LAND AND WATER 
January 30, 1915. 
believing that it will be pursued. The news of a 
considerable advance against Servia was put for- 
ward through the same sources as that which the 
German Government has used time and again with 
the object of deceiving the Allies. We had it from 
the same sources as the news that masses of Ger- 
man troops were being concentrated for a new at- 
tack upon the Yser more than a month ago when, 
as a fact, the whole German effort was being de- 
veloped in the eastern field, and at the very- 
moment when the German General Staff had de- 
termined to stand for some time upon the defen- 
sive in the West. 
Moreover, it is elementary that a diversion 
towards Servia at this stage would be very bad 
general strategy. The Austro-German line in the 
eastern field cannot be held as the German line in 
the West can be held, that is, continuously from 
end to end. It cannot be so held because it is 
nearly twice as long. The coming of better 
weather, the equipment of further Russian re- 
serves, may put the extremities of the line in peril 
at any moment. For it is obvious that a line of 
trenches can be turned like any other line by supe- 
rior numbers when they are available, unless that 
line reposes, as does the line in the West, upon 
two absolute obstacles — the sea and a neutral 
frontier— and unless there be men enough to hold 
the whole of such a line. The Austro-German 
forces in the East are not numerous enough to hold 
a line from the Carpathians to the Baltic continu- 
ously, and therefore they are in peril of a Russian 
offensive whenever Russia has sufficiently ad- 
vanced her equipment and munitions to attempt 
it, or even when the first more favourable condi- 
tions in the weather permit it. To waste ten Army 
Corps ill a distant and quite separate field under 
such circumstances and that against an enemy 
whom it is comparatively easy to contain along the 
line of his frontier rivers, of the Save, the Drave 
a^nd the Danube, v^ould obviously be bad stra- 
tegics. 
But there is one possible motive for sucti a 
blunder which, like every other disturbance of 
Austro-German strategy, is political in character, 
and that motive would be twofold: — 
(1) If Servia could really be successfully occu- 
pied a road would be opened for the provision of 
munition, and if necessary later of reinforcement 
to the Turkish Ally of the Germanic Powers. 
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