January 30, WIS. 
LAND AND WATER. 
MUST THERE BE A WAR OF 
ATTRITION? 
A PLEA FOR A STRONG AERIAL OFFENSIVE. 
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS. 
NOTE— This Article hts been inbmitted U tht Press Bureau, which docs not object to Ih: publication as ceasored aad takes m 
responsitility for the correct^vess of the statements. 
IT might be an interesting theme for th© military his- 
torian to discuss how the Napoleonic wars would have 
ended, had not the French, a hundred years ago, been 
defeated at Waterloo ; but there can be no two opinions 
that Wellington's crushing victory brought to its close 
a campeiign which might have been very protracted 
bad it not 'been for the opportune intervention of the English 
contingent in support"of their Prussian allies. Yet the result 
of the Battle of Waterloo — which has shaped the course of the 
history of the great nations for the last hundred years, and 
bas exercised a greater influence on the political history of 
the world than any other recorded CTent — in its last resort 
depended upon a timely participation of the English guard. 
It is a matter of pure speculation to imagine what would 
be the present relative position of the European powers had 
the Haye-Sainte been crushed and the English troops, which 
were under cover in the corn fields, been annihilated before 
they could take a timely part in the battle which dashed to 
the ground, for ever, the dreams of conquest of the great 
Buonaparte. 
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO AND 
AIRCRAFT. 
Let na now consider the battle of Waterloo in the light 
of modern knowledge, and see how its result might have been 
affected by the employment of certain appliances which scien- 
tific progress has since brought to the service of war. Let 
us picture to ourselves the anxiety of Xapoleon at his enforced 
ignorance of the posi'tion of Wellington's men and we shall 
then have no doubt that, if ho had had air scouts at his dis- 
posal, he would not have failed to make good use of them. 
This is clear from a perusal of his military Manuel, especially 
that part dealing with the importance to a commander-in- 
chief of having exact information about the strength and posi- 
tion of the enemy. Let us assume that his air-scouts had 
located the position of the English troops, waiting in con- 
ooalment for orders to participate in the battle that was 
already engaged, and let us, merely for the sake of argument, 
suppose that ho could not take from the general field of battle 
» sufficiently strong force to hurl against the British forces 
either to destroy them or to keep them in check, thus depriv- 
ing his enemy of a reserve which might be thrown against 
him, as, in fact, it wasf, at the critical moment. What 
would a Napoleon do in the hypothetical Waterloo we are 
considering! He would know that if he did not annihilate 
the English troops or succeed in keeping them away from the 
field of battle they would be employed against him at a well- 
tuncd moment; and yet he had no troops to use for the pur- 
pose without courting disaster from anotlier quarter. 
Let us exert our imagination a little more. Let us sup- 
pose that, at this grave moment, some daring airmen of the 
Napoleon's Imperial Flying Corps, realising their commander- 
in-chief's perplexity, hinted to him that their aircraft, besides 
being valuable for reconnaissance or kindred work, were also 
of great offensive value, and that tho worth of their suggestion 
was recognised by their oommnader. The question which 
would immediately present itself to the Napoleon for solution 
would be, how best to use his offensive aircraft to attain his 
special object — that is, either to annihilate the English troops 
or to prevent them from coming to the assistance of their 
Prussian allies. 
THREE KINDS OF AERIAL OFFENSIVE. 
Three methods of dealing with the problem would sug- 
gest themselves. Ho might (1) carry out an aerial raid over 
the ground occupied by the English ; (2) attack, from above, 
the English troops lying in the cornfields ; and (3) by destroy- 
ing the roads, bridges, etc., prevent the English contingent 
from participating in tho battle. 
If the Napoleon possessed but a small number of aircraft, 
the first solution would be the only one capable of adoption. 
Its olTect, if tho operation were constantly repeated, would be 
eithfr (1) to force the English troops to take up a new posi- 
tion nol exactly of their own choosing, or (2) to compel them 
(o take part in the general action sooner than they had anti- 
cipated. In cither case the aerial raid could not do more 
Chan alter the original plans of the English commander in 
some details, and would n6t influence, to any considerabU 
degree, the issue of the battle rriging at that moment. 
If, however, tho Napoleon had at his disposal a power- 
ful force of aircraft, consisting not only of a great number of 
machines but also of an adequate body of airmen, fitted and 
trained for offensive v.'ork, he would be in a position to adopt 
the second course open to him ; that is, to make a regular 
attack from the air on the English forces below. There 
would then be a battle royal taking place in a vertical plane, 
and of such a novel character to those on the ground that, not 
only morally — ^because they would be unprepared for it — but 
also materially, they would be at a disadvantage to the aerial 
attackers. The fighters from the air would be provided with 
the equivalent of a great number of big guns, all placed in 
position, and ready to deal death and destruction, right and 
left, whilst the soldiers below, in replying to the attack, would, 
almost entirely, be relying on their rifles which they would use 
with astounding inefficiency, for all their training and prac- 
tice had been based upon a horizontal range. The result 
would have been that iho English reserve would have found, 
themselves in such a difficult position that not even a dis- 
ordered retreat nor a precipitate flight oould save them from 
tho aerial offensive. 
For certain reasons, some based on local and economio 
factors and others on the psychology and training of his air- 
men, the Napoleon of our hypothetical Waterloo might, how- 
ever, prefer not to engage the English force in a vertical 
battle, but, by directing his aerial attackers to destroy all the 
possible routes by which the English reinforcements could 
march to the support of their Prussian allies, he would pre- 
vent them from influencing tho battle in progress. For tho suc- 
cess of suoh a plan, it would be necessary that the aerial attack 
should result in the destruction of all the avenues whereby 
the enemy could receive timely reinforcement. Such an at- 
tack must be made in force, and the same bridge, or road, or 
passage should be attacked several times to ensure certaia 
destruction. An aerial raid, of a small number of aircraft, 
mide with the object of destroying avenues along which rein- 
forcements could bo sent to the front, would not, however, 
lead to the moral certitude that the aim of the raid has beca 
accomplished. 
Let us now turn from the hypothetical Waterloo which, 
as regards many details has, of necessity, been very imper- 
fectly and inaccurately examined, and let us see how, in the 
present conjecture a strong aerial offensive of the Allies might 
considerably curtail a campaign which, by the employment 
of the ordinary method of warfare only, promises to be a very 
protracted one. 
MUST THERE BE A WAR OF 
ATTRITION ? 
Almost all the foremost military critics of the world have 
repeatedly declared that the present great European War 
mus't be one of attrition. Must it, however, be so'( Yes, if 
the Allies do not apply to their utmost all the legitimate 
means al tJieir command. No, it they employ, on a compre- 
hensive scale, a method of attack which, as we have seen, 
might have reversed the results of Waterloo and which, as 
the writer has pointed out in his last article,* could prove of 
inestimable value in the present war, and especially in tha 
situation existing to-day at the front. 
Without taking into account the misery and povei-ty and 
grief of hundreds of millions of women and children, who, by 
no process of logic, can be made responsible for the war; 
without considering that every day that passes sees tho 
destruction of thousands of noble and valuable lives ; without 
being influenced by the fact that all the scientific progress 
of tho world, relating to a true and well-understood civilisa- 
tion, is at a standstill, the writer contends, on purely tech- 
nical grounds, that it might be profitable to the Allies, with- 
out relaxing in any degree tho rigid application of the plan 
of campaign of their commanders, in whom they have full 
confidence, to enter upon a formidable aerial offensive which 
might render a war of attrition unnecessary after all. Think 
"Xhe Aeroplane on the Ollcnsiire," Zand and M'affr, January 23, 
1015. 
13* 
