LAND AND WATER 
January 9, 1915, 
the French to the low heights on the Rethel road), 
it comes suddenly down south, and even bends a 
little to the west again round the hill of Nogent. 
Indeed, it is the continued occupation of this 
height by the German guns which allows the shell- 
ing of Reims to be continued occasionally, and 
which also supports the outward thrust here of 
the German trenches. The French have not suc- 
ceeded in retaking that height. Now, it is just 
where this bend or forward thrust of the German 
trenches takes place that the French lost their 
advanced trenches by the explosion of an enemy 
mine, and the German thrust was brought for- 
ward, as at A, from the dotted line to the thick 
line. 
In the same way and over a greater extent of 
ground in much the same days, the French line 
was advanced, as at B, in the region of Perthes. 
Many other minor flexions of this line took 
place in the same period. Thus, in front of the 
Wood of Forges on the Meuse, in front of Verdun, 
at C, there was an attempt of the enemy to thrust 
forward which was broken back: while in the 
Wood of Grurie, at D, they seem to have made a 
few yards. But A and B, the movements at Sil- 
lery and in front of Perthes, are the most impor- 
tant. 
Now, why are comparatively small movements 
of this kind of importance? The general import- 
ance of perpetually keeping the enemy moving and 
occupying as many of his men as possible v/e have 
seen. But what particular importance is there in 
small special advantages of this kind? If they 
cannot be followed up, of course, there is no par- 
ticular or local importance : but my point is that 
each such slight advance does promise more than 
it actually obtains, and that at any moment a suc- 
cess or a failure upon this scale may breed a very 
much larger success or failure. 
Look, for instance, at these points, A and B. 
It is apparent that behind the French line there 
runs past the village of Sillery, past the junction 
of St. Hilaire, past Suippes to St. Menehould, and 
60 to Verdun, a line of railway important to the 
French supply. It is equally apparent that there 
runs along the line R, R, R, R, a line of railway 
which crosses the Argonne, and is important not 
only to the German supply, but also for linking up 
what was the Crown Prince's Army in front of Ver- 
dun with the other German forces in Champagne. 
Now it is the object of either combatant in this 
region to reach out and to cut such lines of supply, 
and if either could attain his object he would im- 
peril the whole line of trenches of his opponent. 
If the French from B could get across the railway 
R, R, R, R, or the Germans at A could get acros.5 
the railway running from Reims through St. 
Hilaire to St. Menehould, the corresponding sec- 
tion of trenches between the two railways would 
have to be abandoned— by the Germans in the first 
case, by the French in the second. During all 
these weeks of fighting in this region neither 
party has succeeded in reaching either of these two 
essential lines; but note that the space to be 
crossed is not great— such an advance as was made 
at Perthes the other day is something like a third 
of the distance the French have to go to achieve 
their object— and that the only reason each of 
these numerous attempts does not get home is that 
the force against which it is made at once brings 
up men from other parts which are not being at- 
tacked, and strengthens the threatened line. On 
the day when this bringing up of men is done 
slowly, or on the day v/hen the line is too thinly 
held for the gaps to be thus stopped by regular 
concentrations wherever they occur, there will 
follow in that region a really considerable ad- 
vance. And that is why, in spite of such very 
small immediate results, the men in the two 
parallel lines of trenches continue to attack and 
counter-attack. The thing will be still better 
understood if we look at it in more detail. 
Here, for instance, is the detail of the Sillery 
(Rangti in "Metres) 
tmt sooit 3ee» *oo* awyit *oa^ tactf '0M 
MUea. 
position. Tlie great road south-eastward from 
Reims, A, A, and the railway from Reims to St. 
Hilaire, B, B, are the parallel lines which supply 
the French trenches, which I have indicated by a 
line of crosses. Opposite these French trenches 
you have the German trenches, which I have in- 
dicated by a dotted line. Of course, in reality 
the system of trenches is infinitely more compli- 
cated, and the distance between the opposing 
firing lines considerably varies: but that is the 
general conformation of the line east of Reims. It 
is dominated by the heights of the hills of Nogent 
I'Abbesse, which the Germans continue to hold. 
The Gei'man attack which was successful in blow- 
ing up the first French trenches was made at about 
M, the site of an isolated farm to the south of Sil- 
lery, and within the parish limits of that small 
toAvn or large village. The Germans only suc- 
ceeded (and that apparently temporarily) in get- 
ting the French line back as far as N, but the 
sketch is sufficient to show what they were driving 
at, and what proportion their success bore to the 
task before them. Small as was the distance, it 
was more than a quarter of the way to the level- 
crossing in front of Great and Little Sillery at 
O, and if the Germans could ever thrust their 
trenches out so as to include 0, and perhaps to 
occupy the Sillerys, they would cut, and therefore 
be masters of, the railway, B, B, and the road, 
A, A, at one and the same time, and probably 
paralyse a long section of the French trenches im- 
mediately to the east, which this railway and thia 
road supply. 
Here we have two local examples, at Perthes 
and in front of Sillery, of the way in which the 
trench fighting is carried on, and the particular 
local objects which it has in view, apart from the 
general object of ultimately compelling the enemy 
to shorten his line. 
