'Januarj^ 2, 1915. 
IL AND AND WAT EH 
THE ADVANTAGES OF CONVERGENT 
FIRE. 
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, G.B. (late R.E.). 
f 
IN my lasi' article I hliowed the cumulative influence that 
individual courage and coolness exercises on the battle- 
field, by enabling a smaller number of men to do the 
necessary amount of work, thus diminishing the losses 
and economising the vital forces of tho whole nation. 
This' week I propose I'o explain how for equal numbers 
of men greater results can be obtained from their collective 
fire power by grouping them suitably against the enemy. 
Clearly if, say, one man to the pace can hold his own front 
against, gay, five-fold odds, because he comes of a well-bred 
fighting stock and has been suitably trained, 10,000 such men 
«an safely hold a from' of 10,000 yards against, say, 20,000 
men of inferior race on, say, a 5,000 front, provided they 
«an see either directly or by means of observation posts or 
aeroplanes what the enemy is doing and wliether he is trying 
to m.^ss superior numbers against any part of their ])osition 
lor a surprise attack, and ihen they can employ the balance 
of their numbers by establishing an overlap on either or both 
flanks. 
The advantage thus gained can best be understood by 
taking the case of a small force completely encircled — or 
rounded up — a position into which want of mobility or local 
conditions of camping grounds has often driven us, in tho 
first case in the Boer war, and in the second in frontier ex- 
peditions' in the mountain passes and districts in India, where, 
very fortunately, we were not the worse fighting race of the 
two considered as individuals. 
Here, for instance, is the typical case of a British brigade 
■with transport, say 5,000 men, compelled to camp in a circle 
not exceeding 500 yards in radius — rather a close fit — when 
camek and other baggage animals, stores, etc., have to bo 
provided for. 
It will be seen that it the exi'reme range of the rifle be 
taken as 2,500 yards, then every bullet fired from the invest- 
ing arc A-B-C, even if it misses' liie particular head at which 
it was aimed, has got to come to ground somewhere within 
the inner circle and is pretty sure to strike a baggage camel 
or somebody before doing so. 
But a defender's bullet aimed at a man on the inverting 
Kne A-B-C, if it misses him will find very little to hit in tho 
1,000 yard belt beyond him, and is practically a round wasted. 
1 rememljer some years ago working out in detail a case 
■of this sort wliich had happened during the Tirah campaign, 
after which many things were said about our bad shooting and 
the apparent deterioration of our troops as compared with 
thoir predecessors of some fifty years earlier date, from the re- 
sult of which it appeared tliat every Afghan sniping into tho 
brown of our camps had a twenty-fold Ix-tter chance of hitting 
sonic-lliing vulnerable tlian one of our men shooting outwards, 
•whereas with the old musket, range only 1,000 yards, his ad- 
vantage had only been as about three to one — ^a fact quit© 
suflicient to account for the trouble the modern hillmen with 
their Martini-Henrys had been causing us. 
The same question cropped up again in South Africa, 
where the Boers, thanks to the mobility conferred upon them 
by their ponies, always managed I'o " round up " our slower- 
moving infantry, and ihus derived an initial advantage in 
probability of hitting someone, according to the degree of 
overlap tliey established, whether complete or partial. It was 
not ihe fact tliat they v.ere better marksmen than our men— 
for except with a tew of the older men this was seldom the case 
— but it was because their superior mobility gave them the ad- 
vantage of position that our " regrettable incidents " were so 
frequently reported. 
Of course, a line can only have two ends to it, so in the 
g.igantio fronts of the present war this advantage can rarely 
appear in this extreme form, but it can still be used locally, 
especially by artillery, for directing a converging fire on cer- 
tain points which it is desired to storm; and ihis advantage 
belongs entirely on each occasion to the side which has made 
up its mind to attack first, and this explains why the 
Germans are still trying from time to time to assault certain 
portions, of our lines. This is the only forjn remaining to 
them by whicli they can still derive advantage from the initi'a- 
tive, for in every other direction they are completely held by 
us. 
Now, if we combine tLe advani'ages which have accrued to 
us, thanks to our better shooting and superior coolness, as I 
explained in my last article, with these to which I have just 
called attention, we can realise better how far we have gone 
towards establishing a complete superiority over our enemy. 
I think we may fairly assume that the troops we fought 
in tho retreat from Mons and on the Aisne and Matne were 
at least twice as good as the partly-trained masses, all thai' 
are now left to oppose us; whereas ours can be relied 
on in allotting tasks to them fully twice as much as at first* 
i.e., we are certain of them now, whereas no staff in the 
world could have counted on any men for such brilliant fight- 
ing qualities before they had been suflSoiently tested. 
We can, therefore, trust longer fronts to fewer men, 
keeping thus greater reserves in hand for the final decision; 
and as Mr. Hilair© Belloo has so well pointed oui' in tis last 
contribution to these columns, reserves are the hammer to drive 
the ultimate issue home, and thanks to tho staunchness of the 
first line troops ihey can be kept out of danger until titej 
are actually wanted. The enemy must place more rifles in 
his first line and support them with fresh troops and reserves, 
all very much closer at hand, so that they are swept by tho 
"overs" meant for ihe first line the whole time the engage- 
ment lasts. And from the moment he breaks cover for an 
assault he now draws a convergent fire from every gun within 
range, for local conditions completely prohibit his attacking 
on a broad front of a couple of miles', as in the earlier days 
of the war, which is the only way tlo minimise tlie effect of such 
convergence. 
It is impossible, of course, to give absolute figures in a 
comparison of this nature, but trying it every way in my 
mind I do not think I overestimate our present advantage in 
putting it as high as four to one, i.e., setting aside the extra 
exposure inherent in every attadt. I believe the Germans are 
losing four times as many men in each as.^ault they are now 
making as previous experience led them to anticipate, or as 
we sfiould suffer in attacking them under similar conditions. 
But whereas we are now accumulating or about to ac- 
cumulate fresh troops of excellent quality by the hundred 
thousand, they have now been compelled to call out men of 
an age and general physical inferiority that no one had ever 
dreamed of sending into the field at all, and aro so markedly 
short of artillery projectiles that they hare had to prohibit tiio 
only use of artillery fire which gives a certain guarantee of 
adequate preparation for their assaults. 
The 1915 edition of " Debrott's Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage, 
and Companionage," published by Dean and Son, Ltd., at 31s. 6d,. 
TcHects on almost every page, the effect of the war, for hundreds of 
both titled and untitled names familiar in "Debroti's" have appeared 
in the casivalty lists, wliile thousands of Naval and MiliUry appoint 
ments and pi-omolions have been dealt with. The volume contains 
the names of all officers announced on December 2 as appointed D.S.O, 
