LAND AND WATER 
January 30, 1915. 
those primaril;? responsible for its naval operations. I am by 
no means sure that I ehould attempt to except the Trafalgar 
campaign — no less a person than the great Duke of Wellington 
regarded Nelson &a a "vapouring and viiin-glorious charla- 
tan " I 
This, or some sLuiilar term, is ficquently applied to Mr. 
Churchill. From one point of view it is correct : he has said 
things about the enemy which smack much of the democratic 
political platform. But, we have to remember thr.t this is a 
democratic war. and that the millions like their stuff well 
spiced, and need it if they are to bo kept up to the mark. 
For the rest, Mr. Churchill is the first First Lord we have ever 
had who has laid himself out to become familiar with the 
technicalities of his post. He entered office deeply distrusted, 
and cordially disliked by the Navy. The outbreak of war 
may not have seen him loved afloat, but it certainly found him 
respected and esteemed in a way that no predecessor ever was. 
We now come to Lord Fisher, a man with an absolute gift 
for making personal enemies, and a remarkable talent for 
making himself unpleasant to any enemy. That, apart from 
Lis record, is proof that he is no " noodle." As for his record, 
that began in the Mediterranean years ago, when he was 
thoroughly abused for sacrificing old ideas about "steam tac- 
tics " in favour of some new-fangled fad of his own about the 
value of the torpedo. These ideas are accepted to-day, but 
when promulgated they were regarded as modernity carried to 
ridiculous excess. It is possible that Lord Fisher may occa- 
sionally have anticipated to-morrow a little too quickly; but 
there is certainly no "back number " about him. The only 
error he is ever likely to make is in crediting the enemy with 
better brain than he actually possesses. But I really do not 
think that we are likely to arrive at any ultimate trouble over 
a Sea Lord who is inclined (by his record) to over-estimate 
the enemy's brain. Rather, I think, we should esteem him 
as a man prepared for every contingency. 
We now como to Admiral Jellicoe. His record in naval 
manoeuvres is that he never was beaten. War may be 
different, but every naval manoeuvre scheme simulated real 
war as nearly as was possible. Ho was easily the best man at 
the game, and the games that he played were many and 
various. 
Now, witliout any eye-wash, compliments or anything of 
that sort, 1 may say that all the critics, non-technical or worse 
as they may be, are all actuated by genuine motives, but this 
war is emphatically a case of "trust the man at the helm." 
(The above was written before news was received of the 
action in the North Sea. In order to avoid seeming to pose 
as a prophet wise after the event, 1 have therefore cut out 
certain paragraphs which followed these remarks, and will 
merely refer readers back to a previous issue of these notes.) 
A word may be added as to the German official statement 
that one British battle-cruiser was sunk. The statement is 
incorrect on the face of it; but we shall do well to avoid regard- 
ing it as an official lie. At the Yalu the Chinese honestly 
believed that they had seen a Japanese cruiser sink; at 
Tsushima the Russians were equally convinced that they saw 
a Japanese vessel go under. Similarly, and for similar 
reasons, I am of opinion that the German claim is made in 
all good faith; and if we call them liars wo shall merely con- 
yince them that their claim is true, inspirit them accordingly, 
and discount the moral effect on them of our victory accord- 
ingly also. 
The correct explanation of the German claim is probably 
as follows. The Bliicher wqs seen to drop astern in a sinking 
condition. A little later, the British ships were up round and 
a1>out her, and other German observers saw her sink. The 
wish being father to the thought, it was perfectly natural 
honestly to presume that the unrecognisable mass of sinking 
wreckage was one of the Briti.sh warships. It has been abso- 
lutely demonstrated that precisely similar reasons accounted 
for the mistaken claim at Yalu and Tsushima. There is an 
»ld saying about tho danger of assuming your opponent to 
be a fool. It can be equally dangerous to assume him a liar. 
Air Raid on the East Coast. 
The air raid on Yarmouth and district has probably a con- 
siderable significance. We may take it that it was merely a 
reconnaissance somewhat on the lines of the first naval raid 
on Yarmouth, when the Halcyon was fired at. We must be 
prepared for the next effort to be quite on Scarborough lines, 
and perhaps more so. 
Emphasis is laid by the Germans on the fact that their 
■" naval airships " were concerned in the raid. This may be 
merely a reply to the fact that it is the British naval air ger- 
Tioe which has played havoc with German Zeppelin sheds on 
more th'an one occasion;. but personally I am not inclined so 
to regard it. 
There is considerable difference between navigating a diri- 
gible over water and over land, and I am inclined to be 
sceptical as to whether any purely military Zeppelin could 
cross the North Sea. 
The German naval airships are said to be differently con- 
structed to the land ones, owing to experience gained. 
I have no exact information as to where this difference 
exists: I merely know of its existence. But the point is 
an important one to remember. It has something to do with 
a variation of cooling between the atmosphere of sea and land, 
and the consequent expansion or contraction in " gas bags." 
Further I cannot follow it. 
If, however, tho difference in construction is so great as has 
been alleged, it means thai only the naval Zeppelins which 
have been built and the crews specially trained for sea work 
are seriously available for offensive operations across the 
North Sea against this country. 
As to the operations which have already been indulged in, 
the less said the better. From the military point of view, 
they were absolutely fatuous : one cannot possibly conceive of 
even an expected military advantage (except in so far that it 
has increased recruiting in this country, which was certainly 
not the object sought after). From the humanitarian stand- 
point the affair was mere ordinary murder in cold blood. 
Comment has been aroused by the circumstance that neither 
by sea nor land was any defensive attack made on the hostile 
aircraft. It is rather generally attributed to inefficiency on 
the part of the Naval Air Service, and all others concerned. 
I do not think this criticism justified. I have seen some- 
thing of our aerial defence work. It is not in the public 
interest to go into details, but whatever else it may have 
been, there was certainly no lack of efficiency visible. 
Even on land and water, where men have been accustomed 
to fight for thousands of years, surprises still occur, despite 
all precautions. In the air, which is an entirely new battle- 
field, surprises are necessarily far more easy, since all precau- 
tious have as yet to be based to a very large extent on theory. 
THE BLACK SEA. 
That the Goehen has been considerably damaged is now 
independently confirmed, neuti-al eye-witnesses having seen 
her carefully screened 15y transports. The chances of her 
being effectually repaired by tho dockyard at Constantinople 
are small, as the resources for any such work are inadequate, 
and the temper of the Balkan States hardly of a nature to 
lend itself to the smuggling through of spare parts, etc. 
One way and another, therefore, there is fair reason to 
hope that the Russians, who have at present secured the undis- 
puted command of the Black Sea, will continue to hold it 
undisputed till the end of the war. 
At present they are making full use of their advantage, 
and the Turkish loss of war material, sent overseas in spite 
of the obvious danger, must be growing very serious. Tho 
latest report is that a transport carrying most or all of the 
Turkish aeroplanes has been destroyed. 
GENERAL MATTERS. 
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS. 
P. S. (Castlecaulfield). — An idea substantially similar to 
yours was mooted many years ago. I do not know whetlicr it 
has been adopted. If the Admiralty is not sympathetically- 
responsive, it m.iy either mean that the idea is in use, or else 
that there are technical difficulties in the way of its employ- 
ment. 
A. S. H. (Dundee), and P. H. (Southend).— I do not 
think that I was in any way unduly optimistic in estimating 
that there has been no numerical net increase in the German 
submarines. They have certainly lost more boats than they 
admit to; and they could not possibly yet have completed' 
moie boatsi than were in their normal programme. That since 
tho war began they have laid down a great many boats is 
probable enough, but none of these would as yet be complete. 
As regards the value of scouts, whether or no both fleets are 
intent on engaging does not materially affect the question. It 
is in any case of the utmost importance for an admiral to be 
kept informed of the exact strength, formation, and course 
of the enemy, before that enemy is actually sighted. A.s re- 
gards my statement that, " For the rest, we only know for cer- 
tain that a dozen Dreadnoughts, plus tho complementary lessen 
craft, are superior to a dozen plus x Dreadnoughts minus the 
complementary lesser craft," did not merely refer to scouta 
only, but also to destroyers, submarines and auxili.iry vessels 
of every sort or kind. 
l3. D. F. — I am inclined to think that " Hartmann, the 
anarchist," was one of the best futurist stories ever written; 
but you must remember that it was a story, not a question- of 
existing facts, such as we now have to deal with, and I anx 
afraid that your "suggested floating battery" comes into 
something like the same category^ .That is k> aay^ it docs ootl 
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