LAND AND WATER 
February 6, 1915. 
lo fall rit'ht back from the crests of the mountains, 
bs along°the arrow, the original French line being 
A-B before the battle and C-D after it. 
A* 
Mitz 
T'BamofUetz 
^^yfiss 
But we are supposing for the purposes of this 
analysis a new German offensive undertaken with 
the fuUest strength available against one sector of 
the line. If these new formations should attempt 
too wide an advance, if they should try at once to 
attack the first sector from the east and to turn it 
from the north they could not succeed. The main 
battle would inevitably develop upon the northern 
front, and the French from within the angle could 
concentrate there very much more rapidly than 
their opponeits. The thing could only be done at 
the beginning of the campaign, and with the ad- 
vantage of complete surprise at this stage of the 
war, where every party to it has learned by heart 
the nature of the fight, that surprise, where a large 
body of men were concerned, would be absent. 
South of the obstacle of the Vosges the first 
sector only consists in the narrow gap of Belfort, 
and Belfort is not only among the strongest of the 
fortresses, but has had six months of leisure in 
which to develop the new character of siege work : 
to establish temporary and concealed batteries far 
outside the old permanent works, and to design a 
covering trench work all along the eastern half of 
the circumference of greatly extended fortified 
zone. 
Whether the enemy will think the advantage 
of breaking the French line here great enough to 
counterbalance the vast difficulty of the task, and 
therefore worth while, only the future can show. 
2. The second sector, which may be called the 
sector of Verdun, was already marked in these 
notes last week as that in which the principal 
German effort, when it came, might very probably 
be made. It has at first sight no conspicuous ad- 
vantages; it involves the reduction of what must 
have become in the course of the last few months a 
most formidable new system of defence, and pro- 
gress could not be rapid or dependent upon sup- 
plies. While it was taking place, moreover, the 
French should have ample tmie to concentrate. 
But when one looks a little more closely at the 
problem one may well believe that the Verdun 
sector would especially attract the enemy. 
Apart from the general considerations men- 
tioned last week, there are special points well 
worth remarking. 
(a) The enemy has here very short and very 
excellent lines of railway communications, as along 
A-A to Treves and Goblentz, along B-B to Spires, 
along C-C to Strasburg. Great depots advanced 
to within a stone's throw, so to speak, of his objec- 
tive, are available at Luxembourg, at Thionville 
and at Metz. Very numerous railway lines con- 
nect him in a couple of hours with the further bases 
on the line, and a network of these running north 
and south, as well as east and west, permit him to 
mass men very rapidly upon any point of this 
sector. 
(b) The conformation of the line is already 
such that one particular and successful effort 
would complete the investment of Verdun. The 
enemy holds the wedge ending at St. Mihiel, and 
the line to the north and east of this goes round in 
three-quarters of a circle. It is only the remain- 
ing quarter, or a little more, that has to be joined 
up to effect the enemy's purpose, and he would, did 
Qgrm^fi 
StMihiei 
«• 
