January 23, 1915* 
LAND AND WATER 
is to Germany, the reinforcements come up nearly 
two days later than in the case of the attack on 
Soissons. 
Now what are the obvious lessons to be drawn 
from this parallel and its differentiating point? 
The first is that the Germans are not yet working 
with new formations. 
The Geiinans, never hnoiving quite where the 
JFh'ench are going to attack, are in great jyeiil of 
having their line broken whenever an attack ujoon 
a considerable scale is delivered. They ^vill not 
risk men, as yet at any rate, in trying to recover 
ilie initiative for themselves and in being the first 
to attack. They are thus compelled to wait for the 
French initiative. They meet it whenever a strong 
attack is delivered by hurrying up men from else- 
where^ and the men so hurried up, though coming 
in gi'eat numbers, do little more than hold their 
own. 
This conclusion is indisputable, for it is no 
more than a summary of ascertained facts. But 
it leads us to another conclusion which, though not 
directly ascertainable, follows logically from such 
premises of fact. 
This further conclusion is that the Germans 
strengthen that part of the line which is attacked 
hy draxving men from other parts of their line, not 
from large available reserves nor from new forma- 
tions. 
It is exceedhigly important to seize this, for 
it makes all the difference to our judgment of the 
situation. 
Supposing the enemy had new large forma- 
tions already in the field or new great reserves 
gathered and ready to operate in the West, he 
would in the first place not wait until some par- 
ticular point of his extended line was attacked, 
but would himself begin to attack in force upon a 
point of his own choosing. That he does not do 
so, but has to await attack, proves that his men 
are drawn from the existing lines. But, apart 
from this, the rate at which the German reinforce- 
ments are brought up sufficiently prove my point. 
Such new reserves or new formations of 
the enemy would either be grouped close 
behind the existing line so as to attack wherever 
the enemy thought fit, or at any rate to be used 
(even if only defensively) where the enemy thought 
fit, or they would be grouped at some central 
pomt well behind the lines, from which central 
point they could be directed at a moment's notice 
and with approximately equal rapidity in any 
direction where a threat against the continuity 
of the defensive line was delivered. 
Either such great reserves if they existed 
would be massed as at A and at B ready to attack 
on the points of their commanders' choosing at 
{a) or at (ft) or for purposes of general defence 
they would be kept at some central point such as 
C e.bout equi-distant from all the points that could 
be threatened and ready to be launched wherever 
the threat occurred. 
But what takes place proves that neither of 
these dispositions has been made, and that there- 
fore no such new formations or great reserve are 
yet present upon the western line of the enemy. 
For the German reinforcements do not arrive until 
some time after the French attack has put the lines 
in peril at some point chosen by the French them- 
selves, and, what is even more important to my 
case, they don't arrive with the same delay. 
Against Soissons, which is a central position, 
they come up with a much shorter delay and also in 
larger numbers and with more effect than against 
Burnhaupt, which is an extreme position. At 
Soissons they arrive within two days; at Burn- 
haupt after four days. 
Put all this together and you may be perfectly 
certain that work of this kind is, so far, being 
done at the expense of other parts of the line. 
Take a line shaped as is the line A, B, C in 
the accompanying diagram. 
If you find thai on the enemy's being attacked 
unexpectedly to himself and through the action of 
the Allied initiative at a central point, B, he can 
bring up reinforcements within a delay of, say, 
forty hours, while if he is attacked at such an ex- 
treme point as C he can only bring them up in a 
delay of, say, a hundred hours, it is sufficient proof 
that he is bringing them up from along his line. 
For in the case of B he has two short distances 
to go, bringing his men up from various portions 
of A-B and B-C ; in the case of C most of his units 
will have a long distance to go, as some of them 
will have to be drawn from A-B, which is further 
from C than any portion of the line is from B. 
Remember that he dares not weaken too much 
any part of his line : he must draw men in small 
amounts from all along it. The thing is clear if 
we suppose him to be drafting men from the four 
points 1, 2, 3, 4 in aid first of the point B, next of 
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