January 9, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
But the success ait Steinbach, at the extreme 
south-eastern end of the line in Upper Alsace, is 
a matter of greater moment. To that we will 
next turn. 
II.— THE AFFAIR AT STEINBACH. 
I 
A rough diagram of the position in Upper 
Alsace (only a diagram, not a map) is afforded by 
the following sketch. The shaded oblong, V, V, 
with the passages across it at P^ and P2, repre- 
sents the Vosges with the two southernmost passes 
across those mountains. The dotted line, S, S, S, 
represents the Swiss frontier. The continuous 
perpendicular line, R, R, represents the Rhine. 
The circle, M, represents the town of Mulhouse, 
and the star blocking the gap between the Vosges 
and the Swiss frontier at B represents the fortress 
of Belfort. From the Vosges to the Rhine lies a 
flat plain (slightly inclining, of course, towards the 
river) everywhere more than ten, and every- 
where less than twenty miles broad. Mul- 
house is a very important manufacturing 
town, much the chief town of Upper Alsace: 
it is not fortified. The trenches as they 
stood at this extreme end of the line a week ago 
may be represented on the diagram by the line of 
dots. Finally, you have just behind that line of 
dots, at X, a little promontory, as it were, a jut- 
ting-out position from the foothills overlooking 
the plain, and just in front of it the small town of 
Cernay at C. 
Now, from such a diagram it is fairly evident 
what tlie French plan was. The French were 
already in possession of the crest of the Vosges, 
represented in the diagram by the double line run- 
ning from V to V. They were in possession of the 
passes, but not in full possession of the mouths of 
those passes where they debouch upon the Alsatian 
plain. To enter Mulhouse would be both politi- 
cally and strategically a result of high importance. 
In the first place, it would uncover a section of the 
Upper Rhine (fortified, it is true, though not 
heavily fortified) and provide, for the first time 
since the campaign in the West was opened, an 
issue into Germany proper. Further, to capture 
Mulhouse would be to hold in fee one important 
industrial district of the conquered provinces. It 
would have its full effect in Germany politically, 
and quite inevitably it would draw down (as I 
think the mere threat has already drawn down) 
considerable German forces from the north. 
It is an invariable rule that, if you desire to 
be rid of a military obstacle, it is easier to turn 
it, if you can turn it, than to try and pierce it. Or 
rather, if you are making for an objective covered 
by an obstacle, to get round towards your objec- 
tive is usually less expensive than to butt right 
at it. In this case of the trenches in Upper 
Alsace in front of Belfort, the arrow from Belfort 
indicates the direct advance on Mulhouse. That 
portion of the trenches was, of course, very 
strongly held. But the French, being in posses- 
sion of the pass, P2, which is called the Pass of 
Thann from the town standing at the foot of it on 
the Alsatian side, could, if they broke the Rhine 
near X, occupy a gun position there dominating 
the plain, and might hope either to proceed to the 
occupation of Cernay, and so onwards on the north 
of Mulhouse, towards the Rhine, along the double 
arrow— thus rendering useless and compelling to 
retire the whole of the German line between X and 
S. Such a thrust would put Mulhouse into their 
hands, and at the same time uncover something 
like twenty miles of the Upper Rhine. 
Note that the much more probable result of 
such a thrust would be to bring German forces 
down in considerable numbers from the north in 
order to save Mulhouse. But, though this result 
would, of course, not be so satisfactory to the 
French as the entry into Mulhouse and the reach- 
ing of the Rhine, it would have its value because 
the number of men by which the Germans hold 
their western line is limited, and if it is seriously 
menaced in one place it can only be strengthened 
there at the expense of dangerously weakening an- 
other. This is particularly true of Upper Alsace, 
where the forces are few, the quality of the Ger- 
man reserve troops poor, and the distance from 
the main field of the fighting very great. 
X, the gun position which the French were 
fighting for, is a hill just to the south of the village 
of Steinbach, and to show in detail the whole 
value of the movement it is necessary to look at the 
succeeding plan. Here it will be seen that the 
Vosges fall from their high mountainous part on 
to the Alsatian plain, and their terminus along 
that plain is very abrupt. High, wooded moun- 
tains, across which goes the main road of the Pass 
of Thann — and which resemble for their landscape 
the lower Californian hills and red woods more 
than any others I know— fall in sharp foothills to 
the plain; and the distinction between the hill 
country and the flat along the line, F, F, is more 
marked than any other I can recall. For the 
Vosges stand straight up out of the Alsatian plain 
like a long, mountainous, wooded island rising out 
of the sea. From these heights a man looks across 
the Plain of Alsace to the Rhine and sees beyond 
that stream the corresponding heights of the Black 
Forest. The plain is as flat as can be, though 
sloping over its fifteen or sixteen miles of extent 
towards tlie great river. 
