XAND AND WATER. 
January 23, 1915, 
ON THE COLOURS OF UNIFORMS 
AND BRODRICK CAPS. 
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.). 
THE subject of th« colours of uniforms is by no 
means novel, and was discussed by our ances- 
tora almost as widely as it is to-day. 
On the whole they found a very practical 
solution, rendered possible by the fact that in 
tLose days there was a distinct and radical differ- 
ence between the duties of light infantry and of the line. 
Ihe line did the actual shock of battle work, the light in- 
fantry or rifles the preparatory skinnishing, mostly in 
broken or wooded ground, and every country solved the pro- 
blem of invisibility to suit its prevailing tone. Thus, Lord 
Amherst in America, about 1758, clad his liglit infantry in 
" Eut brown," an excellent colour for the Canadian woods. 
In Germany, whence came the " rifle " or " jager " regi- 
ments, a dark green suited the shadows of their pine forests 
better, or was thought to do so. 
In tlie Peninsula, with few trees but much red and dark 
cclire rock and mountain, our brick-red tunics were parti- 
cularly good, and green not in much favour. The Duke of 
Wellington, when asked his opinion as to the colours of uni- 
forms, said that in his experience he had not found it a matter 
of much importance, but that it was essential under all 
circumstances that each army should show a clearly-marked 
difference of profile in its hesiddress against the skyline ; and 
a little reflection will show how sound this reasoning was. 
But in these later days we have forgotten the Duke and 
the wisdom of our forefathers, who often spent more years 
at the front than we spend months at the manoeuvres, and 
when we adopted the " Brodrick " cap (it was not Brodrick'g 
•t all, by the way) it looked to me as if we had attained 
the very nadir of our imbecility, for both Germans and 
Kussians, in their flat-topped forage caps, showed precisely 
the same eilliouette against the sky as our own, and as we 
wore nearly the same-coloured greatcoats, it seemed impos- 
eiBle to conceive how mistakes could be avoided. 
Fortunately, the Germans elected to stick to their "Pickel- 
LauBe," or spiked helmet, on service, so that the matter of 
the caps has about righted itself, but there have been many 
regrettable incidents, I am told, due to the similarity of tone 
in our clothing. 
The truth is that the whole question about " colour ' 
has never received any scientific attention at all from the 
people responsible for our Army clothing. We took to khaki 
because in India and South Africa we were not only operating 
in a country with which it blended easily, but our fighting was 
almost entirely of light infemtry character, i.e., in open order, 
in small bodies, where concealment is the essence of the 
whole problem. 
In France and Flanders the war is of a totally different 
character, where the great decisions which depend 
on the co-operation of ai-tillery, infantry, and on the 
control the stafi can keep of the movements are the chief 
things that matter, small skirmishes being only a temporary 
condition that will now pass away as the weather improves. 
In these big operations the essential is that the gunners 
should be able to watch the infantry closing on the enemy, 
and support them with fire, over their heads, to the very last 
moment possible. 
This is why the French never would abandon their red 
breeches as long as a certain old artillery general lived. Like 
every other nation, they had played with the question for 
years before the v/ar broke out, and nunieious reports had been 
presented from the infantiy advocating various shades of 
greeny-greys and khaJiis, but he struck his pen thi'ough every 
one of them, pointing out in very direct language that if he 
could not see their little red breeches (but he used a cora-ser 
word) how the hell was he to know when to cease firing 
in support? 
He died about three yeai-s ago, and, as is generally 
known, a new invisible colour was approved by the French 
just before the war, but too late for its introduction, and it 
is fortunate indeed that this was so, because it is now be- 
coming quite apparent, especially to English onlookers, that 
for tliis same reason the little red breeches are proving woi-th 
thousands of lives to onr Allies. 
An English ai'tillery ofiicer describes the attack on 
Vermeilles the otlver day as a " dream," the co-operation 
of guns and infantry was so perfect. The gunners could see 
the red legs twinkling ahead of them, and kept up such a 
storm of shrapnel over their heads tliat the enemy could not 
see to take aim. The shells kept raining in on them till 
the last twenty-five yards (he said) had been reached, then 
the guns ceased, and before the Germans could look up to see 
what had happened the French were npon them with the 
bayonet, and ihe place was carried. 
Similar accounts have come to me from other sources 
during the earlier phases of the war, and I feel perfectly 
satisfied in my own mind that where all other conditions 
have been so nearly balanced, this last factor, the power 
of covering the infantry advance for a couple of hundred 
yards more owing to their visibility, has just turned the 
scale in favour of the French infantry. 
Generally their success has been attributed to the 75mm. 
gun. It is, in fact, an excellent gun, but at these ranges 
all modern guns are so nearly perfect in accuracy that there 
-is nothing to choose between them. Where the French score 
'is in the perfect co-operation of the guns with the infantry 
■which they have been able to attain. 
CORRESPONDENCE. 
"MINE AND TORPEDO NET DEFENCE." 
Sir,-— It ie by no means surprising to learn that Sir Wil- 
liam White combated Colonel Maude's suggestions for the 
©onYersion of battleships into diving-bells, seeing that aa a 
practical naval architect he must have been well aware of the 
general impracticability of any such proposals. 
The protective deck or decks of the modern vessel of war 
posseea three functions:— (1) To keep out^hot and shell from 
the engine and boiler rooms, from the raagaaines, and from 
the vital portions of the ship's interior economy. (2) To give 
lateral strength and stiffness to the general construction of the 
Teasel. (3) To seal hermetioally, as far as it may be pofssible, 
all lower compartments from the inrush of water. consequent 
upon the breacliing of the bottom by tiae explosion of torpedo 
cr> mine. 
These decks, however, for the ordinary working of tlie 
•hips, are pierced by a large number of openings, e.g., engine 
and boiler room hatchways, funnels and funnel-casings, Ash- 
hoi«t«,. shell and ammunition lifts, ladderways and hatchways 
for the passage of the crew, etc., etc., and it ie obvious that 
in proportion to the number and magnitude of these openings, 
the principle of the diving-bell must disappear; and no 
naval architect who has had experience of fitting air-locks 
to boiler rooms, worked under forced draught, would 
a«8ire to. multiply or extend these cumbersome and clumsy 
oontraptions to. other compartments of the ship. Colonel 
Maude writes as a Royal Engineer and inventor, but I think 
be scarcely realises the extremely narrow limits of space and 
weight within which the naval designer is compelled to work. 
The art and mystery of battleship design may be- compendi- 
ously if crudely defined as the efiort to squeeze a quart into 
a pint pot — a task of proverbial difTioulty. 
Colonel Maude writes lightheartedly of increasing the 
depth of the double-bottom from 3ft. to 5tt., not realising that 
the draught of these vessels has to be calculated within inches, 
and that every cubio foot of air space added at the bottom of 
the vessel tends to send up the centre of gravity of the sliip, 
to shorten the height of " meta-centre " (that theoretic pivot of 
the vessel's pendulous suspension), and generally to disturb 
the calculations of stability upon which the safety and sea- 
worthiness of the ship depend. In these directions 1 fear that 
the problem of safeguarding a ship against mine or torpedo 
attack has already been mainly thrashed out, though probably 
etill something remains to be done in providing controlled 
water -communication Jietween the several transverse and hori- 
zontal compartments of the ship. 
Few vessels go down by. direct vertical subniereion, but 
when one or more side-compartments have been breached the 
inrushing water upsets the stability and trim of the vcsiscl, 
till, with more or less rapidity, it turns turtle and goes to tlio 
bottom. 
Apart from the active defence of a battleship by gunfire or 
torpedo boat patrols, and beyond all question of construc- 
tional design, there still remain to bo explored the possibili- 
ties of net-defence, which in my judgment have jn recent 
years been grossly neglected by our naval authorities. Tho 
w 
