December 5, 1914. 
LAND AND WATER 
& case of "beads I win, tails you lose" so far as ultimate 
result against Germany was coucemed. 
We havo the sequel at any rate. Cradock did not win, 
but the entire West Coast of South America has now a strong 
self-interest in cutting ofi supplies from German raiders. 
The British Navy lost two old cruisers, which went down game 
to the last. Germany lost no ships, but she has lost some- 
thing very much more important— easy neutral bases for her 
corsairs. And hence her moral defeat. 
This conclusion is not on© to be arrived at at the first 
reading. It takes thinking out. It nec-essitates a complete 
overthrow of tho popular yjea of Admiral Cradock as an 
admiral whose " heart was bigger than his head," a " foolishly 
brave man," eto. 
When, if ever, the exact history of the war comes to be 
written I think we shall find that Admiral Cradock in going 
to his death struck Germany & far heavier blow than most 
people yet wot of. Also that it was the only vay. Tlie 
more one works it out the more con^^nced one feels that 
Admiral Cradock did exactly the right thing for the general 
interests of the Empire. 
THE WAR BY AIR. 
BY FRED T. JANE. 
IT is impossible to overestimate the importance of the at- 
tack on Friedrichshaven, the headquarters of the 
Zeppelin works. Whetlier success was little or great 
does not matter very much — the delivery of the attack 
is "the thing that matters." 
By now the Germans must have oonolusively become 
aware that aerial warfare is a thing apart, just as sea warfare 
and land warfare have little in the way of a connecting link. 
.\s I have several times emphasised, the potential danger 
of a Zeppelin is absolutely enormous. She can carry big sup- 
plies of bombs and she can act at night or in twilight with 
comparatively little risk — facts wliicli the Germans appear to 
have assimilated very thoroughly. But the Koppclin has her 
heel of Achilles — her slied, and especially tlie sheds oeatre in 
whiili construction goes on. - . 
Ill the ordinary way this centre appears to have been 
Bominally efSciently protected by anti-aerial guns. Such pro- 
tection has, however, proved of siiiall avail against a small 
aeroplane attack. If increased, it has no more prospect of 
succfss against an attack also numerically increased. The 
whole idea of a central constructional base is therefore proved 
incorrect. Divide et tmpera has consequently taken on 
quite a new meaning. For aerial purposes safety in new con- 
struction lies only in widely scattered construction bases, and 
such cannot suddenly be improvised. 
I think that the lesson of Pi- ied rich shaven is that we may 
safely discount the Zeppelins during this war- Not impos- 
sibly one will get over London before we have done; not im- 
possibly a certain amount of damage will be created. Only 
occasionally also will a Zeppelin Ije brought down by land lire 
or even aeroplane attack. 
On the other hand, however, a Zeppelin is entirely depen- 
dent on her shed, and replacement of losses is even more depen- 
dent on a considerable area which offers a more than oonsider- 
al)le target. A few years hence these facts will be recognised^ 
and super-Zeppelins will be created and housed under con- 
ditions which may well defy all base-attaok from aeroplanes. 
But for this war — unless it lasts beyond the most pessi- 
mistic calculations — the 2k?ppelin does not seem to have the 
remotest chanoe of doing anything except ofcasionally. 
We have found the heel of Achilles. We know it. and tlie 
Germans know it also. And this is the exact moral asset of the 
attack delivered on Friedrich.shaven by Squadron-Commander 
Briggs of the R.N. Flying Corps. The R.N.F.C. has com- 
pletely altered the perspective of probabilities as previously 
viewed through German eyes. 
Squadron-Commander Hriggs is a wounded prisoner in 
Germany. But his FrieSrioh-shaven exploit has pricked the 
bubble of the threatened Zeppelin raid just as cffectivelv as 
Admiral Cradock, by going to his death off the coast of Chile, 
destroyed German domination of the Pacific. 
So far as aerial warf.are in this war is concerned, we need 
only think of ft further in terms of aeroplanes. And tltt-re 
is very fair reason to believe that we now hold the command of 
the air. 
FIELD ENTRENCHMENTS. 
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late RE.). 
I HAVE just found on one of the District Railway book- 
stalls ihe most excellent little handbook on entrench- 
ments (" Spadcwork for Riflemen " is its sub-title) 
that I have over had the luck to peruse. We owe it 
to the enterprise of Mr. John Murray, as publisher, 
to Mr. J. Solano, well known in connection with the 
miniature rifle ranges as editor, and last, but by no means 
least, to the anonymous author, an officer of the Royal Engi- 
neers, who has seen much service in South Africa, and also 
followed the campaign in Manchuria as one of the British 
military representatives. 
It is not marked " official," but it does, in fact, contain 
in condensed form the essence of the instructions in field 
works issued from Chatham corrected up to the very latest 
date, and I can most .sincerely recommend it to all the troops 
under training at the present moment. 
Nevertheless, looking at all the well-executed plans and 
ceciions in its pages, it appears to me that the practice of 
our forefathers, in the days when field entrenchments were 
part of the daily experience of aniiies for years,, was in many 
re.s{>ects in advance of our latest endeavours, and that as time 
goes on we shall have to go back in design to the principles 
which they then involved. 
In the days of Marlborough the contending armies, French 
and Allies, faced each otlier in parallel lines of field entrench- 
ments right across from the sea to the Rhine, a little north 
of Stras.sburg, at Weissenburg, and they licld this line, trace.s 
of which still exist, with forces which certainly never exceeded 
200,000 men. whereas we are both using about 2,000,000 
armed with the very best rifles and artillery in existence. 
In those days the musket could be loaded and fired about 
twice to tl-.ree times a minute, its extreme range was a bare 
1,000 yards, and its decisive range 200. Our rifles now can 
easily lire ten rounds in thirty .seconds with cxtrciiK' range of 
anywhere, about 4,000, and a decisive, i.e., point blank range 
of, .say, 600. A gre.Uer contrast could hardly be imagined, 
and yet we are employing more men to the mile than our 
ancestors ever dreamt of doing, and their losses when they 
did come to hard fighting were quite as high, and even higher, 
than any we liave as yet — on our side at least — had to endure. 
Ultimately the most celebrated of these entrenched positions — • 
called the Me plus ultra Lines — was forced by a .s«(l<k'n 
and most masterly concentration carried out by Marlborough 
with the British forces under his command. And it is curiouS 
to notice how history repeats itself, for this manoeuvre of his 
was identical in conception with that carried out by Sir John 
French the other day in his flank movement from the Aisne 
to the Lys River. 
Tlie difference which strikes one most in comparing the 
methods of the two periods lies in this, that our ancestors 
considered the nature of the man first and the weapon with 
its characteristics second. We seem tp turn the matter 
around, and consider the nature of the weapons first and the 
man only in second place. 
Now the nature, <ir power, of the wea]K>n, as used against' 
Us is not a fixed factor, but varies at different ranges and 
with different climatic conditions, etc. 
As long as during the first weeks of the present great 
struggle the superior siege artillery was all on the enemy'a 
side, the latter was free to choose his range to suit the 
hitting power of his own weapon, and for the time we have 
been exposed to the most crushing artillery power to which 
troops have ever been subjected in history, with the conse- 
quence that the consideration of cover against his projectiles 
has forced itself into the foremost place, and comfort, con- 
venience of attack cut of the trenches, and so forth have all 
had to retire into the background. 
Now, however, that the balance in siege artillery power 
has been redressed, we siiall see tlie enemy compelled to keep 
at the distance we dictate ; in other words, he will no longer 
be free to suit Ins own convenience in the choice of sites for 
his batteries, but will have to keep just 60 far out of our 
reach as will make it possible for liim to keep his guns from 
being silenced at once. This will entail a great increase of 
range and a corresponding diminution in his power of scoring 
direct hits on our trenches. 
15" 
