now this mean.?, optimistic statements notwithstanding, 
that the German commerce war has damaged British Pacific 
trade, and any ostrich-like attempt to disguise it is foolish. 
Till Admiral von Spee is accounted for British prestige in the 
Pacitio is bound to suffer. 
It should not, however, be taken from this that Germany 
has scored a success. The action off Chile mentioned last 
week, the above-mentioned plea for a "neutral zone," both 
indicate witJi absolute clarity that the neutrals of these parts 
have been hit more than we have. From which it is clear 
that no matter how much at large German raiders may still 
be we h&ve in some way or other managed to prove to the 
South Americans the futility of helping Germany. 
When a few weeks ago in these Notes I diagnosed the 
destruction of Admiral Cradock's squadron as a, " moral defeat 
for Germany" I was subjected to a certain amount of caustio 
and hostile comment. Time, however, is proving the correct- 
ness of my assertion. ■ 
I lay claim to no prophetic insiglit into the matter; it 
was simply a matter of adding two and two together. 
So long as Cra<.lock's squadron was intact British trade! 
went on much as usual. Once it was destroyed by Von 
Spee British trade was heavily injured by being confined to 
harbours. * 
But since the Biitisfi Fleet elsewhere still remained 
Germany was quite incapaole of affording a substitute for th© 
British trade which she had checked. Consequently, th© 
Pacific coast of the American conti.oent found itself reduced 
from something to nothing, and neutrals were hit accordingly. 
The instant result was increased stringency on the part 
of Chile towards the German corsairs and their supplies. W'e 
may or may not flatter ourselves about pro-British sympathies 
— the main point is that however sym}>athies may go self- 
interest dictates a sort of passive war against Germany. 
Ci-ystallised into a phrase it is " England or nothing." 
The real work, of course, is done in the North Sea, where* 
our Fleet puts a stop on all German trade. But the spade 
work was done by Admiral Cradock. We do not know — we 
shall in all probability never know — whether ho deliberately 
and of set purpose sacrificed himself to attain a certain end — - 
but it is clear that that end has been achieved. 
All the evidence that we have is to the effect that ho 
entered into an action against impossible odds. Without 
any great stretch of imagination we may therefore credit him 
with having thought out tJiat if ho attacked Von Spee it was 
11* 
