LAND AND WATER 
January 16, 1915* 
infoi«ements in infantry alone that (Jermany has 
required to meet this novel pressure upon Upper 
Alsace must come from somewhere: the whole 
point of exercising such pressure is to " stretch " 
and thin the line somewhere else. But whereas 
infantry of sorts can be improvised, gunners can- 
not. By which I mean that the heaviest part of 
the advantage acquired by the French in thus ex- 
ercising pressure upon the extreme of their line is 
not that it brings great masses of German infantry 
there — though that is not to be despised: it is 
especially that it compels the enemy to denude 
some part of his line of its proper complement of 
guns. And you will find that the moment heavy 
German reinforcements are needed at some point 
where pressure of this kind has been ai^plied, the 
second step immediately taken is for the French to 
search the line up and down to find where a weak- 
ness in guns may be discovered. It takes a day or 
two to move such guns : they may often come from 
reserves of material. But it only takes a few hours 
to move the gunners, and the gunners, moved from 
one part of the line, at once weaken that part of 
the line. How the novel pressure upon Upper 
Alsace has worked the last few days may be 
gathered from the accompanying sketch. 
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,;■ H^Ush. 'Miles 'f~j. 
There has been a double effort upon Mulhouse 
since the village of Steinbach was captured, now 
nearly a fortnight ago. There has been an effort 
from the north by a French offensive in front of 
Steinbach itself, which effort has been met by 
strong German reinforcements there; and there 
has been an effort about six miles away to the 
south, near the two Burnhaupts, where the Ger- 
mans have also brought up considerable reinforce- 
ments to check this second movement. 
The first is about ten miles from Mulhouse, or, 
counting right up to the French front, about 
11-11^. The second is no more than eight. On 
the northern part of this double effort the German 
defensive, though still maintained, is maintained 
under most expensive conditions. The French 
hold all the gun positions on the foothills, and they 
hold, of course, the dominating heights just above. 
For instance, above Wattwiller they hold the 
height more than a thousand feet above the plain 
upon which stands the ruined castle of Herren- 
fluh; while above the famous gun position upon 
" Hill 432 " (which means a point marked in the 
Ordnance Survey as being 432 metres above the 
sea, or about 1,400 feet above the plain) they hold 
the height which supports the ruins of the castle of 
Steinbach, also somewhat more than a thousand 
feet above the plain. 
Against their positions reaching down from 
the first of these ruined castles the enemy have 
made very determined, but as yet unsuccessful, at- 
tempts to carry the slopes from the plain village 
of Wattwiller. They have maintained themselves 
in Uffoltz, which is divided between the hill slope 
and the plain ; they have not succeeded in re-taking 
the site of Steinbach village ; they have failed to 
carry and re-capture Hill 432, and in general they 
have here established a check to the French ad- 
vance, but have failed to throw it back. 
In the southern sector they have been more 
successful. The French for a moment captured 
Upper Burnhaupt, they were driven out of it again 
by heavy German reinforcements five days ago, 
and at present their line is roughly that of the dots 
across the above sketch map. 
Our principal interest in this affair so far has 
been in the estimate of the German reinforcements 
required to stem the threat of the French offensive 
in Upper Alsace. We have some indication of this 
in the estimate of German losses during the re- 
capture of Upper Burnhaupt alone. These losses 
amounted to about 4,000, of which one-half repre- 
sented unwounded prisoners; and that, of course, 
must have been during the initial stage of the 
fighting, because, as it was the French who retired, 
they would have taken no prisoners, either 
wounded or unwounded, in the last stages of this 
local action. We may therefore estimate at a 
Division the reserve called down from the north to 
protect the advance upon Mulhouse from the south 
alone; and one is perhaps safe in estimating at 
nearly the same strength the forces protecting 
Mulhouse from the northern advance. What the 
French forces opposed are we do not know, but pre- 
sumably superior in number of guns at least, and 
probably in men as well, for it is they who have 
been able to take the offensive. 
But the pressure all along this front is not 
confined to the direct threat upon Mulhouse. There 
are forces operating in front of Colmar to the 
north and against Alstricht to the south; and it 
is the most probable development of the situation 
that the pressure, and the bringing up of men to 
withstand that pressure, will increase continually 
all down the line of the Vosges as spring ap- 
proaches. It is much the best game for the French 
to play, and the Germans know it. It thins the 
rest of the line somewhere to within danger of 
breaking point. It has some political value, and 
its high political-military value lies in the fact that 
here only is the frontier of Germany proper imme- 
diately exposed to the French offensive. It is 
within sight from the hills. Everywhere else the 
limits of the German Empire, as distinguished from 
annexed and disaffected territory like Alsace- 
Lorraine, or territory merely occupied like Bel- 
Q* 
