February 6, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
he threaten to achieve such a success, put the 
French commanders in the dilemma whether to 
Allow a large force to be invested upon the frontier, 
jjnd so hold up further offensive there, or to retire 
:while there was yet time, and in so doing to give 
the whole of Lorraine and most of the Barrois to 
the enemy, to abandon the heavy artillery in posi- 
tion and to jeopardise the whole line to the south. 
One may repeat that, merely as a problem 
upon the map, the most oWious move for the new 
German attack would be down east of the Argonne 
on to the main railway supplying Verdun, and 
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thence downwards towards the western bank of 
the Mouse opposite St. Mihiel. The counter argu- 
ment to this is only what may be seen almost any- 
where on the line, the facility for rapid concentra- 
tion upon the French side. But this facility is 
rather more extended at this particular point than 
anj'W'here else. It is, as a sketch printed last 
week and here reproduced shows, a close system 
of railway, double and single, of Verdun raihvay 
system, normal gauge and light, and can be fed at 
once from all the depots that lie towards Paris, 
from all that are drawn up between the frontier 
and the centre, and from all that are reserved 
further south. There is, perhaps, no point 
between the Swiss mountains and the sea where a 
larger number of the French reserve in men and 
material could be more rapidly put into the field 
than the arc now protected by Verdun. 
3. Sector of Champagne. Three elemeuts 
combine to make the new offensive attempt to 
break through in the sector of Champagne — that 
is, the open country fiom Reims to the Argonna 
The first is that this sector is the centre of the line 
so that existing troops could be concentrated more 
rapidly upon It than elsewhere. Tlie second is one 
of those political reasons which have already liad so 
much effect upon the conduct of the campaign from 
the German side: the reoccupation of Eeinis would 
be a success to put heart into the farther Gcrniaa 
offensive. The third reason is the nature of the 
coimtry ; how far the advantages here are counter- 
balanced by the defensive character of modem 
French work, only those who have had experience 
of the latter during this campaign can say. But 
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