LAND AND WATER 
January 23, 1915. 
the beginning of the war, and even before its out- 
break, been remarkable for the volume of its 
German information),' and as it was delivered 
through the Marconi channel. 
" The German booty taken in the battle 
north of Soissons up to the present amounts to 
5,200 prisoners, fourteen cannon, six machine- 
guns, and several ' revolver guns.' The French 
suffered heavy losses ; five thousand killed French- 
men were found on the battlefield. Their retreat 
south of the Aisne came within range of our heavy 
artillery. In how far the proportions have 
changed, compared with previous wars, a compari- 
son of the battle discussed here with the results of 
the battle of 1870 shows, although the importance 
of the battle north of Soissons cannot be compared 
with that of the battle of August 18, 1870, the 
width of the battlefield approximately corresponds 
to that of Gravelottc and St. Privat. The French 
losses of January 12 to 14, 1915, however, pro- 
bably surpass those of August 18, 1870, by a con- 
siderable amount. This is the truth." 
The salient points of this statement are : — 
(1) The minute detail of the number of 
prisoners mentioned, 5,200. 
(2) The mention of the number of French 
killed, 5,000. 
(3) A very extraordinary recollection of and 
parallel with Gravelotte. * 
(4) A very exact enumeration of guns. 
On the fourth point one remarks with interest 
that the German estimate is too low. The French 
have admitted a loss of more guns (counting 
machine-guns) than the Germans give. 
The third point is negligible. The two 
actions, Gravelotte and Soissons resemble each 
other in nothing save that Germans and French- 
men were opposed, and it would be wasting the 
space of this paper to analyse s^kch puerilities. 
But the first and second statements are really 
worth watching. Their value will be 'apparent to 
all acquainted with the elements of military his- 
tory, and I think they can be made apparent to 
the general reader as v/ell. 
On the right bank of the Aisne in front of 
Soissons was a French division (three brigades) 
already depleted by war, and further weakened 
by the big offensive movement ordered ten days 
ago when the spur above Crouv was taken by it. 
French officers, eye-witnesses of the scene, tell us 
that about 10,000 men were engaged. That is 
probably the rough figure. But swell that figure 
as v.e may we cannot make the French more than 
15,000 m the nature of things. Had thev been 
perfectly fresh troops just sent out, there \vould 
not have been present in the thick of the action 
many more than 17,000 men, and there is no doubt 
whatsoever m the mind of any observer used to 
the meaning of such units that, under the con- 
u-°u^ ^^"* action, after the heavv fi^htin*' 
which had preceded it, the months of war behind it'' 
and the general disposition of the French alon^' 
all this section of the line, 10,000 is nearer the 
truth than 15,000. But 15,000 is a maximum. 
-^tjetotalfrontover which the action ranged, 
a front of trenches and of thinly stretched line, 
was less than three miles, but all the heart of the 
action was in a section of less than 1^ 
The whole point of the battle walthe impossi- 
bihty of reinforcing this single French division in 
tune because the sudden rising of the Aisne had 
8* 
carried away certain bridges. We are asked to 
believe that out of such a unit — 10,000 at the least, 
15,000 at the most — over 5,000 are prisoners 
and at least 5,000 dead. The statement has 
no conceivable significance in arithmetic or 
in any other form of analysis. Put as low 
as 5'ou like the proportion of v/ounded to 
killed (and in an action of this sort the pro- 
portion of killed to wounded is very high), 
you cannot in the most murderous action get it 
lower than one to three where such numbers are 
concerned. It is almost certain to be higher than 
that, but let us put it at that ; then the killed alone 
account, with the wounded, for nearly twice the 
force present ! Five thousand killed means at the 
very least 15,000 wounded. So, after leaving 
nobody to get back across the Aisne and nobody 
to be taken prisoner, the Germans have already 
accounted for tv/ice the number of Frenchmen pre- 
sent if they were ten thousand, or 5,000 more than 
were present if they were 15,000. No matter by 
v/hat avenues you approach the result, the Ger- 
man figures of men make nonsense : while the Ger- 
man figures of guns are less than the whole truth 
and probably based on a real estimate of numbers 
hitherto counted. 
We have no need to accept on their own autho- 
rity the French accounts, which tell us the com- 
paratively small number of troops engaged upon 
their side, admit a loss of guns larger than the 
Germans claim, allow for somewhat over a thou- 
sand prisoners, and tell us that the enemy did not 
pursue. Even if the French contradiction did not 
exist, the German account is a foolish mixture of 
accuracy and falsehood on the face of it. 
Why this folly? The general accuracy of 
German official nev/s has been amply insisted upon 
in these notes, and occasional absurdities inter- 
mingled with such accuracy now and then noticed. 
Those absurdities have been increasing of late in 
proportion to the accurate rest. Why? 
I can only hazard the suggestion Ihat there is 
something in common between the fantasies them- 
selves and the romantic language which commonly 
accompanies them; and that that something in 
common is a necessity for impressing domestic and 
neutral opinion. Hence the silly parallel with 
Gravelotte (which v/ould be like comparing 
Givenchy with Waterloo), hence the theatrical rant 
about all this being done " under the eyes of the 
War Lord himself," hence the comparison of the 
German failure in front of Warsaw to the great 
victory of Salamis, and hence those extraordinary 
phrases which appear reiterated at regular in- 
tervals that (for some mystical and incalculable 
reason) victory, that least determinable of all 
human events, must necessarily fall to the German 
General Staff which has hitherto failed in every 
single one of its main plans : the envelopment of 
the Allies in the West, the entry into Paris, the 
investment of Verdun, the march upon Calais, the 
seizure of Warsaw and of the railway nexus there, 
the subjugation of Servia and the " counting out " 
of the Servian Army, the raiding of Caucasia, etc. 
It will be an advantage to the Allies at least, 
and in particular to those whose duty it is to study 
this war in detail, when the German communiques 
return to the older plan (far better suited to the 
German temperament) of accurately detailing a 
mass of undigested matter, and thus supplement- 
ing the continued frankness with which the Ger- 
