Januarv GO, 1915. 
LAND AND WATEE 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
NOTE.-Thl. Artid. h.. b»> .abmlltel t, th, Pr,,. Bar«», which doe. not object to th. pabllc.tl.a .. eea.ored, .al take. .. 
reijoniibility for ths correctnejj of the ttattmenti. 
i 
THE NORTH SEA. 
The Battle of the North Sea. 
ON Sunday, 2ith, Admiral Benttv's battk-cruiscr 
squadron met the German battle-cruiser squad- 
ron in the North Sea, aud, having chased it, suc- 
ceeded in sinking the BUicher aud damaging two 
battle-cruisers. 
This is probably the most important naval 
action which the war has yet seen. I use the v/ord " prob- 
aijly " because we do not know -what was the German objec- 
tive. If it were merely to indulge in another East Coast raid, 
then the action has less military significance than the battle 
of the Falkland Islands. If, however, the German objective 
was to endeavour to slip out on to our trade routes — as I re- 
cently suggested in these Notes they will sooner or later 
attempt to do — then the battle takes on a very high impor- 
tance, for these battle-cruisers would have been far more dan- 
gerous in the Atlantic than von Spee's ships would have been 
had Admiral Sturdee failed to find them off the Falkl.inds. 
The idea of a foiled coast raid will probably be most 
pleasing to popular sentiment in this' country on account of 
the element of poetic justice involved, but for every pound's 
■worth of material damage that the German ships could have 
achieved against the coast towns, they oould have done some- 
thing like ten thousand pounds' worth on the high seas', to 
say nothing of a possible interruption of our food supply. 
As the Germans turned tail and ran for it so soon as they 
sighted Beatty's ships, it is clear that they were not out spoil- 
ing for a fight at all hazards. On the other hand, to turn and 
run for it was the only logical thing to do. 
To have fought a pitched battle would have resulted in 
annihilation with small prospect of inflicting much, if any, 
damage in return, for the British squadron had a very con- 
siderable superiority, as the following table of guns avail- 
able on the broadside will indicate: — 
BRITISH. 
Lion 8 13. Sin. 
Tiger 8 13.5in. 
Princess Boyal ... 8 13.5in. 
New Zealand 8 12in. 
Indomitable 8 I2in. 
GERMAN. 
Derfflinger 8 12in. 
Sevdlitz 10 llin. 
Moltke 10 llin. 
Bliicher 8 Sin. 
1 
That is to say, 40 big guns against 28, plut 8 inter- 
mediates unlikely to do much damage. I have omitted all 
reference to lesser guns, as it is obvious that, though well 
supplied with these, the Germans would not be given an oppor- 
tunity of using them. Still, the measure of our big gun 
superiority is not merely a hiattcr of numbers, but also of 
superior size and, consequently, greater effective range and 
peuctrative power. Altogether, therefore, our superiority 
may be put as at least two to one, and the German admiral 
could have had no delusions whatever as to th© result of a 
general action had lie attempted one. 
As things were, he got off with the loss of his weakest 
ship, the Bliicher, and considerable damage inflicted on two 
of his battle-cruisers — probably the Derfflinger and Moltlce, 
presuming the flagship, Seydlitz, to be leading the line. 
No doubt he had hopes of getting back beTore our ships 
could close sufficiently to do him much serious damage. No 
douI)t, also, he had dreams of drawing his pursuers over mine 
fields or in the way of submarines'. Of all this, however, we 
shall probably see nothing in the German reports, which we 
may l>e certain will make much of " the British in ovcrwhel'n- 
ing f'jrce," and a " masterly retreat." We need not grudge 
them such an explanation. 
There is one circumstance in connection with the action 
which puzzles me, and that is' the absence of tlie German 
battle-crulsor, Von der I'aiin, which is, or was, the flagsliip of 
Kear-.\.dmiral Funke, a fast vessel armed with eight 11-inch 
guns, and certainly a more fitting unit to the squadron than 
was the much weaker Bliicher. 
As to why she was absent tlieie are three possible 
Lypotheses. Of the.sc, the first, that she v.'as undtTj-'oing refit, 
is improbable. A second is that she has' either been sunk or 
fcftdly damaged by mine or submarine, and the loss concealed. 
A third possibility is that she came out and managed to slip 
away bound for the trade routes. Whether she will get there 
is another matter. If she does, the Germans will probably 
consider the Bliicher well lost; and till the whereabouts of 
the Von der Tann is ascertained, we may do well to avoid 
over-elation about a victory, of which the inain significmoe is 
in any case that our ships were at the right spot at the right 
moment, rather than the precise amount of damage inflicted. 
Submarine Attacks on Merchant Shipping. 
On January 21 the British steamer Durivard was cap- 
tured and sunk by a German submarine off the Dutch Coaiit. 
According to the accounts which have been issued, three torpe- 
does were fired into her, and it then took hor about half an 
hour to sink. The submarine is stated to be U19, and tho 
approximate cost of the torpedoes fired must have been some- 
thing like double the value of the cargo of the Duruard. A 
cruiser could have dons the same work at about one-tenth to 
one-twentieth of the sum involved. The Germans may, of 
course, obt.iin more value for money next time, but takin? 
one thing with another it looks as though the von Tirpitz plan 
of attacking merchant ships by submarines has economic dis- 
abilities likely to render it inoperative, the more so as onlv 
a relatively small number of Gorman submarines ,ire armed 
with guns, and so are unable to compel a steamer to stop. 
A submarine which can get out is, of course, an efficient 
substitute for a cruiser which cannot; but since war is mostly 
n matter of psychology and money, paying twopence for a 
I>enny is not likely to endure very long. 
Of course, n certain amount of capital is injured, out of 
the sailing of various vessels being canoellcd. But I for ono 
absolutely refuse to believe that much money is to be made out 
of commerce warfare unless it be on a heavy scale. And if 
nothing can be made out of it, the odds are that tlie enemy 
is accumulating financial losse? and wasting strength accord- 
ingly. To adopt a chess analogy, at the best there is little 
in it except exchanging pieces. Unless a great deal of dis- 
crimination be used by the enemy, it is a great deal nion; 
likely to be equivalent to throwing pieces away. There is not 
the remotest occasion for panic in any way •svhatever. 
Nor, so far as the Duruard is concerned, is there any 
rc.ison to describe the operation as " piracy." So far as tho 
circumstances admitted, U19 acted exactly as' the Emden 
acted. Her ultimate fate, we may hope, and believe, will be 
more or less the same. Everything was what is vulgarly 
known as a " fair cop," and to seek to represent things other- 
wise is foolishness. 
This statement will, I expect, bring ma a certain storm of 
protest from those who fail to realise tlsat wo arc engaged in 
<a wqr of facts without regard to sentiment. If the Germans 
submarine a single merchant ship, leaving her crew to drown, 
we shall then have a very decided case for vengeance. But our 
case then will certainly not bo improved by hj'sterics now a.bout 
perfectly legitimate and reasonable acts of war. 
So long as a merchant ship is captured and destroyed 
only after lier crew have been salved, there is nothing to l>o 
tea id, whether it be from the air or from under the sea. There 
is no difference in principle involved. If the enemy considers 
himself likely to obtain advantage by such procedure he is 
morally as well as legally entitled to .seek that .idvantago. It 
is by no means to our disadvantage that he should divert his 
torpedoes from main to subsidiary objects. 
The Admiralty and the War. 
For some time I have been receiving letters which eipress 
profound dissatisfaction with the Admiralty and our Ad- 
mirals. Of late these letters have increased in number and 
intensity, and it is abundantly clear that an ever-increasing 
section of the public is coming to regard Winston Churchill as 
a "gasbiig," Lord Fisher as a "noodle," and Admiral Jelli- 
coe as an " incompetent." 
The only satisi'actory feature of this state of affairs is 
that it is characteristically British^it happened regularly in 
the old wars. With the ponsible exception of the Trafalgar 
campaign, there was' never a war in which the great British 
public was not firmly convinced ot the incompetence of all 
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