LAND AND WATER 
December 12, 1914.- 
After Duzy you come round to Krakus again 
bt a range of a little more than 3,000 yards. There 
are, therefore, six first-class works, or, if you 
count a double work near Rakowice or 
Rodowice as two, seven first-class works 
forming the ring of the fortress. But to 
these must be added two outer permanent 
works upon the north-east at no less than 10,000 
yards from the centre of the town. These 
are the two heights, 256 metres and 230 metres, 
specially fortified to dominate the main railway 
coming from Russia, which railway passes almost 
immediately between them. Such works so long as 
they could hold out would gravely hamper the sup- 
plies of a Russian Army invading from the north- 
east and dependent for its heavy artillery am- 
munition upon the only railway from that direc- 
tion. As a matter of fact, in this campaign, the 
invader is coming in quite as great strength along 
the south of the Vistula as along the north of it. 
But still these two fortified heights above the rail- 
way would give trouble until they were reduced, 
and would check the investment of the town. 
I have, in the course of the above notes upon 
the fortress, said that I would speak later of the 
most recent development of siege work in connec- 
tion with Cracow. It is of especial importance, 
because the perimeter is here so small, and, there- 
fore, the vulnerability of the fortress to attack with 
modern long-range weapons so high. This quite 
recent development of siege work which the Ger- 
mans have taught us since the fall of Liege, really 
deserves a passage to itself, and, with the reader's 
leave, I will speak of it by way of digression before 
returning to the positions at Cracow. 
THE IMPROVISED DEFENSIVE 
HEAVY BATTERY. 
In all siege work of the past — at least since 
detached forts came into being — besides the re- 
gular works round a town, the various develop- 
ments of the siege would necessitate the breaking 
of new ground and the setting up of temporary 
works here and there outside the original peri- 
meter and separate from the existing permanent 
forts. Very few of the great sieges of the latter 
nineteenth century failed to give examples of this, 
and at Plevna, if I am not mistaken, the work was 
almost entirely of that character. But the modern 
development of this idea, as the Germans have 
conceived it in the course of the present war (their 
first experiments of the kind were outside Metz, 
they are still being actively prosecuted in that 
region, a jid Verdun has followed suit on the French 
side) differ somewhat from this older and occa- 
sional necessity. The difference may be expressed by 
saying that whereas the improvised heavy battery 
of the past was an exception to and only a supple- 
ment to the permanent detached fort, the present 
improvised heavy batteries replace the permanent 
detached fort. 
The permanent detached fort could stand a 
lengthy siege of its own, and could support its 
neighbours against attack until the advent of the 
very heavy siege howitzer with its enormous pro- 
jectiles of high explosive power. And even so men 
doubted, until the present war, whether the ring 
fortress with its permanent fortifications could not 
stand out for months. But Lifege, Namur, Ant- 
werp, Maubeuge, and the isolated Manonvilliers 
on the French frontier of Lorraine, Camp des 
Ronaains above St. Mihiel, all showed that modern 
howitzer fire dominated permanent fortifications 
of that type. And even Troyon, south of Verdun, 
though it managed to hold out for five days, was 
only saved by the skin of its teeth, and, had the 
battle of the Marne not taken place, would surely 
have been reduced in another forty-eight hours. 
Courage and tenacity only save the modern 
permanent work by so many days, and those a 
few days. It is a fixed target, the range of which 
is known from every point from which the howitzer 
can conceal itself, while, with air reconnaissance, 
the accuracy of the howitzer fire may be corrected 
and determined by the enemy. There is not usually 
from the fort an opportunity of rising with an aero- 
plane in order to discover the position of the howit- 
zers bombarding it. Even where the fort could use 
aeroplanes its area is restricted. Even were it not 
restricted, and could proper air work be done from 
a fort, the circumference along which the enemy 
can choose his positions for concealed howitzers is 
immense compared to the small target of the fort, 
and will require lengthy and continuous searching 
day after day. Finally, the howitzer, even once 
placed, can be moved. It is, though a very heavy 
piece, mobile; whereas the armament of a fort is 
stationary, and the howitzer, therefore, even if it 
were possible to spot its place exactly from the 
fort, could shift its position perhaps before it v/ar, 
shelled by corresponding fire from the fort. On 
account of all this, and after the experience of their 
success before the fortresses of Belgium and 
Northern France, the Germans began a new 
method of defending their fortified places, and they 
have been particularly observed doing it in the. 
neighbourhood of Metz. They are digging wide 
trenches, presumably with light rails laid in them, 
or pejhaps with hardened bottoms to take the 
wheels of the mobile howitzer. These they dis- 
pose in wooded or rough country, where it is diffi- 
cult to discover position or distance. They estab- 
lish this outer ring of improvised temporary de- 
fences well outside the old ring of fortresses, and 
with such a system it may be possible enough to 
defy for a considerable length of time the effect of 
modern siege trains. 
Now,' how far has Cracow opportunities for 
this kind of thing ? 
It appears to have no opportunities for any- 
thing of the sort in the south. The works there 
are too close to the city, too suburban, and the 
ground not wooded or confused enough for any- 
thing of the kind. But the hills of which Koakiusco 
is the terminal fort, that is, the hills to the we^t 
of Cracow, do offer opportunities of the kind. The 
area showed in hatching on the sketch is heavy 
and fairly open land, with a certain amount of 
scrub and wood, and as it is much higher than 
anything around it, it might offer a prolonged re- 
sistance, preventing a complete investment or 
masking of the fortress. 
There are also opportunities to the north in 
the waste ground and woods there, but these are 
less formidable, because the ground rises continu- 
ally towards the Russian frontier, and every 
battery established in this region would be domi- 
nated by some point to the north of the enemy. 
Thus Witkowice dominates Rakowice and a point 
between Witkowice and the frontier is again 250 
feet above Witkowice, and so forth as one goes 
north. 
We know that the Russian advanced cavalry 
have already appeared in Wielicza, where the salt 
mines are, within a few miles to the south of the 
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