LAND AND WATER 
January 23, 1915. 
GiJB point C, and if we allow for the distance be- 
tween any one of these points one day for entrain- 
ing, carriage and disentraining. His last rein- 
forcements will, in the case of an attack on B, ar- 
rive within a delay of two days, which is the length 
of the journey from the extremes to the centre ; 
while in the case of C his last reinforcements will 
2,000 prisoners, and accounted for at least as manj 
more killed and wounded; and casualties of 4,000 
do not mean less than a division at work — at least 
where that division is successful. 
The French at Soissons found themselves at 
last in front of quite 40,000 men upon a front of 
little over three miles. Now, let the argmnent 
arrive in a delay of four days, which is the length consequent upon this be carefully noted. ^ If the 
of the journey from A to C. ' ' "' ^ "~"^ 
But apart from this arithmetical line of argu- 
ment we have the noticeable fact that before any 
of these concentrations took place the enemy's line 
is demonstrably weakened in all sorts of points 
save where the main attack is being delivered 
upon it. 
Thus, the last two weeks which have seen a 
concentration upon Soissons and upon Burnhaupt, 
in two re?ions where the French had tised their 
enemy had made these great concentrations of 
men for the purpose of attack we could not arrive 
at the conclusion that he was anxious for the stabi- 
lity of his line. On the contrary, we could con- 
clude that he was quite secure behind his " wall " 
and could therefore choose his own moments and 
places for striking. 
But the enemy made a concentration utterly 
different from this in character, both at Burn- 
haupt and in front of Soissons. He did !not mean 
initiative to develop an xmexpected activity and to to concentrate and did not attempt to concentrate 
press home, a whole series of minor successes were until the forces that were pressing him had 
registered by the Allies in many places scattered achieved a certain result, and when that result was 
along the Ime. There was the advance befQre achieved, although in each case it was quite a small 
Perthes, the perceptible advances at Eoye, and in thing in mere distance (the advance of a mile in 
front of Arras, north-east of Verdun and just north one case and of less than two miles in the other), 
of Font-k-Mousson. In other words, you get on the be at once is at the expense of weakening his line 
elsewhere and of forming concentrations for re- 
pelling an attack which, slight as it seems, he 
judges may be fatal. 
It is but the repetition with further proof of 
what has been said so often in these columns : — 
The problem before the Allies in the West is 
not the problem of gradually pushing back an op- 
posing force ; it is tJie problem of compelling that 
force under pressure to shorten lines which are 
already as stretched as they can be, consistently 
tvith being held at all; and ivhen the compulsion 
for shortening these lines shall arnve, it cannot 
take the form of gradual retirements from one line 
of trenches to another close beJmid it; it can only 
take the form of a ivholesale retirement, either 
evacuating Noi-thern France and half Belgium or 
evacuating Alsace. 
All this does not mean that the enemy may not 
in the near future bring up large reinforcements 
and new formations with the object of hold- 
ing his line unshortened. It does not mean that 
he may not, even in the near future, bring up re- 
inforcements so large as to take the offensive again. 
It only means that the considerable movements 
which we have seen during the last two 
,*: A TD n weeks, and particularly at Burnhaupt and 
line A, 13, O, two strong French attacks which by before Soissons, prove the non-existence so 
successive reinforcement of the enemy are turned far of such reinforcement; and it also proves 
back at B and at C, but meanwhile you are getting the twin facts that the enemy fears c^ravelv 
smaller but more numerous successes of the Allies for the stability of his line in the west and only 
i' ?'r' . ^' ^°^ ^' ^^®^6 ^^6 line must in all remforces threatened points at the expense of the 
probability have been perilously weakened by the general strength along the rest of it. 
®^®"th .u • ., , We can sum up, therefore, and say that in the 
. .^"6 enemy, then, is still drawing upon his last two weeks, including Soissons, we have had 
existmg line. upon a line of some 400 miles between the Swiss 
ti,,- \ r^ ? ^second conclusion to be drawn from mountains and the North Sea a considerable body 
ims state ot affairs which is also of moment in aid- of German reinforcements successfully resistini 
mg our jud^ent upon the present phase of the attacks delivered in front of Soissons (1) and in 
war and this is th&i the enemy is now put into Upper Alsace (2), but that the concentration alon? 
tSIL Frtthl'^r^. •^^■\^^'"'-. 'Y ^^^"^ \'' ^^''' P°^^*^ ^^' b««^ effected at a cost 
Dosition don^^Tr^^S P Stembach and the gun of so weakenmg the general strength of the lines, 
was rmorT^h.. ! ^ i^^^'^^^T ,T^°^" ^'^^^^^^e that the Allies have exercised successful pressure 
moned Twn M^ n ^ T^ ^'^F' ^"^ '^ s""^" "P«° ^ smaller scale by the French in front of Nieu- 
tTon. offhTLl .y^Pf Alsace from other por- port (a), in front of Lens (b), by the French L 
The FrUl l?\ Tu f ^^^l^ ^"™^^ ^^^«^°«- ^ '"^^^ ^^ ^^^a^ (c), in front of Roye (d), in front o 
The French captured, before they lost Burnhaupt, Perthes (e), north-east of Verdun (/). north of 
6* 
