LAND AND WATER 
January 2, 1915. 
of tie other ways. He failed to poini out that it was " other 
ioays or nothing." 
We do not know how far von Tirpitz ib his disciple. Xi 
ho be a true disciple he will sit tight in the Kiel Canal. But 
the indications are rather that he will not do so. Apart from 
all naval questions, German puhlic opinion may — if it ha« not 
already — demand action of bomo kind. 
Also, from what wo do know of von Tirpitz, he is "a 
man with a head on his shoulders." Given a free hand ho is 
Tcry unlikely to overlook the cardinal error made by Mahan 
and others who, while conclusively proving the necessary in- 
gredieniis for victory, have ignored the "most mischief " ques- 
tion where victory is impossible — which is the crux of the 
entire situation. German action in the future, therefore, de- 
pends somewhat on how far von Tirpitz has a free hand and 
on how far ho may be hampered by theorists. But, should he 
have any free hand, I think we may take ii' as certain that 
the German battle cruisers will presently be on our trade 
routes. In which case we shall be faced with a second and 
altogether different and more difficult war situation to any 
■which has hitherto obi'ained. 
Of late the German Press' have been overfull of a scheme 
propounded by von Tirpitz, the essence of which is to destroy 
British commerce by submarine attack. It is not an original 
«cheme, since it is all to be found in a pre-war story of Conan 
Doyle's, which appeared in the Strand Magazine and in 
America in Collier's Weekly, where it was luridly illustrated 
by Henry Reuterdahl. 
The attempt may be made as a last forlorn hope; but its 
success would depend on at least two factors which Germany 
does not possess. These are (1) ability to arrive at and remain 
at a strategical poini' without British interference, and (2) 
the problem of how to deal with a powerful neutral like the 
U.S.A., finding that inofiensive American civilians had been 
treated to a nautical Louvain. 
It may, of course, be argued that in a war of this kind 
an esi'ra enemy or two would not matter, but seeing the 
desperate game that Germany has played for American sym- 
pathy one can hardly imagine her as inviting active 
American hostility. 
Personally, I think ihat the whole thing can be put down 
to Wufi, pure and simple. German fubmarinea are very un- 
bkely to hamper our trade in any way whatever. 
They have talked of their submarines just as they have 
talked of their Zeppelins. About their battle cruisers they 
have preserved a complete silence. And on this account I 
characterise them as the danger point. 
On Christmas Day the first real fighxl of the " new war- 
fare " took place. Cuxhaven was attacked by British sea- 
planes, supported by cruisers and submarines, and defended 
by Zeppelins, seaplanes, and submarines. 
Cuxhaven, of course, is Germany's latest and best naval 
and aerial base; and it has been made as impregnable as any 
such place can be made. The moral effect of any attack on 
it must, iherefore, have been tremendous; the more so as for 
the last two or three months the Germans have employed all 
their ingenuity in attempts on Portsmouth— failing in every 
effort — whereas at Cuxhaven we " goi' there" at the first 
attempt. 
Between the British and German official reports there is 
a considerable discrepancy. It is puerile to suppose that 
either report is deliberately false. We must, therefore, take 
it that the truth lies somewhere midway. All we claim is no 
loss and some damage; the Germans claim something of the 
same kind reversed. 
THE HIGH SEAS. 
Details of the Falkland Islands battle have now com© in, 
and they reveal strategy of a high order on the part of Admiral 
Sturdee. Admiral Sturdee was, of course, in greatly superior 
force, the respective squadrons being something like four to 
one in fighting value on paper. 
There were, however, certain modifying circumstances 
which might easily have very profoundly aSected results. 
When the enemy appeared, the two battle cruisers were 
coaling and, therefore, unavailable for immediate action. 
Theoretically, of course, they should not have been coaling 
simultaneously; but it appears that both had almost abso- 
lutely empty bunkers, and either of them uncoaled would have 
been useless as a fighting unit. To coal together was, there- 
fore, a bit of mere plain common sense, especially as there was 
no particular reason to expect ihe enemy to appear at the 
time and place that he did appear. 
Next, the Canopus, on account of her slow speed, had no 
fighting value against the enemy; they had merely to keep out 
of her way, and hammer the weakly-armed County class 
cruisers. 
It is clear, therefore, that Admiral Sturdee's position was 
fine in which a mess of things could easily have been made — 
for any inkling that battle cruisers were about would hav* 
coincided with a vanished von Spee. 
The battle which ensued was, of course, on " slaughter 
house" lines, but the strategy whicli preceded it was for that, 
very reason of a high "big game shooting" order. 
The appended diagram is not, of course, in any way- 
representative of the tactics employed, but it will, I think, 
indicate the problem better than a lengthy verbal description. 
(bO 
^- — y 
@ 
© 
® 
DIAGEAM TO lU.USTKATE THE .STRATEGICAL PROBLEM OF TUB 
FALKLAND ISLES BATTLE AS EXPLAINED IN THE TEXT. 
G represents von Spee, B 1 the British battle cruisers,. 
B 2 other British cruisers, B 3 the Canopus. A point in front 
of and equidistant between B 3 and B 2 is where G was lured 
to before he discovered the trap. In the form of a diagram 
witTi sizes to indicate approximate fighting values, it looks 
simple enough; but sea warfare is a more complicated matter 
than diagrams. 
For example, von Spee had experienced oS Chile how 
Cradock, though in hopelessly inferior force, did not hesitate 
to attack him. If, therefore, our lesser cruisers at B 2 did 
a bolt for it he would have suspected a trap of some sort. On 
the other hand, did they attack him they would have been 
annihilated with difficulty. 
Wo now begin to see how tricky the problem was. 
So far as 1 can read matters everything centred on iho- 
Canopus; and there must have been some very pretty manoeu- 
vring on both sides. 
Be that as it may, von Spee was "contained" until 
the two batile cruisers rushed out to annihilate him. Then, 
of course, he realised the facts of the case. He turned and 
fled, while his lesser cruisers scattered. The sequel was a. 
foregone conclusion, which does not require discussion, except 
in so far as we may credit the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on 
the magnificent fight that they put up against absolutely over- 
whelming odds. They might easily have surrendered without 
any dishonour; but they went down fighting, and to that 
extent obtained some moral success and spoiled Sturdee's vic- 
I'ory acoordiligly, since a surrender would have been of in- 
finite psychological value to us. 
Against this we can set that the Leipzig did actually 
hoist the white flag (probably the ward room table cloth). 
When approached by our Glasgow she fired a shell into her; 
but since only one shell was fired we may put' this down to 
the perfervid zeal of some " no surrender " German. The 
Glasgow, of course, re-opened fire, and the Leipzig \vent 
under. 
It is a matter of regret that this should have occurred ; 
the ship would have been so infinitely more valuable to us as 
a prize of war. However, since the Glasgow had no means of 
knowing that the "white flag trick" was not being played 
on her, she had no option but to re-open fire, as she did. We 
can only put the matter in the chapter of ill-luck. 
For the rest, " Thank God, we have the ships " seems to 
be the sanest altitude to adopt. Man for man, I greatly doubt 
whether we can put up anything against the enemy in the- 
matter of brute courage. But it gives us one more indication 
of how accurately the late Admiral Cradock judged ih© situa- 
tion when he went to his death and the disabled Monmouth 
hoisted no white flag, but sank helplessly. 
Physical victory is at present a matter of who has most!' 
ships to lose. On that score wo can rest content. Moral 
victory is another affair altogether. Wlio dies best can count 
for much. Thai' white flag from the Leipzig — for all that some 
unknown German sailor heavily discounted it by subsequently 
firing a shell — is probably our very best asset out of the Sturdee 
victory. 
Till it be proved, there is no sucli thing as a fact in naval 
warfare conducted on modern lines. Wlien the shouting is 
over, and the headlines are over, and when all things aro 
reduced to a bedrock of fact, I think that we shall find that 
that white flag from the Leipzig was our best asset in th^ 
Battle of the Falklands. 
14* 
