January 23, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
THE AEROPLANE ON THE OFFENSIVE. 
A POTENT QUALITY HITHERTO UNRECOGNISED. 
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS. 
NOTE.— Thit ArtlcU hat been inbmitted to the Pren BBrc»o, which doti not object to the pablUttlon m centored, and ttkci no 
reiponiibility for the correctneee of the itatementi. 
IT is with a deep sense of responsibility, and after very 
mature consideration, that this article is written. It 
will be a matter of considerable regret if it does not 
attract, in a practical manner, the immediate atten- 
tion of our authorities, and does not convince them 
of the value of the suggestions therein made. It is 
obvious that, in the present state of international 
politics, the writer cannot go into details to prove, by dot- 
ting the i's and crossing the t's, the soundness of his views ; 
but it is hoped that his conclusion, based on general reason- 
ing, will appeal to those on whom rests the very heavy 
burden of directing our military operations in the present 
conQict, inasmuch as it is contended that, by the employ- 
ment, in a particular manner, of a weapon, now in our pos- 
session, it may be possible for the Allies to reduce, by many 
long months, the duration of the present war. 
It is beyond contest that the worth of the aeroplane, 
at the front, has been demonstrated for certain purposes, 
such as reconnaissance work, dispatch-carrying, and other 
specific uses, which, as Sir John French recently told us, 
are suggesting themselves almost daily. The most valuable, 
way, however, in which the Allies could use the aeroplane is for 
offensive purposes on a comprehensive scale. 
A GUN WITH A 150-MILE RANGE. 
In fact, in the hands of the Allies, the aeroplane could 
now be regarded as being equivalent to a powerful gun with a 
range of about 150 miles, a much more formidable weapon 
than the large Krupp gun which waa so conspicuous in the 
first stages of the war. Besides having a range of from seven 
to eight times that of the Krupp siege-gun, the aeroplane, 
considered as an offensive weapon, would not, like the 
German monster machine, require any complioatod preli- 
minary installation for its proper working. The offensive 
aeroplane would almost always be ready, and its missile 
would reach its aim with a greater certainty than if it were 
fired from any existing long-range gun. Some figures, from 
actual experience, will prove the truth of these two state- 
ments. 
In November and December, 1913, th« Frenoh air- 
man, Helen, flew during thirty^ine consecutive days, an 
average distance of 330 miles a day, most of the flights being 
made in tempestuous or foggy weather. Another French 
airman, Fourny, a few weeks before, had flown an average 
of 439 miles daily for twenty-three consecutive days. These 
performances, among others, show that, in the beginning of 
1914, there were aeroplanes in existence which, almost every 
day, had a range of over 300 miles, or a radius of action 
over 150 miles, and this conclusion regarding the reliability 
of the flying-machine applies with even greater force at 
present, in the beginning of 1915. It is not too sanguine, 
therefore, to assume that we have now in our possession de- 
signs of machines capable of flying 150 miles over territory 
occupied by the enemy, there to discharge their shots or 
explosives, and then to fly back to their base. 
The practicability of considering offensive aeroplanes as 
being equivalent to a 150-mile range gun having thus been 
^tablished, it remains to show its efficiency. 
EFFICIENCY OF THE OFFENSIVE 
AEROPLANE. 
Since the beginning of hostilities the aeroplane, as we 
have been told in various official dispatches, issued either 
by the War Office or the Admiralty, has, on several occa- 
sions, been used for the dropping of projectiles, such as, 
for instance, on various airship sheds at Friedrichshafen, 
Cologne, Diisseldorf, and Brussels. The exact amount of 
success achieved by our airmen in their offensive operations, 
thus carried out, has never been officially published. It is 
not, therefore, possible to discuss the success or non-success 
of our airmen in these special offensive missions. Nor is it 
proposed to examine the question whether those airmen, who 
were detailed for those missions, had had a suitable train- 
ing differing from that of ordinary military aviators usually 
employed on reconnaissance or kindred work to especially 
fit them for their offensive undertakings. But, apart from 
what little offensive aerial work has been carried out at 
the front since tiio beginning of August, 1914, there are 
available some figures, obtained in poaco time, which will 
serve as a guide in considering the efficiency, in actual prao- 
tice, of the aeroplane regarded as the equivalent to a 150- 
mile range gun. 
Towards the end of 1912 the airman Gaubert piloted 
an aeroplane in which Scott, acting as bomb-dropper, 
dropped dummy bombs on a goal erf a circular shape 33 
feet in radius. Scott, who had been training himself for that 
purpose, dropped the " boinbs " from a height of 820 feet, 
and he succeeded in dropping on the target 12 projectiles 
out of 15, thus securing an average of hits of 80 per cent. 
This feat was surpassed in the following year, towards the 
end of 1913, when the French Lieutenant Varcin, who had 
also undergone special training, dropped, on a pre-arranged 
date, from the same height of 820 feet, fifteen bombs on 
a target of the same radius, namely, 33 feet. Lieutenant 
Varcin succeeded in hitting the mark thirteen times, his 
average of hits being thus very nearly 87 per cent. 
These figures speak for themselves. There is no long- 
range gun in the hands of the Allies, or in those of their 
adversaries, which, however well served, could secure a 
higher percentage of hits. It can, of course, be objected 
that at a height of 720 feet, from which the " bombs " were 
dropped so successfully, the aeroplane would, in actual war- 
fare, be very much exposed to artillery and to infantry fire 
from below. This objection is well founded; but there is 
no reason why, with a sufficient amount of training, a large 
percentage of hits should not be secured from greater 
altitudes, especially on bigger targets. Tliis would be the 
more attainable when one keeps in mind that, at a height 
of 720 feet, an aeroplane is more subjected to " tossing " and 
" pitching" on account of the wind eddies which exist near 
the earth's surface, than it would be at a height of from 
2,000 to 3,000 feet, where the atmosphere is more steady. 
At an altitude of 3,000 feet an aeroplane, which of necessity, 
is in motion, is practically immune from artillery and infantry 
fire. 
It may, therefore, be concluded that, with sufficient and 
adequate training, an aerial bombardier can be formed who 
will render the aeroplane the equivalent of an efficient 150- 
mile range gun. It is not too much to ask for the adequate 
training of aerial bombardiers when constant practice is de- 
manded from the artillery and infantry in order that they 
may be efficient. From information which the writer pos- 
sesses it would appear that efficient aerial bombardiers can 
be trained very quickly. 
EFFICIENCY OF PROJECTILES. 
There is another important point to be considered in 
connection with tlie offensive aeroplane, quite apart from the 
machine itself; it is the efficiency of the projectile to be 
dropped from the aeroplane. 
Let us consider, in turn, the weight of projectile an 
aeroplane can carry, the quantity which can be dropped at 
a time, and its possible effect. The weight of projectile an 
aeroplane can carry will depend, of course, on how far from 
the base it is required to be dropped. The greater the dis- 
tance an aeroplane has to travel the greater is the amount 
of fuel and lubricant that has to be taken on board tho 
machine, and, consequently, the smaller is the quantity of 
projectile that can be carried. 
As regEU-ds the amount that can be dropped at a time, 
we have to guide us some experiments carried out at the 
French military centre of Chalons, by Captain Bousquet, who, 
from a height of over 3,250 feet, suddenly dropped from his 
machine a weight of 242 Iba., without the stability of the 
machine being affected in the slightest degree. The services 
which an aeroplane, carrying 700 or 800 lbs. of projec- 
tiles, can render, from the offensive point of view, can, 
therefore, be easily conceived by the reader, and need not be 
laboured. 
The effect of the projectile from an offensive aeroplane 
would depend not only upon its nature but also upon its 
mass. It does not require very much imagination to under- 
stand the effect of bombs filled with some modern explosive 
and weighing 100 or 150 lbs. each. 
Having thus established tho value of the offensive aero- 
plane the writer proposes to discuss, in his next article, the 
especial importance of a strong aerial offensive in the preaea/ 
wsur. 
13* 
