JTanuary 2, 1915, 
E'AND AND WATER 
THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC, 
nOTE.-Thli Article hai been lubmltted to the Preii Bnrean, which doei not object to the publication at eeniored and takci no 
reiponilbillty for the correctneii of the itatementt. 
In accordance with the requirement! of the Pre.. Bnrean, the po.ltlon. of troop, on Plan. Illn.tratinf thi. Article mu.t only be 
regarded a. appr oximate, and no definite .trenjr th at any point i. Indicated. 
this so-called " deadlock " in the west as though 
it also were something unknown in the history of 
war, and therefore presenting no elements by 
which we could calculate its nature and probable 
duration. 
This view is erroneous. We have many 
parallels in history by which to judge the situation 
and some elements for calculating its staying 
power. It is evident that these new elements pro- 
foundly modify any strict analogy with past ex- 
perience, but the elements of the business are 
pretty clearly what they have been throughout 
military history. 
The enemy is holding " lines "—that is, tem- 
porary field fortifications — and the Allies in the 
west are engaged in forcing those " lines." That 
the enemy is sufficiently numerous to hold " lines " 
over three hundred miles long is due to the num- 
bers engaged in this new kind of war, and such an 
enormous extension is a novel feature. 
Another not wholly novel, but paradoxical 
feature is the fact that those now attacking are 
themselves moving from " lines " which, if the 
defenders are (as they can be) largely reinforced, 
will in their turn be subject to pressure and have 
to be held against a counter offensive. 
But for the moment the Allies are on the 
offensive in the west, and their offensive is directed 
against the lines held by the Germans. The essen- 
tials of the problem are exactly what they have 
always been. A force holding " lines " can only 
be driven out of these in one of two ways ; either 
the " lines " are pierced in some part so that the 
enemy gets round the flank of either of the two 
halves into which the " lines " are thus divided — 
enfilades it, takes it in the rear, and all the rest 
of it ; or the enemy gets round one or the other, or 
both, of the ends of the " lines " and turns them in 
that way. To prevent the latter misfortune, a 
man drawing his " lines " reposes both ends of 
them upon obstacles which the enemy cannot turn, 
or can only turn so slowly and with such difficulty 
that he will be met and defeated if he tries to do 
so. For instance, Wellington drew up his "lines 
of Torres Vedras " between the sea and the broad 
waters of the Douro, and the French had no choice 
but to try and pierce them, which they failed to 
do. The French revolutionary generals conceived 
in the same way the " lines " of Weissembourg, re- 
posing one end upon wooded hills and the other 
upon a broad river (these, if my memory serves me 
right, were pierced at one moment, but not 
turned). 
The Germans in the present instance have 
their " lines " drawn from the frontier of Switzer- 
land—the territory of which neutral country tlie 
Allies do not propose to violate — and the North 
Sea. 
Now, if your " lines " are so drawn that they 
cannot be turned by the extremities, and your 
enemy has no choice but to pierce them somewhere. 
THE DEADLOCK IN THE WEST. 
FOR now three weeks — or nearly — a pro- 
nounced offensive by all the Allied forces 
in the west against the opposed German 
forces has proceeded. This offensive 
has gained here 50 yards, there 100, 
there 500 : rarely a thousand. It is still, in the 
popular eye, " a deadlock "—but the phrase is mis- 
leading. 
On account of the scale upon which this war is 
being conducted, and because it necessarily con- 
tains a great quantity of novel tactical features 
(due partly to the unprecedented numbers 
engaged, and in some degree, but less, to unprece- 
ccnted weapons), there is a tendency to speak of 
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