December 26, 1914, 
LAND AND WATER 
foriifledzcne 
iTWfUshl^RLes 
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that I am here erroneous in my conjecture and that 
the point of Lowicz is still retained, but I doubt it. 
For if it were that would mean that the Russians 
were here holding an exceedingly dangerous 
salient, as along the angle of dots on the sketch, 
and to hold such a salient under the heavy pres- 
sure of numerically superior enemies would be 
folly. 
It would be apparent, then, that in this 
region, as all along the Poli^ line, right to the 
south of the country 200 miles away, the retire- 
ment corresponds to a belt averaging ten miles in 
width, or, say, one day's march. It is still fed 
by the Vistula, that ample avenue for the carriage 
of munitions, and by the railway uniting Lowicz 
and Warsaw. It still defends the latter town at 
a distance of three days' march, and upon the 
flank of a German advance here, should the Rus-. 
sian line further retire, you have the great fortress 
of New Georgievsk. Warsaw is in no more danger 
and no less than it has been for a month past, but 
it is evident from the telegrams, both from what 
they say and what they leave out, that the Ger- 
mans are here making a very determined effort 
indeed. They have attempted a crossing on the 
Bzura at the point D, and their evident object is 
a direct advance upon Warsaw, roughly following 
the line of the railway. If they succeed they do 
something corresponding to what they will have 
done in the south if they can there push the Rus- 
sians off the railway. If they fail they have strate- 
gically done nothing except fend off their foe until 
such time as he receives further reinforcements 
and supply. 
THE WESTERN TRENCHES. 
In the West the news has been that charac- 
teristic of the last few weeks, quiet and steady 
progress, some few yards a day, with occasional 
advances of some hundreds of yards, to which 
monotonous, though not unpleasing talc, there is 
but one exception : the check received by a portion 
of the British contingent at Neuve Chapclle, 
though this is compensated by the corresponding 
advance of the Indians immediately to the south 
of that neighbourhood. 
I have already compared the work that is 
being done against the trenches in the West to 
the pressure a man may exercise upon some strong, 
but brittle, substance — such, for instance, as 
a rod of glass. The efforts he will make 
have a very slight, a hardly perceptible effect up 
to the breaking point. But when the breaking 
point comes, it comes suddenly and the result is 
final. To this metaphor I will add another, which 
I think helps to explain the so-called deadlock in 
Flanders. 
Suppose you had a hammer and the hammer 
was of such a nature that ij it struck its first blow 
unsuccessfully it would he shattered and useless for, 
any further work. And suppose that, while you. 
are applying pressure to your glass rod, a friend 
holding this hammer was ready to give the blow at 
the breaking point upon your signal. It is evident 
that a great deal would depend upon your choice 
of the moment for the use of the hammer. 
If you misjudged the strain you had put 
upon the glass rod, thinking it greater than 
it was, and if you, therefore, gave your friend 
the signal to strike with the hammer too soon, the 
rod would remain unbroken, and the hammer 
could never be used again. If you judged the 
moment just rightly, then, though your hands were 
not strong enough to break the glass rod, the ham- 
mer would come in with just sufficient force to 
achieve the result, adding its effect to the strain 
you had already put upon the resisting, but 
brittle, substance. 
Now, in this wearing down of resistance of 
enemy trenches, the hammer is the reserve. The 
whole point of a reserve is that you cannot have it 
and use it too. The risk of working with a great 
reserve (as Napoleon did in all his later battles), is 
that unless you judge the exact moment rightly in 
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