LAND AND WATER 
January 30, 1915. 
those primari^ responsible for its naval operations. 1 am by 
no means sure that I should attempt to except the Trafalgar 
campaign — no less a person than the .great Duke of Wellington 
regarded Nelson aa a "vapouring and vijin-gloiious charla- 
tan " I 
This, or some similar term, ia frequently applied to Mr. 
Churchill. From one point of view it is correct: he has said 
things about the enemy which smack much of the democratic 
political platform. But, we have to remember that this ia a 
democratic war, and that the millions like their stuff tvcII 
spiced, and need it if they are to bo kept up to the mark. 
For the rest, Mr. Churchill is the first First Lord we have ever 
had who has laid himself out to become familiar with the 
technicalities of his post. He entered office deeply distrusted, 
and cordially disliked by the Navy. The outbreak of war 
may not have seen him loved afloat, but it certainly found him 
respected and esteemed in a way that no predecessor ever was. 
We now come to Lord Fisher, a man with an absolute gift 
for making personal enemies, and a remarkable talent for 
making himself unpleasant to any enemy. That, apart from 
his record, is proof that he is no " noodle." As for his record, 
tliat began in the Mediterranean years ago, when he was 
thoroughly abused for sacrificing old ideas about "steam tac- 
tics " in favour of some new-fangled fad of his own about the 
value of the torpedo. These ideas are accepted to-day, but 
when promulgated they were regarded as modernity carried to 
ridiculous excess. It is possible that Lord Fisher may occa- 
sionally have anticipated to-morrow a little too quickly; but 
there is certainly no "back number " about him. The only 
error he is ever likely to make is in crediting the enemy with 
better brain than ho actually possesses. But I really do not 
think that we are likely to arrive at any ultimate trouble over 
a Sea Lord who is inclined (by hia record) to over-estimate 
the enemy's brain. Rather, I think, we should esteem him 
as a man prepared for every contingency. 
We now come to Admiral Jellicoe. His record in naval 
manoeuvres is that he never was beaten. War may bo 
different, but every naval manoeuvre scheme simulated real 
war as nearly as was possible. Ho was easily the best man at 
the game, and th« games that he played were many and 
various. 
Now, witliout any eye-wash, compliments or anything of 
that sort, I may say that all the critics, non-technical or worse 
AS they may bo, are all actuated by genuine motives, but this 
war is emphatically a case of "trust the man at the helm." 
(The above was written before news was received of the 
action in the North Sea. In order to avoid seeming to pose 
r»8 a prophet wise after the event, I have therefore cut out 
certain paragraphs which followed these remarks, and will 
merely refer readers back to a previous issue of these notes.) 
A word may be added a« to the German official statement 
that one British battle-cruiser was sunk. The statement is 
incorrect on the face of it j but we shall do well to avoid regard- 
ing it as an official lie. At the Yalu the Chinese honestly 
believed that they had seen a Japanese cruiser sink; at 
Tsushima the Russians were equally convinced that they saw 
a Japanese vessel go under. Similarly, and for similar 
reasons, I am of opinion that the German claim is made in 
all good faith; and if we call them liars we shall merely con- 
vince them that their claim is true, inspirit them acocrdingly, 
and discount the moral effect on them of our victory accord- 
ingly also. 
The correct explanation of the German claim is probably 
as follows. The Blucher wijs teen to drop astern in a sinking 
condition. A little later, the British ships were up round and 
about her, and other German observers saw her sink. The 
wish being father to the tliought, it was perfectly natural 
honestly to presume that the unrecognisable massi of sinking 
wreckage was one of the British warships. It has been abso- 
lutely demonstrated that precisely similar reasons accounted 
for the mistaken claim at Yalu and Tsushima. There isi an 
eld saying about the danger of assuming your opponent to 
be a fool. It can be equally dangerous to assume him a liar. 
Air Raid on the East Coast. 
• "^J^f ^^' ''^''^ °^ Yarmouth and district has probably a con- 
•iderable significance. We may take it that it was merely a 
reoonnaissanco somewhat on the lines of the first naval raid 
on Yarmouth, when the Halcyon was fired at. We must be 
prepared for the next effort to be quite on Scarborough lines, 
and perhaps more so. 
^^ Emph-asis is laid by the Germans on the fact that their 
naval airships were concerned in the raid. This may bo 
merely a reply to tie fact that it is the British naval air ser- 
Tice which has played havoc with German Zeppelin sheds on 
more than on« occasion; but personally I am not inclined so 
to regard it. 
There is considerable difference between navigatinff a diri- 
gible over water and over land, and I am inclined to bo 
sceptical as to whether any purely mflitary Zeppelin could 
cross the North Sea. 
The German naval airships aro said to be differently con- 
structed to the land ones, owing to experience gained. 
I have no exact information as to where this difference 
exists: I merely know of its existence. But the point is 
an important one to remember. It has something to do with 
a variation of cooling between the atmosphere of sea aiul land, 
and the consequent expansion or contraction iu "gas bags.'' 
Further I cannot follow it. 
If, however, the difference in construction is so great as has 
been alleged, it means thai only the naval Zeppelins which 
have been built and the crews specially trained for sea work 
are seriously available for offensive operations acro.ss tlie 
North Sea against this country. 
As to the operations which have already been indulged in, 
the less said the better. From the military point of view, 
they were absolutely fatuous : one cannot possibly conecivo of 
even an expected military advantage (except in so far tl)at it 
has increased recruiting in this country, which was certainly 
not the object sought after). From the humanitarian stand- 
point the affair was mere ordinary murder in cold blood. 
Comment has been aroused by the circumstance that neither 
by sea nor land was any defensive attack made on the hostile 
aircraft. It is rather generally attributed to inefficiency on 
the part of the Naval Air Service, and all others conoerncd. 
I do not think this criticism justified. I have seen Bome- 
thing of our aerial defence work. It is not in the public 
interest to go into details, but whatever else it may have 
been, there was certainly no lack of efficiency visible. 
Even on land and water, where men have been accustomed 
to fight for thousands of years, Burpriscsi still occur, despite 
all precautions. In the air, which is an entirely new battle- 
field, surprises are necessarily far more easy, since all precau- 
tions have as yet to be based to a very large extent on theory. 
THE BLACK SEA. 
That the Goebeii Las been considerably damaged is now 
independently confirmed, neuti'al eye-witnesses having seen 
her carefully screened By transports. The chances of her 
being effectually repaired by the dockyard at Constantinople 
are small, as the resources for any such work are inadequate, 
and the temper of the Balkan States hardly of a nature to 
lend itself to the smuggling through of spare parts, etc. 
One way and another, therefore, there is fair reason to 
hope that the Russians, who have at present secured tlie undi.s- 
puted command of the Black Sea, will continue to hold it 
undisputed till tlie end of the war. 
At present they are making full use of their advantaf^e, 
and the Turkish loss of war material, sent overseas in spite 
of the obvious danger, must be growing very serious. The. 
latest report is that a transport carrying most or all of tie 
Turkish aeroplanes has been destroyed. 
GENERAL MATTERS. 
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS. 
P. S. (Castlecaulfield). — An idea substantially similar \o 
yours was mooted many years ago. I do not know whetlicr it 
has been adopted. If the Admiralty is not sympathetically 
responsive, it mn.y either mean that the idea is in use, or elise 
that there are technical difficulties in the way of its employ- 
ment. 
A. S. H. (Dundee), and P. H. (Southend).— I do not 
think that I was in any way unduly optimistic in estimating 
that there has been no numerical net increase in the German 
submarines. They have certainly lost more boats than tliey 
admit to; and they could not possibly yet have cou)pk(ed 
mare boats than were in their normal programme. That since 
the war began they have laid down a great many boats ia 
probable enough, but none of these would as yet bo complete. 
As regards the value of scouts, whether or no both fleets are 
intent on engaging does not materially affect the question. It 
is in any case of the utaiost importance for an admiral to be 
kept informed of the exact strength, formation, and course 
of the enemy, before that enemy is actually sighted. As re- 
gards my statement that, " For the rest, we only know for cer- 
tain that a dozen Dreadnoughts, plus the complementary lessen 
craft, are superior to a dozen plus a; Dreadnoughts minus the 
complementary lesser craft," did not merely refer to scouts 
only, but also to destroyers, submarines and auxiliary vessela 
of every sort or kind. 
^- J^- F.— 1 am inclined to think that " Hartmann, the 
anarchist," was one of the best futurist stories ever written; 
but you must remember that it was a story, not a question 08 
existing facts, such as we now have to deal with, and I am 
afraid that your "suggested floating battery" comes into 
something like the same category^ That is io say^ it- does w% 
10* 
