LAND AND WATEE 
December 26, 1914. 
that the moral of the Austro-Himgarian Army as 
a whole is weaker than it was in September : there 
is a great deal to show that it is stronger. 
When from these we turn to the attitude of the 
Government at Budapest and at Vienna, and of 
the higher command, we find ourselves in the pre- 
sence of a factor until the present moment insigni- 
ficant and continuing to be insignificant. Hun- 
garian civilian opinion, led by the chief Hungarian 
lieve; you must concern yourself only with what- 
he does believe — and that is what the civilian in 
Germany is believing to-day. 
The unanimity of the German Press is not 
artificial ; the very wording of the articles breathes 
sincerity and a sort of simplicity, which is not with- 
out pathos. Neither the French nor the Russians 
publish casualty lists. The enormous losses, 
therefore, of his own Armies, the German can set 
politician, may emphasise its independence, and against supposed still larger losses upon the part 
may sooner or later point towards a separate of the enemy. The very numerous prisoners in 
peace. But the armies are under the control of the hands of the Germans are made the most of for 
Berlin— and that is an end of it. A priori this the purpose of impressing the civilian population, 
must be so. There could be no chance of success Their camps are something of a show. They are 
unless all the movements of the two Allies — Ger- photographed in their daily tasks, and the photo- 
man and Austrian— were co-ordinated. It would graphs are circulated everywhere. The guns 
be madness to act otherwise. But, apart from taken in battle are paraded in the streets. The 
this obvious necessity, there are the known facts. French temper, and for the matter of that the Eng- 
The Austrian movement in Galicia has been one lish during this war, is in contradiction with such 
with the German movements in Central and methods. No prisoners taken by the British con- 
Northern Poland. The transport of troops from' tingent have been marched through the streets 
point to point is upon the German model, the Ger- of London. Our illustrated papers do not make 
man troops are in the centre and south-centre of the most of them for our civilian public. The 
the long line, interspersed, chessboard fashion, guns picked up during the German retreat over 
with Austrian troops. It is even true that in some the Marne are not to be seen parked for the amuse- 
cases German officers have replaced Austrian ment of the public in Paris or in London. In 
officers in Austrian units. On this third head, general, the tone of mind as bred in the Western 
therefore, the state of mind of the Austrian higher Allies by their past civilisation and tradition of 
command, any answer to our question must be re- government is opposed to any deliberate fostering 
f erred to the corresponding state of mind in the of illusion. 
higher commands of the German Armies, and xn 
that of the Government at Berlin. 
When we ask the same series of questions 
about the German Empire, the very first thing we 
In Germany under Prussia, the fostering of 
an illusion of strength in peace and of success in 
war is a deliberate part of policy and of tradition. 
Whether it is wise or unwise the event will show. 
shall note, if we are wise, is the profound oonvic- An illusion dissipated is a very dangerous thing 
tion held everywhere from East Prussia to the 
Rhine and from Hamburg to Silesia, that Ger- 
many will emerge victorious from this struggle. 
And by the word " victorious " is meant (in the 
mind of these civilians) the full objects for which 
the war was forced by Prussia. The average edu- 
cated man — let alone the mass of the population 
which takes its cue from above — would tell you 
to handle in individual as in national life. But 
Prussia believes in calculated illusion for the 
masses, and carries it out in detail. The resulting 
contrast between Germany and the Allies is strik- 
ing. 
For instance, hundreds of miles from the front 
and where all thought of the war's ever coming is 
negligible, in Toulouse as in Bristol, you will find 
soberly to-day in Frankfort or in Cologne — nay, a temperance legislation more gloomy and severe 
does tell those neutrals who are seeking informa- than would have been tolerated during peace. But 
tion upon this point, and who convoy it to us — ^that within a short motor-ride of the German Armies, 
Russia can no longer recover the offensive, that in Breslau or in Aix-la-Chapelle, you will find the 
France is already sick of war, that soon England amusements, the places of public resort for drink- 
will be the only objective of the German effort, and ing and the rest, crammed, and all that side of the 
that peace will be dictated in no very long space of national life at its fullest. 
time, not in ruthless terms, for that would be im- We must remember in this connection that 
possible, but in just such terms as the German civi- there came at the beginning of the war a good 
lian has ahvays conceived that it would be die- foundation upon which the Government could 
tated : a slight modification of frontiers to the ad- 
vantage of Germany, German and Austrian econo- 
mic preponderance over the Balkans and Con- 
stantinople, the maintenance of the present econo- 
mic superiority of Germany over France (which 
may, after this heavy blow, be left to what Ger- 
mans believe to be its own rapid process of decay). 
The only doubtful point is England ; and here that 
German civilian opinion of which I speak would 
tell you that with England as the sole enemy, Ger- 
many's remaining task would be quickly accom- 
plished. 
This point of view is in our ears— and still 
more in the ears of the French— so grotesque that 
it seems to belong to another world from the real 
world in which we live. But when you are talking 
of your enemy's 77ioral you cannot, at the risk of 
error, concern yourself with what he ought to be- 
build such a sentiment, and build it strong enough 
to last for months to come. It is a truth too often 
forgotten in this country, that the war opened for 
the Germans with three successes of varying mag- 
nitude, but all of them initial and striking the first 
note, each of them very great, and, in the eyes of 
the victors, overwhelming. These w^ere, first, the 
Battle of Metz, with its dramatic recapture of all 
Alsace-Lorraine, with its thousands of French 
prisoners : one of those sharp actions on a limited 
field which almost remind one of the old wars. 
Immediately following this came, second, the vast 
and overwhelmingly victorious advance upon 
Paris, with its unparalleled captures : Maubeuge 
going down in a few days, the whole of North- 
Eastern France strewn vnth wounded French and 
English prisoners, and the German avalanche 
sweeping . beneath it shattered and abandoned 
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