LAND AND WATER 
December 19, 1914. 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
BOTE.— TbU ArtleU h«« been ittbrnitted to the Pres. Bnrean, which doei not object to the publication ti ceiiored, uti takei nO 
reiponilbiUty for tbo cerrectncii of the itatementi. 
THE HIGH SEAS. 
AT 7.30 a.m. on December 8, Vice-Admiral Sturdce 
encountered Admiral von Spee witli the entire 
German China Squadron off the Falkla-nd 
Islaods. 
How Admiral Sturdee came to bo there at 
the psychological moment has not been dis- 
elo«ed. We only know that he met von Spee, and that he anni- 
hilated him with very small loss bo his own squadron. 
The inference is that von Spee had (one way and another) 
found the Pacific too hot for him, and that he was 
seeking to transfer his activities to the South Atlantic. This, 
wc may without exaggeration, put to the credit of the late 
Admiral Cradock along the lines suggested in these Notes a 
fortnight ago. There was " nothing doing" in the way of 
neutral bases for von Spee along the Western Coast of South 
A/nerica. Like a wise man, therefore, he shifted his vcime, 
probably calculating on finding the Argentines more pliable 
than tlie Chileans — the Argentines not having had personal 
eii?erience as to how (things being as they arc) a German 
victory was bound to tell chiefly on neutrals, simply because — 
as already emphasised— though the Germans could destroy 
British defenders of British trade, they were totally unable 
to .supply the necessary German traders in return. 
Certain critics have challenged this point of view. 1 
have no intention of dealing with such criticisms beyond point- 
ing out onoe more that if the Germans are unable to get their 
sea trade into workin,g order, no matter how many British 
cruisers they may sink, it is still no victory for them, since 
a victory must have results. The utmost achievement possible 
is to cause grave inconvenience to neutrals and to get them- 
selves regarded as a general nuisance by those neutrals. And 
that in substance is defeat. 
Failure to recognise this elementary fact has oonvei-ted 
every German material success on the Hi^h Seas iate a 
moral defeat. 
None the less, we may well be glad that von Spee and the 
Schamhorst group has been done for, since it immensely sim- 
plifies the " beggar my neighbour " game which the Germans 
have been playing. 
By now the German Naval Staff must have realised the 
futility of trusting to commerce warfare as an asset againet a 
superior Naval Power. They might have learned it from 
history, by just reflecting that altered conditions do not affect 
general principles: also that — nations being more interde- 
peodent now ih&n formerly- — to destroy the man with some- 
thing to sell must necessarily mostly inconvenience the neutral 
wanting to buy. 
Not improbably in the Napoleonic Wars the commerce 
attack theory was folly; but to-day it is absolute rank lunacy 1 
From this point of view Admiral Sturdee's victory is prob- 
ably of less value to us strategically than just at present we 
are disposed to imagine. 
In prestige and matters of that sort it is very valuable to 
us — but wo were in amy case in the position of crying " Heads 
1 win, tails you lose." 
In this matter the ineptitude of the German General Staff 
passes belief. Had von Spee sunk Sturdee as he sank Cradock 
— ^ho would have been no further on. He oould not have sub- 
stituted German trade for British trade — the North Sea 
Wockade sees to that. And a third British Squadron would 
presently hnvo attacked him. 
Ha was ablo to do a certain amount of damage to our 
trade ; but every shilling of it was two shillings off the neu- 
trals involved. 
The German idea ii fundamentally wrong. Since von 
Spec got caught far from the West Coast of South America we 
can put it to his credit that be was under no delusions as to 
fundamental facts, Wo may conclude that he did endeavour 
to do his best in impossible circumstances. His methods, too, 
woro clever, By using liis two big ships as a moving base, his 
.«;ranU raiding <n-uisers always had something to fall back on 
if chased— a now idea in the history of commcroo warfare. 
Tlila,^ liowever, may have been a General Staff idea wlicn the 
constitution of the German China Squadron was determined 
soma faw years (vgre. At th.it time the report was circulated 
tliftt botlj the RcharnharH and Uneiaenau were " failures," 
and that they had been sent nut of the way to the Far East 
for that reason. Reports and rumours of this kind are, how- 
ever, never very safe things to go by. 
Von Spee's squadron consisted of the Scharnhorat, Gnei- 
senau, Leipzig, Nurnberg, and Dresden. Of these all but the 
last were sunk in a battle, which, "with intervals," lasted 
" five hours " — the Scharnhorst being sunk three hours from 
the start, the Gneisenau following two hours later. This sug- 
gests a chase or else action at very long range indeed. For, 
the rest, like every action in this war, one side has been 
practically annihilated without any appreciable loss whatever 
to the other : a circum.stance which at first sight may seem 
to negative the leseons of the Russo-Japaneso War, except in 
80 far as Tsushima was concei'ned: 
MAP 10 llLUSTitATE PEE8UMED VEJJ UB OF THB SIUEDEE Y. VON SPEE FIGHT. 
In the Russo-Japanese War, however, the combatants 
were generally evenly matched : in tins conflict on© side or tho 
other has always had a decided preponderance of strength^ 
and every action has necessarily been a foregone conclusion. 
It is a realisation of this which has kept the German High Sea 
Fleet behind its shore defences — annihilation being the only 
reasonable sequel to emergence. If we did not know it before, 
we now know full well that, man for man, the German person- 
nel is fully equal to our own in spirit and in " no surrender '' 
ideals. We should, however, be careful as to what conclusions 
we draw,i when we remember the comparatively frequent sur- 
renders in the old days. It was practically impossible to sink 
the old wooden wanships' — thase used to strike their colours 
because a stage was reached in which further resistance was 
impossible. The modern warship stands to be sunk before 
that stage is arrived at. 
Exceptions have occurred, as when Nebogatoff surrendered 
after Tsushima because most of his guns were disabled, and 
there was no fight left in his crews; but it is rare that such 
©ircumstances will happen. Gunnery has greatly improved 
since those days. Consequently, should a surrender occur, it 
would be of incalculable moral advantage to the side receiving 
it. With conditions as they are, one ship captured would 
probably be worth three times that value in ships sunk 1 
We should, however, be very careful how we assume that 
the German General Staff will accept the proposition that com- 
merce warfare cannot be succoBsfullj' carried out. We have 
to remember two important points: — 
(1) The Berlin had no difficulty in getting out from the 
Bight of Heligoland. She was, it is true, driven into a Nor- 
wegian port by our cruisers, and compelled to intern. Tlie 
inference therefrom is that it is possible to get out, either via 
Heligoland or via the Kattegat. 
(2) Germany has available the following battle-cruisepe : 
Derflitiger, Molthe, Scydlit:, Von dcr Tann, and tho scmi- 
battle-cruiser, Blucher — very different propositions in every 
way to armed liners like the Berlin. 
I think we may take it that tlio exit of tlie Berlin was 
experimental. The exit of further armed liners, though not 
impossible, is improb.able. But tho sudden exit of one or 
more of the battle-cruisers is by no means equally improbable. 
These ships are very fast, and have nothing whatever to 
fear from anything except ships of their own kind. They are 
heavily protected — far more heavily protected than similar 
vessels in our fleet. In offence they are inferior, but when all 
H» 
