LAND AND WATER 
January 23, 1915. 
field guns fourteen (as it would seem) ; and in 
machine guns perhaps a score. 
On the morning of Friday, the 15th, Ger- 
mans, whose numbers had now increased to about 
40,000 men, were everywhere advanced to the line 
of the river, and had possession of the road from 
Crouy to Missy. The positions in front of Soissons 
were maintained by the French, but on that 
Friday there was a vigorous attempt on the part 
of the enemy to rush the town itself. Such a suc- 
cess would have put into the enemy's hands the 
junction of four railways, the best bridge head 
across the river, and have thrown upon the French 
artillery the onus of shelling their own city. It is 
probable that the attempt will be renewed, for the 
possession of Soissons is of real value. The hand- 
to-hand fighting got at last as far as the suburb of 
St. Paul and then went no further. It was 
checked there, and would appear to have remained 
so checked during the last four days. 
The Germans once in possession of Soissons 
would have a real advantage, and might almost be 
said t-o have recovered there the initiative. They 
would hold a railway junction of first-class import- 
ance; they would have a bridge head over the 
flooded Aisne ; they would have broken the first 
French line. 
The Germans out of Soissons north of the river 
have accounted for about half a depleted French 
division, at a far heavier numerical cost to them- 
selves, and have gained 1,800 yards over a front of 
5,000 yards, weakening slightly other parts of 
their long line, which weakening will lead, and has 
already partly led, to a number of local small suc- 
cesses of the Allies north and south. 
Nor can the Germans withdraw more than a 
certain proportion of the men here concentrated 
vdthout losing the small advantage gained. For 
they are in a very narrow salient wedge. Th i 
French are far advanced on east and west — especi- 
ally on the west— and if the Germans are to remain 
on the Aisne, even over a front of only three miles, 
they must immobilise great numbers here to keep 
the angle open. They stand roughly as the wedge 
A, B, C, D, on the accompanying sketch, and they 
Trscy 
Craonne 
Soissons 
isne 
P. 
must hold, and, if possible, push back A B and 
D, or retire. They are, at the moment of writing 
(Tuesday), engaged precisely in this "pushing 
back " of A B and C D. 
II.-THE MEANING OF SOISSONS. 
Having grasped what happened at Soissons, 
let us ask whether the action has any lesson to 
teach us upon the present phase of the war. 
If we co-ordinate all the facts that we know 
with regard to that action so far and consider cer- 
tain results in other parts of the field, \ve shall 
bnd, I think, that we have rather important in- 
dications given us here of how the enemy stands in 
the west. 
The salient features of the action at Soissons 
are five: — 
1. A strong French offensive is ordered with 
4* 
no more than the troops long on the spot (a; 
division) against a particular sector of the long 
German line. 
2. This unexpected offensive delivered at a 
point chosen by the French (who preserve the 
initiative), though made without special re- 
inforcement, succeeds at rather heavy cost ta 
them. 
^. Upon its success and after a delay of rather 
more than forty-eight hours very large enemy re- 
inforcements arrive, so large that they out- 
number doubly, trebly, and at last four times 
over, the French in the district. 
4. These large reinforcements are almost 
entirely of infantry, supported, of course, by 
some corresponding proportion of field artillery, 
but apparently no new heavy artillery. 
5. Having succeeded in their object of check- 
ing and even reversing the French attack by the 
bringing up of such numbers, the Germau 
counter-offensive is spent and can go no further. 
Now consider those five points as fixed and 
then turn to what happened 200 miles away and 
more in Upper Alsace nearly a fortnight ago. 
1. The French took the offensive because they 
possessed the initiative, and they took it at a 
point where they were not expected. 
2. This unexpected offensive was made with- 
out special reinforcement, by no more than the 
troops originally present in the district; none 
of the great French reserve appears to have been 
used; it is successful, though at rather a heavy 
cost. 
3. Upon its success and some time afterwards 
— in this case nearly four days — large enemy 
reinforcements begin to arrive, until they quite 
outnumber the French in the district. 
4. These large reinforcements consist almost 
entirely of infantry, supported, of course, by 
some corresponding proportion of field artillery, 
but with no more heavy guns than were present 
originally. 
5. The enemy using their new-found supe- 
riority of numbers, in part reverse the French 
offensive, but their counter-offensive exhausts 
itself and cannot be pursued. 
You see that there is an exact parallel in the 
main features. 
In certain important details there are impor- 
tant differences. At Soissons ground which had 
been held for some months is lost by the French 
over a breadth of just more than a mile, while in 
Upper Alsace all that is recovered by the Germans 
is a particular swell of land (Upper Burnhaupt) 
from which the French had but recently driven 
them, while in the main the whole Alsatian opera- 
tions record a considerable French advance. The 
forces engaged in Upper Alsace on the Germau 
side are rather less than the forces engaged against 
Soissons. Also, in the one case, the fight imperils 
an important town; while in the other the fight 
only concerns a few ruined villages in the moun- 
tains. Also, in the case of Soissons, you are fight- 
ing nearly as close to Paris as Reading is to 
London, whereas in the case of Upper Alsace you 
are fighting in a region remote from the heart of 
either belligerent. 
But in the main the great features are the 
same, and there is but one considerable contrast 
to note for the purposes of our induction, which is 
that in the case of Upper Alsace, vital as that point 
