LAND AND WATER. 
February 6, 1915. 
handicap him in his purchase of this material from 
abroad. 
Lastly, there is a category of things necessary 
to war, which he either possesses only in small 
quantities or does not possess at all. We have 
already seen in these notes how he stands in the 
matter of copper. He is, perhaps, just beginning to 
feel the strain here. If the war be prolonged he must 
feel it, and even in the absence of a blockade, an in- 
secure financial position would hamper him in his 
purcliase from abroad of a necessary factor in 
armament. He needs, also, antimony (which he 
does not possess at all) for the hardening of lead, 
and he needs indiarubber acutely. It is in this last 
it«ra that insecure finance would, perhaps, hit him 
worse if the war were prolonged to a second year. 
Even in the absence of a blockade, an unfavourable 
exchange would gravely affect his power of purchase 
over an article which is tropical in origin, and 
nowhere obtainable within his frontiers. 
Quite apart from the blockade by sea and with 
reference only to their financial position the Germanic 
Allies, as their position becomes unstable through the 
strain upon gold, this latter will not handicap the 
enemy in any of those things vital to the prosecu- 
tion of war save horses, petrol, rubber and certain 
metals, of which the chief is copper. All these 
materials, some of which must be purchased in large 
amounts, and notably horses, rubber and petrol, 
would be gravely endangered by a really unsound 
financial position of this kind. Petrol and rubber, 
which are necessaries for modern war, would be 
the most afiected. 
But if we look on the situation as a whole it is 
not true that blunders or unavoidable trouble in 
mere financial arrangement will compel the enemy 
to peace within a suitable period, certainly not 
within one year, probably not even two. 
At Devonshire Park, Eastbourne, on February 8, at 3.30, 
Mr. Uilaire Belloc will give an illustrated lecture entitled 
"The Progress of the War." 
Mr. Hilaire £elloc will lecture at Guildford on Saturday 
afternoon, February 6, and at Quocn'g Hall on the afternoon 
of Tuesday, February 9, on '^' Material and Matters." His 
neit evening lecture, on " The Progress of the War," is -on 
February 17. 
Mr. Fred T. Jane -will lecture atiQueen's Hall on Friday 
evening, February 26. 
'Cwing to great pressure on ovir space Mr. £elIoc is unable to ideal 
with " Correspoiidence " tliis week. 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
BOTE.— Tbli Article bu b<eo labmittcd to tfa< Preu Bnreaa, which dcet not object to the pnblltiticn ai ceoaored, and ialici no 
rei;on<ibility fcr tbe ccrrectoeii of the itatemeDti. 
THE NORTH SEA. 
The North Sea Action. 
ADMIRAL BEATTY'S further report puts a some- 
what different complexion on the North Hca fight. 
li was apparently not the two-to-one aflair that 
it appeared on paper to have been, but a more 
or less equal fight which, had Hipper'e tactics 
been good enough, could comparatively easily 
nave been a German victory — a victory mainly averted by the 
fact that Admiral Beatty was the superior tactician. 
Eeporia ore etill not full enough ior complete comment, 
but certain main facts emerge very clearly indeed; and no 
further information that we may ever glean is likely to affect 
these main facts one iota. 
Now, marshalling these facts in chronological order, the 
first is that the German battle cruiser squadron was accom^- 
panied by light vessels. Since it certainly did not take these 
lesser vessels with it for the pleasure of their society, it 
follows that they were taken for some definite object. 
For the bombardment of an undefended British seaport, a 
light cruiser would be as efficient as a battle cruiser, and' a 
ipooddeal more economical. In this connection, by the way, 
it is important to remember that for many a year all German 
naval policy has been along the lines of getting a pennyworth 
ci value for every penny expended. It is true that in the 
^ade War the reverse of this obtained ; but the blame for 
ihat lies with unexpected British naval activity, not vdth 
errors of judgment on the German side. Similarly, the first 
East Coast raid was a wonderful waste of money without 
•fesnlt-but they did not so regard it. To them it represented 
../■/.>, *• .y® ^"^^ ^^ S^"^ <" + y- Under the head of 
frightfulness y will be a valuable aaset to us. Therefore 
It 18 worth risking a few "ight cruisers to obtain y." 
In the second and destructive raid, y having been pre- 
•nmably easily secured before, they thought that /might also 
be incorporated, and they obtained such z as havin| killed 
»nd wounded a number of non-combatants may represent. 
«„-„/° "'A ^,°«f.S°*' ^^"^ " military asset, but the German 
^.1. nf1^-'''^^'^5f^^«^^ y ^o the British mind, and in a 
matter of this sort it ,s only the German mind that counts 
Ofth?r; W ••'f ^f^^"'"" --id we know two thing.. 
Of these It IS fairly wel). established that it was a battle cruiler 
Slti:;.'"'' "^^ ^^P'*^' ^^^^'^ «"*' '^PP-ently, withr* 
On the third egress the German, battle cruisers were 
accompanied by a full complement of destroyers and such 
other auxiliaries as would be required for a battle. From 
this the inference is that a battle was expected — to take 
destroyers out for what Mr. Churchill calls a " baby-killing " 
■expedition would be a waste of money along the lines of the 
economical German mind. 
I suggested last week that a possible German objective 
was to get battle cruisers out on the trade routes, but I have 
Bo desire to labour the point. I will merely say that if -{hat 
were their objective they had ai-r-angcd for it in the smartest 
possible w^y. 
We now come to tho preliminaries of the action. Here, 
again, the Germans exhibited a very high technical ability 
to grasp things. When our light squadron found them and 
did not at once turn and run, the German admiral imme- 
diately deduced that a British force superior to his own was 
somewhere in the vicinity. 
I am somewhat inolinod to fancy that the really con'eet 
thing for our liglit squadron to have done might have been 
to do a " cut and run." Perhaps they did. Equally, 
perhaps, that gave the show away. You never knov/. In 
chess, a knight that retreats is often more dangerous than 
■one that advance.s, and in naval warfare you cannot sit down 
for an hour and think things out like you can in chess. Tl» 
only possible thing to do is to act on the instant and along the 
main idea. 
The action, whatever it was, of our light squadron is, 
therefore, a matter of minor significance; whatever" they did 
was bound to be right or bound to be wrong, according to 
the enemy's reply. 
Tlie enemy's reply was absolutely correct. It was to 
turn about and run for it, taking no chances. So swiftly 
and well was this accomplished by the Germans that only oim- 
two fastest battle cruisei-s, the Lion and Tiger, had any actual 
important part in the battle, other than the finishing off the 
reai-most and slowest German. 
The guns per broadside really engaged were as follows : 
Lion 
Tiger 
BaiTISH. GERMAN. 
8 13. Sin. DerlHinger 8 12in. 
8 13. Sin. Seydlitz 10 llin. 
Moltke 10 llin. 
Bliieher 8 8iB. 
Omitting the Blucher as hopelessly outranged and a sort 
of Iamb sent to the slaughter, this gives us 16 British big 
14« 
