February 13, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
therefore, no need to .explain the state of afiairs in France 
and in Belgium, with which the reader must be now perfectly 
familiar. In studying the drawings illustrating Mr Belloc's 
articles the reader cannot have failed to notice that at many 
points on the Western front of operation the situation is 
somewhat as indicated in Diagram 1, which does not desig- 
nate any particular portion of the confronting lines, but only 
the general state of conditions prevailing at a great number 
of points from the North Sea to Alsace. In the diagram. A,, 
Ai, Ai represents a portion of the German line, and B,, B;, 
Bj the opposing portion of the line occupied by the Allies. 
Behind the portion of the German line under consideration 
there is a railway system with a branch, E, R, R, running 
almost parallel to it, and having nodal points at /', Q, S, T 
and V. This railway system cannot be destroyed by the 
ordinary means of attack, but would be exposed to an aerial 
offensive. There is possibly another railway system behind 
the line B,, B., B, of the Allies, but which, for the purpose 
of our argument, need not be indicated in the diagram. 
Now, let us suppose that the Allies had, at some point O, 
behind their line B,, B;, B,, an aerial base 0, from which 
their aircraft could carry out ofFensive operations within a 
circle of radius M containing the nodal points P, Q, S, T 
•nd V , and let us examine the effect of the destruction by 
mcnns of aircr.-ift of one or more of those nodal points on 
the enemy in the trenches along Ai, A-, Aj. 
If our airmen succeeded in destroying the nodal point 
'S, and did damage there of such magnitude as would require 
considerable time for repair, they would, during that time, 
deprive the enemy, on the right of S, of quick and direct 
railway communication with those in the trenches to the left 
of »S', but the enemy could still send reinforcements and sup- 
plies by rail along the whole of the line we are examining. 
The same remarks apply to the nodal points V and T . 
If it were the junction Q that was destroyed, rail com- 
munication between the enemy would be maintained along 
the line, but supplies during the time necessary for repair 
■would only reach the troops in the portion of the trenches we 
are examining through the branch /", T. Supplies and 
reinforcements could, however, be sent from one portion of 
the line to another by means of the branch 7?, li, R. If our 
airmen succeeded in destroying the nodal point P the Germans 
in the trenches along A,, A,, A, would be prevented from 
direct railway communication with their base, but would still 
be able to transfer troops and supplies along the line R, R, R. 
AERIAL ATTACK versus AERIAL RAID. 
From the foregoing it will be gathered that the destruc- 
tion of any single point of such a railway system as we have 
been considering would only lead to temporary difficulties 
and slight delay, but would not render the system entirely 
useless to the enemy in the trenches. As an aerial raid, con- 
sidered merely as an offensive operation, could result in the 
destruction of only one point, the conclusion which is forced 
upon us is that generally speaking, so far as their offensive value is 
concerned, aerial raids can only lead to local and temporary embanass- 
merUs, but cannot hare a very great influence on tlit character of 
trencJi warfare. 
If, however, the nodal points P, T, and .S' were destroyed 
hj a simultaneous and concerted aerial offensive, and the 
destruction were of such a character as to entail delay for 
the necessary repair, then the German troops occupying the 
territory, shown by section lines in Diagram II., would bo 
deprived of railway communication with both their base and 
their neighbours in the adjoining parts of the country. If 
considerable delay were necessary to repair the nodal points 
'P, T, and S — and by considerable delay is meant one of 
onlp twenty-four hours — then it would bo a relatively easy 
matter for the Allies to force the surrender of the enemy 
occupying the trenches contained within the section-lined 
area. The result of such an aerial offensive would enablo 
the Allies to occupy the ground previously held by the enemy 
in very much the same manner indiaated in Diagram III., 
where the dotted lines represent the position occupied by the 
Allies previous to the assumed successful aerial offensive, and 
the full lines their position after such an offensive. Tho 
German position v.'ould then be somewhat as that indicated, in 
the same diagram, by means of a continuous thick dark line. 
It will thus be seen that if an aerial offensive were made 
with success at various point^s along the whole line of tho 
German trenches the result would be the driving of a number 
of powerful wedges into the enemy's line, which would be 
bound to break at some point. A successful aerial offensive, 
however, at any one place depends, as we have seen, upon 
the simultaneous destruction of several vital nodal points. 
The failure to succeed at any one point may mean the failure 
of the whole aerial offensive. Hence, in ordei- to ensure the 
SMcess of an aerial offensive at any place the various vital points 
must be subjected to a simultaneous attach in force and not simply 
raided, 
THE N-SQUARE LAW. 
The success of an aerial attack depends, to a great degree, 
upon a law which is well-known to military and naval 
strategists, and which applies with equal strength to aerial 
warfare. That law is known as the " it-square law," because 
it shows that the fighting strength of any force, whether on 
land, on tho sea, or in the air, varies as the square of its 
numerical strength. The following explanation, although 
not a mathematical proof, will help the reader to grasp tho 
meaning of that law so far as it applies to bomb-dropping from 
aeroplanes. 
Everything !)eiug equal, two aeroplanes can carry twice 
as many bombs as a single machine. If the bombs from one 
machine were dropped until there were none left, and then all 
the bombs were gradually dropped from the second machine, 
then the fighting strength of the two machines would be twice 
that of a single one. If, however, the two aeroplanes 
dropped their bombs simultaneously, they would do the same 
damage in half the time, or twice as much damage in the same 
time. Hence the fighting strength of two aeroplanes acting 
simultaneously is twice as great as it would be if the machines 
were acting at different times. It follows, therefore, that the 
fighting strength of two aircraft acting simultaneously is four 
times the fighting strength of a single one, that is, if we double 
the number of machines in an air squadron, the fighting value of 
the squadron becomes 2^ times .as great. In the same way, if 
we treble the number of machines of an aerial fleet, its fight- 
ing value becomes 3', or 9, times as great. The importance 
of the nnmber of aircraft sent out on aa offensive, and likely 
to be engaged in a vertical battle, is thus made evident. 
P.S. — The writer would be much obliged if all firms 
capable of manufacturing any aeroplane parts, whether in 
large or small quantities, would communicate with him with- 
out delay. In view of possible developments of great im- 
portance the writer wishes to get into touch with all those 
who arc in a position to undertake the manufacture, according 
to drawings and specifications, of simple aeroplane parts, 
either of wood or metal. 
Ono of the most noteworthy books of this present yi%ar is Mr. 
J. Mills Whi'tham's S'larveacre (Methueii an<l Co., 6s.), which, deal- 
ing with the tragedy of a country village, makes fine dram.a out of 
very jumple elemente. The figure of llaikes, t'Jie farmcir, domiiiatea 
the book, and this man's character is delineated witli such rutUess in- 
eight as reminds us of Hardy at his beat ; not tliat Raikes is the only 
good portrait, for there are othersequally convincing, and tlie " chorus," 
lacy of tho soil, is also well drawn. A strong, well-written book this, 
tho best its author has yet produced. 
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