December 26, 1911 
LAND AND WATER 
On« way and another, therefore, if this matter of the East 
Coast Raid be ever brought before The Hague Convention, we 
shall probably be absolutely in the position of " No case " from 
the strictly technical and legal point of view. 
It does not lessen Germany's moral crime; indeed, it in- 
creases it, since at Whitby, where all fire was directed at the 
«ignal station, the legal obligations were strictly observed, 
while elsewhere they were strained to the utmost legal limit, 
for all that technically they were never exceeded. 
This is a most important point. We all know of the 
scoundrel who in civil life swindles unmercifully, but avoida 
all retribution because he had just kept "within the law." 
The German naval authorities would appear to have studied 
very carefully the careers of such folk and to have profited 
much by their study. 
This is a very serious matter. The Germans have driven 
the proverbial coach and four through the Hague Convention, 
and, charged by neutrals with the slaughter of harmless 
non-combatants, can technically prove themselves injured 
innocents I 
Along these lines I am afraid that they will ultimately 
succeed in terrorising our East Coast, and perhaps our coasts 
generally. Legally they can prove absolute justification. 
America may protest, as she has already protested, but it is 
a matter of " no case," This East Coast Raid may easily be 
described as the most devilishly clever move in the war. 
We can only meet it by " No quarter," and so put our- 
selves legally further in the wrong. 
Fortunately, the world to-day has established a general 
court of '-'Equity," and on ".Equity" German schemes are 
likely to " gang agley." But so far as "within the law " is 
concerned, we must recognise that we have no case against 
Germany for the East Coast Raid. 
We may now come to consider the nature of the German 
squadron, concerning which many vague speculations exist. 
I put it as probably : the battle-cruisers, Derflmger, Moltke, 
Seydliti, Von der Tann, Bluecher, and two of the small fast 
cruisers which still remain — probably Stralsund and Eostock. 
We know that the Berftinger was there, because she is the 
only one carrying 12-inoh guns, and 12-inch shells were found 
at Hartlepool. Elsewhere 11-inch shells were found. 
Most of the others are open to correction, because in fog 
a ship is liable to look much larger than she really is, but I 
am inclined to think that it was substantially as stated above, 
because only these ships have speed enough to crawl out of 
the Heligoland Bight at dusk and reach our shores in the 
early morning. 
In my last week's Notes (written two days before the 
Raid occurred) I gave reasons why we might expect to see some- 
thing of the German battle-cruisers before long. At the time 
of -writing it is somewhat uncertain whether all these big ships 
have returned to harbour. It is by ne means impossible that 
one or two of them have gone on to the Trade Routes — to carry 
out the function for which battle-cruisers were originally de- 
signed. 
An obviously futile Coast Raid would, of course, be the 
best possible cover for such procedure, as it would give the 
best chance of slipping through the British cordon. Against 
this, however, we must put the circumstance that the Germans 
have hitherto never adopted the " obviously best move." 
They have invariably sought advantage out of the second best — 
the idea, of course, being to utilise the factor of the " un- 
expected." 
So — as like as not — they have all gone back to shelter-^- 
presently to emerge again, and to attack the same old places, 
on the grounds that they will be " expected elsewhere." There 
are times when War and " Poker " seem to coalesce to a hor 
rible extent. 
ELSEWHERE. 
In other seas there is practically nothing to report at the 
time of going to press. Everywhere there prevails the " calm 
before the storm.." 
MODERN FIRE TACTICS. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR LECTURES TO THE NEW 
SERVICE BATTALIONS. 
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.). 
EVER since the musket took its place as the principal 
weapon on the field of battle, every battle or en- 
gagement has always resolved itself into an effort 
to gain time enough to cover the deployment of 
an army, in " order after deployment to strike an 
overwhelming blow against one's adversary," and 
dearly the fewer men necessary to gain this time, the more 
■would be available for the final stroke. 
Now, as both sides were striving for the same end, and 
neither could know precisely when the other would make the 
great effort, each had to provide this first covering force in 
sufHcient strength to resist all attempts to break through and 
spoil the plan, and what constituted sufficient strength could 
only be solved by experience of the value of one's own troops. 
In the days of the long service mercenary armies the 
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quality of the men was so nearly equal that all fixed the mini- 
mum necessary as the number which could deliver about eight 
bullets a minute for everjr yard of front. 
With the earlier muskets, which took about two minutes 
to load, they attained this end by forming their men in files, 
i.e., rows, sixteen deep, as on plan. 
The leading man, being loaded, took a pause to his front, 
fired, turned to his right, passed between the two files and 
turned about into his place at the rear, and began loading 
again. The next file stepped forward in his turn and counter- 
marched in the same manner, and in this way a rolling fire 
was kept up, which contemporary writers describe with much 
the same epithets to convey the impression of intensity that 
we still use. "The bulleta fell like rain," "like hail," and 
so forth, and in practice, unless guns could be brought into 
action against it, such a mass was almost unassailable until 
the adversary had established a definite fire superiority, which 
it took some time to effect. 
Then, step by step, improvements in the musket wer. 
made, and with each improvement, after experience, a reduo- 
tion in the number of ranks was made, till when at length 
Frederick the Great's Infantry with the iron cylindrical ram- 
rods and their faultless drill brought the rate of fire up to five 
rounds a minute, even the third rank practically disappeared 
in the field, though it was long maintained as a drill forma- 
tion, and we all came down to the two-deep line of the Penin- 
sula as sufficient to stop any rush anywhere and under all cir- 
cumstances. We were still at the eight rounds per minute per 
yard of the beginning. 
Even the coming of the muzzle-loading rifle made no essen- 
tial difference, because, in spite of its greatly increased accu- 
racy and range, it took longer to load, mainly because of the 
difficulty of adjusting the percussion cap on the nipple with 
shaking or numbed fingers, and also because portions of a long 
line must take their luck as they find it, and patches of 
broken ground here and there might deprive the men of all 
the advantage of a long range. But with the appearance of 
the breech-loader, presently improved up to the existing maga- 
zine pattern things began to move slightly, though we still 
kept the two-deep lino against the mad rushes of Ghazis and 
13« 
