December 19, 1914. 
LAND AND WATER 
retreat, or rather the opportunities for free 
manoeuvre. A force is truly besieged when it has 
lost this opportunity for free manceuvi-e, although 
it may yet retain certain opportunities for free 
supply. 
Now, looked at in this light the " Siege of the 
Germanies " is imperfect to the extent in which 
supply can still reach the enemy ; and it is important 
for us to estimate the extent of this imperfection. 
It has already upon various occasions been 
attempted in these notes to estimate the German 
and Austro-Hungarian limits in numbers, and the 
question of their supply in food and in material, 
and we have arrived at a general conclusion that a 
scai-city in petrol was already felt, a great scarcity 
in indiarubber, some scarcity in the supply of 
horses ; while with regard to necessary metals we 
had to hold our judgment in reserve, and in regard 
to food to conclude that a sufficient supply was 
present. 
We are able now to supplement these estimates 
and to develop our conclusions somewhat further in 
the light of more recent news. 
The Germanic Allies have three broad sectors in 
the jjerimeter of siege work around them which are 
technically neutral, and through which supplies can 
in theory reach them. 
These three sectors are : — 
(1) First of all the very long line from the 
mouth of the Scheldt, all up the North Sea and the 
Baltic to that of the Niemen. 
(2) Next, the Swiss and Italian frontier, in- 
cluding the Adriatic coast of Austria-Hungary. 
(3) And, lastly, the frontier of Roumania, 
which is still a neutral state. 
Goods from beyond the ocean pass these three 
frontiers with difficulty, and the Roumanian frontier 
not at all ; for the Allied Fleets prevent the entry 
of any contraband through the Dardanelles into 
the Black Sea. 
It is also with difficulty that contraband goods 
can pass from the Atlantic into the northern sector, 
or through the Mediterranean into the southern 
one. Yet Germany and her Ally can still supple- 
ment their domestic supply to some extent 
from the neutral coxmtries within the maritime 
blockade. Thus some supply of metals is available 
from Scandinavia, some supply of petrol from 
Roumania, &c. The real way of gauging the extent 
of the distress to which this virtual state ot siege 
has reduced the enemy, is to discover first the 
scarcity in which he stands with regard to certain 
material elements absolutely required for the 
prosecution of a war, and secondly, the nature and 
the degree of necessity of those elements. 
Now, here we remark at the outset that 
Germany and her Ally are best off" in the primitive 
and most obvious necessities for the prosecution of 
a campaign, and must be more and more anxious 
for the remaining kinds of supply in proportion as 
these are modern and connected with the complexity 
and mechanical character of war to-day. Thus 
Germany and Austria are only slightly hampered in 
the matter of food, more in the matter of horses, 
miuch more in the matter of petrol, more still in the 
matter of indiarubber, most of all in the matter of 
certain metals which, until recently, were not 
necessities at all — metals now necessary for the 
manufacture of projectiles and for the hardening of 
steel in the manufacture of weapons. Of these the 
two chief examples are, perhaps, copper and 
antimony. 
It is well not to exaggerate the difficulties of 
an enemy, but to give him all the advantage we can 
in our estimates. AU we positively know with 
regard to the supply of petrol is that petrol used for 
purposes other than the war has been replaced in 
the civilian work of Berlin and in Vienna by other 
compounds, that Roumania has legally forbidden its 
export (with what practical effect we cannot test), and 
that the Galiclan field is now cut off by the fighting 
near Cracow. On the other hand, we know that for 
many purposes petrol can be replaced by a by- 
product of coal, and that the enemy laid in very 
large supplies indeed of petrol before the war, adding 
to these by considerable imports through neutral 
countries in the earlier part of the war, before the 
blockade in such goods was strictly (but tardily) 
established by the British Government. 
With regard to indiarubber, we know that the 
greatest care has been exercised to collect every 
worn piece and to save the use of this material, 
and we are fairly certain that the imports of rubber 
have all but ceased. We know that the material 
is perishable. We know that it is essential to all 
forma of rapid road conveyance, especially in the 
west. But we are by no means certain that the 
stock carefully husbanded for purposes of war alone 
will not last our enemies lor much more than 
another year. 
With the metals it is otherwise ; and here we 
have certain tests that can be applied, and that 
seem to tell more heavily in our favour. 
With regard to copper, for instance, we know 
that every particle of copper available to Germany 
-is already seized for the army. All the copper 
obtainable in Belgium has been looted, and, what is 
extremely significant, even the plates used for the 
printing of fane art work in Germany itself (what 
art !) have been requisitioned by the Government — 
as, for that matter, has the lead . used for the 
printing of music scores. But most significant of 
all, perhaps, is the evidence that Germany is 
attempting to obtain copper at prices nearly four 
times as great as those for which the metal sells 
in the open, uubesieged, markets of the world. 
With antimony, which is, I believe, a necessity 
for the renewal of armament, the evidence is even 
more striking. It would seem that secret efforts 
have been made to obtain this commodity at no 
less than £240 the ton, the price ruling in the open 
unbesieged market at the same moment being from 
one-fifth to one-sixth of such a sum. 
That the scarcity of copper is really being felt 
and of other necessary metals as well, particularly 
of what is required for hardening steel, is to some 
extent emphasised by a document which recently 
came into the possession of the French Government. 
This document consists in an order Avhich is 
being distributed to the enemy's artillery, an order 
quite recent and one which fell by accident into the 
hands of the French troops. It is an order insisting 
upon economy in the future use of ammunition for the' 
guns. Now this order is not given in the general 
terms which might be wisely applied to any artillery, 
however well supplied, for it contains two clauses 
which are exceptional and significant. The first is 
to the effect that economy is necessary Iccause the 
rale of expenditure has exceeded the rate of possible 
supply. The second will appear, I think, to the ex- 
pert, more significant stUi. It consists In a strict 
order to avoid" in future that method of fire which 
the French call "the watering-pot," or "watering." 
It is, if not an essential of quick-firing artillery, at 
U* 
