December 26, 1914. 
LAND AND WATER 
THE MODERN MILITARY ZEPPELIN. 
UNSUITED FOR LAND FIGHTING, BUT VALUABLE 
FOR NAVAL WARFARE. 
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS, 
Lecturer in Aeronautical Engineering to The Polylechnic, London ; Special Lecturer at Ihe Universities of Sheffield, and of Bristol ; 
at the Manchester School of I'echrMiogy ; Th: Iloyal Military Academy, JFoohvich ; Examiner in Aeronautics for the Fellowship 
Examination of the Society of Engineers. 
IF tlie Zc-ppelin airship has not dared to venture near 
the AUhcs' fighting lines — apparently leaving to tuo 
aeroplane the Sovereignty of the Air — why is it tint 
the Admiralty deems it wise seriously to take into 
account the military possibilities of the German 
dirigible? On first consideration it might seem that 
there is some divergence of opinion between our military and 
naval authorities regarding the value of the Zeppelin aa a 
weapon of war. As a matter of fact, however, such is not 
the case. 
When, in one of his despatches, Sir John French referred 
to the -fiasco of the Zeppelin, ho expressed the opinion of a 
soldier especially concerned with land operations. The 
Admiralty, liowever, has to consider the new weapon of war, 
not with reference to its use in the field, but to its special 
bearing on naval warfare and from the sailor's point of view. 
An examination of the capabilities and equipment of the 
Zeppelin will make clear the fact that, though, in its present 
stage of developnient, it is unsuited for land warfare, yet it 
may prove a factor of great importance in naval operations. 
AIRCRAFT IN THE PRESENT WAR. 
When the war broke out the diilerent Governments were 
only in the initial stages of the study of the best application 
of aircraft to conditions of modern warfare. That study was, 
for the most part, of a theoretical nature only. It is true 
that the value of aircraft had been tested at various army 
manoeuvres; but their real worth, under actual war condi- 
tions, was mere conjecture, especially as regards the relative 
fighting value of the two classes of aircraft, and also as re- 
gards the behaviour of pilots and machines in the face of in- 
fantry and special artillery fire from the earth. 
We now know that it is the aeroplane which has proved 
the more valuable in the various military operations since 
the commencement of hostilities. With very few exceptions, 
tJl the aerial work, that has been done at the front, has been 
performed by the aeroplane. And it would seem from the 
various official reports, that have been published, that the 
Zeppelin airship could, almost entirely, be left out of account 
in the war at present being carried on on the Continent. 
In order to appreciate exactly the failure of the Zeppelin 
to influence, to any degree, events now taking place in Flan- 
ders, in France, or in Poland, it is necessary to understand 
the causes of that failure. 
WHY THE ZEPPELIN IS NOT USED FOR 
LAND OPERATIONS. 
In the tabulated form given below the qualities of the 
aeroplane and of the airship are analysed in the light of 
recent experience. 
THB'AEROPtANS. 
1. Can be used for strategical 
and tactical reconnaissance. 
2. Cannot remain stationary 
over k givea point. 
3. Must return to give result 
of observations ? 
4. Cannot be bit easily from the 
ground. 
6. Cannot be used easily at 
night. 
6. Can carry only a tmall supply 
of projectiles and explo- 
sives. 
7. Can cany one or two obser- 
vers only. 
Trk Aibship. 
1. ifay he used for strategical 
and tactical reconnaissance. 
2. Can remain, stationary over a 
given point. 
3. Need not return, but on 
send result of observations 
by wireless to a distance of 
about 150 miles. 
4. Can be hit ea«ily from the 
ground, unless at a very 
grea/t altitude. 
5. Can be used at night. 
6. Can carry a large supply of 
projectilee and explosives. 
7. Can carry severai observers. 
It will be observed that in the preceding table it is raid 
that the aeroplane can, but that the airship may, be used for 
strategical and tactical roconnaissanoe. It is of interest to 
ascertain why, in spite of its potential military qualities, the 
Zeppelin has not, to any extent, been tiacd by the German 
armies for reconnaissance in the field. The reason is not far 
to seek. TJie Germans know that the Allies, as well as thcm- 
seJvo.s, are well provided witli high-angle, anti-airoraft guns, 
ffrhioh have a range of from 5,000 to 6,000 feet. 
But, it may be objected, the modern Zeppelin can travel 
at an altitude of 7,000 foet, that is beyond the i*ange of thoso 
guns. Here an explanation is necessary. 
It is true that the Zeppelin can travel at an altitude of 
7,000 feet for several hours. Such a performance, however, 
can only be aceomplished with a limited crew, and a limited 
supply of fuel, projectiles, and ammunition. Under these 
conditions, a Zeppelin would hardly bo better fitted than an 
aeroplane for i-econnaissance work, and the German authori- 
ties, recognising this fact, do not employ a large costly airship 
to perform a work which can be done just as well by the smaU, 
dieap, and more wieldy aeroplane. 
ACTIVITY IN THE ZEPPELIN 
WORKSHOPS. 
And yet the greatest activity continues to prevail in the 
Zeppelin workshops. It has been reported that, since tha 
beginning of the war, Zeppelins are being constructed at the 
rate of one every three weeks. Those who are aware of the 
difficulties of producing an airship such as the Zeppelin, 
which, for its construction, has to depend on a number of 
different, and quite separate, industries, will find it almost 
impossible to accept that rate of construction. As a matter 
of fact, it would seem that no reliable motors could be built Lii 
the space of three weeks, since the construction of an aerial 
internal-combustion engine demands a large amount of fitting, 
which has to be done very carefully, and which cannot be 
rushed. Again, the large propellers, which are built up ia 
layers of wood glued together, require very accurate and 
attentive work, and can hardly be finished in much under 
three weeks. 
The report of the construction of Zeppelins at the rate of 
one every three weeks seems to have originated in an article 
published in the French newspaper, Le Journal, of Novem- 
ber 5. In that article it is said that the Zeppelin numl>ercd 
Z 26 left the workshops between August 10 and 15, and that 
those numbered Z 27, Z 28, and Z 29 were completed on Sep- 
tember 3, September 24, and October 15 respectively. Even 
if those dates are correct, it cannot ba said that a Zeppelin 
can be built in twenty-one days, as, in the construction of the 
airships alluded to in the article, it is very likely that parts 
were used which, at the beginning of hostilities, were already 
made and in stock. But complete Zeppelins, even if they are 
made in quantities, can hardly be constructed and tested in 
much less than four months. 
There seems to be no doubt, however, concerning the graat 
and continuous activity in the Zeppelin workshops. The 
Germans, therefore, have some idea that their Zeppelins, even 
after they proved unsuitable for land operations, can render 
them service in the future. And that service will in all prob- 
ability be connected with naval operations. 
VALUE OF ZEPPELINS FOR NAVAL 
WARFARE. 
It is known that fleets at sea are handicapped by the fact 
that their means of getting exact information about the enemy 
are limited, and that they lack rapid scouting cruisers capable 
of operating irrespective of weather. 
Now, what means of naval reconnaissance better than the 
airship is at present available] A scouting cruiser can 
hardly exceed thirty knots, about thirty-five miles an hour, 
whilst a modern Zeppelin can travel at fifty-five miles per 
hour. Apart from its great superiority in speed, the value 
of the airship is still greater than that of the sea-scout once 
the enemy's ships have been located. It is then only necessary 
for the airship to follow them from a distance and, by means 
of wireless telegraphy, to communicate their movements to the 
Commander operating a.gainst them. It is not an easy matter 
for sea scouts to observe, even in the day time, the enemy's 
movements at sea. At night, naval manoeuvres, as well as 
actual operations, have proved that it is possible for pursued 
ships to escape in spite of a strict application of the usual 
naval methods of surveillance. Ob the other hand, a Zeppe- 
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