January 16, 1915. 
LAND AND WATEB 
the left, N, France and her allies, is .attacking 
along the lines Y-Y-Y. 
Hungary, B-2, is not only geographically an 
outlier, but politically is the weakest link in the 
chain of the Austro-Germanic Alliance. The 
area of Plungary is almost denuded of men, for 
most of these have been called up to defend Ger- 
many, A, and in particular to prevent the invasion 
of Germany's territory in Silesia at S. The one 
defence Hiuigary has against being raided and 
persuaded to an already tempting peace is the 
barrier of the Carpathian Mountains C-C-C. The 
mouth of every pass across these is now in the 
hands of the Russians, and when, or if the summits 
shall be again in their possession, and the Russian 
cavalry reappear upon the Hungarian side of the 
hills, the first great political embarrassment of the 
enemy will have begun — I mean the first great 
political embarrassment to his strategy. 
1. Shall he try to defend those passes (which 
are already nearly forced) in permanent fashion? 
Then he must detach men and detach them very far 
from the areas which are vital to the core of the 
;alliance, that is, to the German Empire, A. 
2. Shall he send back Hungarian troops to 
defend Hungary 1 Then he weakens what is vital 
to him, the strength of the effectives which still 
keep the Russians out of Silesia at S. 
3. Shall he abandon Hungary? And let the 
Russians do what they will with the passes over 
the Carpathians and raid the Hungarian Plain at 
large? Then he loses a grave proportion of his 
next year's wheat, much of his dwindling horse 
supply; his almost strangled sources of petrol; 
he tempts Roumania to come in (for a great sweep 
of Eastern Hungary is nationally Roumanian), 
and he loses the control in men and financial re- 
sources of one half of his Allies if the danger and 
the distress persuade Himgary to stand out. For 
the Hungarians have no quarrel except from their 
desire* to dominate the Southern Slavs ; to fight 
Austria's battles means very little to them, and to 
fight Germany's battles means nothing at all. 
There is, of course, much more than this. If 
Hungary dropped out could Austria remain? 
Would not the Government at Vienna rather than 
lose the Dual Monarchy follow Hungary's lead? 
In that case the Germanic Alliance would lose at 
one stroke ll-25ths of its men. It would lose 
more than half of its reserves of men, for the Aus- 
trian reserve is, paradoxically enough, larger 
than the German reserve, though not suCh good 
material. 
Admire how, in every way, this geographical 
and political problem of Hungary confuses the 
strategical plan of the German General Staff. They 
cannot here act upon pure strategics. They can- 
not treat the area of operations like a chessboard 
and consider the unique object of inflicting a mili- 
tary defeat upon the Russians. Their inability 
to do so proceeds from the fact that this great, 
awkward salient, Hungarian territory, is not poli- 
tically subject to Berlin, is not in spiritual xmion 
with Berlin ; has been denuded of ; men to save 
Berlin, and is the most exposed of all the enemy's 
territory to attack. And every day the problem 
re-presents itself to the great General Staff of the 
Prussians : " How can we save Hungary vdthout 
hopelessly weakening our eastern line ? If we aban- 
don Hungary, how are we to maintain our effec- 
tives ?i' 
Such, in detail, is the political embarrass- 
ment to German strategy produced by the geogra- 
phical situation, and the political traditions o! 
Hungary itself, and of Hungary's connection with 
the Hapsburgs at Vienna. Let us now turn to the 
even more important embarrassment caused to 
German strategy by the corner positions of the 
four essential areas of territory occupied by Ger- 
many at this moment. 
2. Tfie political embarrassment due to thi 
geographical position of the four essential areas 
occupied by the German armies. 
We saw in the first part of this analysis and 
followed upon a diagram, which I here reproduce, 
a peculiar political weakness in the German 
strategical position to-day, which consists in the 
fact that the four areas which the German Gov- 
ernment must for diverse reasons particularly pre- 
serve from invasion are (1) vndely separated each 
from its neighbour; (2) standing at the outlying 
comers of the territory occupied by the German 
Armies. This point is of the gravest possible 
moment, and has perhaps not received all the at- 
tention it deserves. Of the four outlying points in 
such a diagram. No. 1 stands for Belgium, as we 
have seen above. No. 2 for East Prussia, No. 3 for 
Alsace-Lorraine, No. 4 for Silesia. And it is the 
distinctive mark of this m^st strange situatio7i and 
the most embarrassing of all, that each area must 
be preserved from invasion for a different and yet 
equcdly vntvportant reason. 
Germany must hold on to Belgium, or it is all 
up with her ; she must hold on to East Prussia, or 
it is all up with her ; she must hold on to Alsace- 
Lorraine, or it is all up vnth her ; and she must 
hold on to Silesia, or it is all up with her. If there 
were some common strategical factor binding 
these four areas together so that the defence of 
one should be connected with the defence of all, the 
difficulties thus imposed upon German strategy 
would be greatly lessened. Though even then the 
mere having to defend four outlying corners in- 
stead of a centre would involve confusion and em- 
barrassment the moment numerical inferiority 
had appeared upon the side of the defence. But, 
as a fact, there is no such common factor. Alsace- 
Lorraine and Belgium, East Prussia and Silesia, 
stand separate one from the other. Even the two 
on the East and the two on the West, though ap- 
parently forming pairs upon the map, are very 
distinct and distant one from the other, while be- 
tween the eastern and the western group there is 
a space of 500 miles. 
Let us, before discussing the political em- 
barrassment to strategy produced by these four 
widely distant and quite separate areas, translate 
the diagram in the terms of a sketch-map 
