December 26, 1914. 
LAND AND WATER 
does it not, synoptically arranged, prove up to the 
hilt the existence of a succession of separate and 
in some measure self-contradictory plans? Is 
it not a continuous process of " I try this : I fail. 
I try that : I fail. I try the other : I fail. I say 
I will hold fast here in order to press on there. I 
do press on there, but I fail to hold fast here." 
One's conviction of this mental attitude 
tovv'ards the general position in the will of the 
German commanders is very much increased by a 
consideration of a niunber of subsidiary points : — 
(1) The official German communiques, for- 
merly so accurate, begin to contain deliberately 
exaggerated and foolish statements: that 15,000 
English have been drowned in the River Yser; 
that there have been no losses of men or of mate- 
rial in front of the River Niemen; that progress 
between La Bassee and Nieuport is " slow but 
sure "; and, lastly, that a vast decisive battle has 
been won in Poland. The said decisive battle 
being the advance, in a month's fighting, over a 
belt of about twenty miles, with no envelopment of 
the enemy, and with no maintained piercing of his 
line. 
(2) The German Fleet effects a couple of 
raids upon open English watering-places, with the 
object of killing a number of civilians. In the 
first, that upon Yarmouth, it misjudges its range. 
In the second, it murders somewhat over 100 civi- 
lians, including women and little children, to no 
military effect whatsoever. 
(3) The enemy first destroys certain monu- 
ments of art and certain treasures of antiquity, 
this in a so-called military policy; then, frightened 
at the criticism of neutfals, he apologises for the 
action in several self-contradictory official ac- 
counts. He then refrains from perpetrating simi- 
lar actions in similar places (the Germans could 
still perfectly well destroy Rheims Cathedral if 
they thought American opinion, for instance, 
would warm towards them), and yet idiotically 
begins the same game against Arras and against 
Ypres, destroying in those two towns things of 
irreplaoable beauty, utterly insignificant to his 
military success. 
(4) The enemy approaches the French Gov- 
ernment with secret terms of peace, ridiculously . 
insufficient (they include Metz and part tof Upper 
Alsace). He approaches the Servian Government 
with terms of peace, v/hich are also rejected. 
Then, at the height of his occupation of Servia, he 
approaches that Government for a second time, 
and his overtures are again rejected. 
'(5) He declares Swedish wood contraband of 
war, the said wood being of insignificant advan- 
tage to England, which has all the markets of the 
world at her disposal, and of none to France, v/hile 
wood is among the staples of Sweden, and Sweden 
the only country in Europe where popular opinion 
is more or less in favour of Germany. 
(6) Turkey is bought, under the impression 
that this action will lead to a great Mahommedan 
rising against the Allied Powers, also with the 
hope of being able to join hands with Turkey 
across Servia. Neither thing happens. 
The list might be indefiuitely extended. I 
have quoted only a few heads to which any of my 
readers can add at pleasure, for the indications 
of kind are increasing numerous as time proceeds. 
Now, I maintain that a disorder of this kind 
means a corresponding disorder in the great gene- 
ral plan of the German higher command, and that 
this disorder is due to the destruction of an ori- 
ginal plan, which has failed after being patiently 
elaborated for years, and which cannot be replaced 
by any other great general plan during the haste 
of war. 
That conclusion has nothing to do with tho 
excellence of particular designs. The march 
along the sea coast towards Calais was patently 
bad. The dispositions in Poland for the relief of 
Cracow are as patently good. But the conclusion 
I here reach has nothing to do with the goodness 
or badness of particular portions. It has to do 
with the whole scheme of the war. And that 
scheme has, upon the side of the German higher 
command, demonstrably fallen into disorder 
during the present phase of the campaign. 
Whether later one co-ordinated plan can be re- 
covered and pursued, only the future will show. 
Mr. Belloc's next lecture at Queen's Hall on the War will 
be on WednesJay, January 27th. 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
ROTE. — Tbl( ArtlcU bat been igbmitted t« tbt Preii Bireko, wbtch doet not object to tb* pnblicatioa ti eeoiored, oad takei no 
respoBiiblllty for tbe eorrectneii of tbe ttatcoentt. 
THE NORTH SEA. 
At 8 a.m. on Wednesday, December 16, three enemy 
ships were sighted o5 Hartlepool, and at 8.15 they commenced 
a bombardment, which was replied to by tho local fort. At 
8.50 the fii-ing ceased, and the enemy steamed away. " Some 
damage was done tp the town and the gasworks were set on 
fire." Some civilians were killed, and a very large number 
Tvounded. About 100 rounds were fired. 
At tho same time the enemy was off Scarborough, and 
fired about fifty rounds, which caused considerable damage. 
About seventeen non-combatants were killed and at least 
ninety-nine wounded. 
At Whitby, at about 9 o'clock, two battle cruisers 
appeared, and in a quarter of an hour fired some 200 shots, 
doing little damage to buildings, and tho casualties were 
two killed and six wounded. 
Taking the number of shells fired, the damage done was 
fioi very considerable^ nor the loss of life, though heavy, so 
great as might have been expected. This, however, was not 
the fault of the German cruisers. From the number of 
rounds fired it is evident that their intention was, except 
at Whitby (where all fire was directed at the signal station), 
to kill as many non-combatants as possible, and do the maxi- 
mum damage to' private property. 
In this there is nothing novel. It was done on the 
Algerian coast by the Goeben and Breslau, both of which 
ships also repeated the incident in the Black Sea. Twice 
at least it has been done in the Baltic. In each and every 
case the idea has been that naval advantage is to be secured 
by the wanton massacre of inoffensive civilians. 
With the moral aspect of this matter we need not here 
concern ourselves — a settled poHcj' is a settled policy, no 
matter how far it may contravene all the hitherto accepted 
rules of naval warfare. 
Let us, therefore, regard the matter from tiie strictly 
technical points of view, of which there are threo. 
u* 
