LAND AND WATER 
January 9, 1915. 
the number present equipped and fighting in the 
European field' is far less than the total, and that 
this is in part due to delay in equipment. 
But there was very much more than this. In 
the first place the Russian forces are divided into 
three quite distinct bodies — the Asiatic, the 
Caucasian, and the European armies. In the 
Polish field, as against Austro-Germany we are only 
concerned with the last of these three. 
In the second place the Russians, most wisely, 
do not use their last Territorial Reserves of trained 
men. 
In the Russian European Service much the 
greater part of the conscripts serve, I believe, for 
three years. They then pass into the " Zapas," or 
classes to be called up for active service in case of 
war, and this " Zapas " only covers men up to the age 
of about 37. The greater part of trained men are not 
called np for this war after that age. Russia has, of 
course, upon the model of Germany, her " Opolchdni^," 
like the German Landsturm, which stands for the 
older trained men and for all the efficients among 
the untrained. She will certainly begin to train the 
untrained younger men first, seeing what vast stores 
of men she has. What number shall be set down 
for these untrained reserves as available — consider- 
ing the equipment to be produced in the time — 
during the first year of active operations on a large 
scale, up to, say, the beginning of September, 
1915? That is the "actuality" as opposed to the 
"potential" in the case of Russia, and we may 
suggest a maximum of S^ millions. We may 
presume 3 J million of trained men out of the five 
million to appear, first and last, in the European field 
alone : for Russia will leave out the oldest categories, 
and has to provide for the Caucasus as well. We 
may add one untrained man to be called up 
and trained and officered and, in such a delay, 
equipped, for one trained man available at the outset 
of hostilities. So we may turn this 3^ of trained 
men present in the Polish field to 7. Not necessarily 
less — but most certainly not more. 
It is a high maximum I know, and very possibly 
it will not be reached, perhaps not even nearly 
reached, in the firstyear. Still it is a possible maximum 
of actuality ; and we may now set down our table 
of these actualities, finally, as follows, for the first 
full year of active operations on a large scale, that 
is, up to the beginning of next September : — 
Allies. 
Britain ... ... 3 
France ... ... 4 
Russia ... ... 7 
Total ... 14 
Enemy. 
Germany 
Austria 
7 
5i 
Total ... 12* 
and these should be our final figures. 
But before leaving these figures, let us remember 
one very important point which tells, happily, in 
favour of the Allies. 
After a certain limit of age, which cannot be 
exactly fixed, but which is certainly not long after 
35 for the mass of men and at the very latest 
not after 37, the military value of a man not 
in long and continual military training becomes 
very low. The French recognise this by using their 
"Territorial" Reserve (a phrase which means in 
France the older men) for duties difierent from those 
incumbent upon the active army properly so called. 
Tliey garrison, they Avatch communications, they 
are separated in the mind of the commander (and 
in his dispositions) from the younger or " active " 
levies. 
Now of the five great nations at war, the two 
which form our enemies — the Germanic body^ — are 
here heavily handicapped. 
When we call Germany " 7 " and Austria " 5^ " 
we are including great numbeis of men between 
37 and 45, but where the Allies are concerned, it is 
only the French co-efficient of 4 that suffers this 
handicap. The British are necessarilij exempt from 
this iveakness because they are picking their men, and 
the Russians can he exempt from it also because of 
the very great numbers from whom they can also 
choose. And the real weight of the AUies by the 
time Russia and England have put into the field 
every man they can put in, usefully equipped, will 
be greater than their apparent numerical establish- 
ment, because upon the whole Britain and Russia 
will be using younger armies. Numerically the 
Allies should be at their actual maximum as 14 to 
12^ against the enemy ; in fighting power they will 
be much more like 16 to 12. 
THE GERMAN MARGIN. 
Now all this elaborate calculation is based, of 
course, upon an ideal state of things in which the 
losses of all parties would be exactly proportioned 
to their original strength. But we know that as a 
matter of fact the losses have been much heavier 
upon the side of the enemy so far than upon our 
own. They have been a great deal heavier in killed 
and wounded ; they appear to have been even 
heavier in prisoners. 
There is an unofficial but sober and highly 
credible estimate, proceeding from Switzerland 
and published by a newspaper wliich has been 
singularly sober and careful and reliable throughout 
this war (the Paris Temps), which sets the prisoners 
in the hands of the enemy at about 5| hundred 
thousand, and the German and Austrian prisoners 
in the hands of the Allies at over 600,000. 
But the first of these figures certainly includes 
a great number of civilians, the latter hardly any. 
The Germans assure us that they do not count the 
vast numbers of civilians whom they have di-iven 
into captivity in their lists of prisoners. But they 
are not to be believed. German official information, 
as has been repeatedly pointed out in these columns, 
is sharply divided into two categories. Much the 
greater part of it is scrupulously, I had almost written 
pedantically, exact. But the small amount which 
is inexact can invariably be proved to be outrageous- 
nonsense, and all the worse nonsense because it i» 
often based upon a verbal quibble.* Thus, when 
the Germans tell us that they do not count civilian 
prisoners, they may be preparing to explain later 
they do not call any man between 17 and 70 a 
civilian. But, at any rate, to say that they are not 
counting what we should call civilians as prisoners 
is nonsense. We have had only this Aveek an 
example of the same kind of nonsense. The Russians 
published the figures of 134,000 German prisoners 
in their hands. Upon this the German official 
communique protested that these figures were 
swollen with civilian prisoners ; and the protest 
may have been justifiable enough, for the Russians 
• Scarborough is an "armed port of war" — and later tliis mean* 
that it had Teiritorial soldiers in the neighbourhood. A '• decisive 
victory " is won in Poland after the Falkland Island battle — and later 
this 13 discovered to be a Russian retirement of 10 miles— not in action. 
Peterkow is "stormed" — that is, ocaupied after the Kussian retire- 
ment. &c., &c. 
10* 
