January 30, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER. 
MUST THERE BE A WAR OF 
ATTRITION ? 
A PLEA FOR A STRONG AERIAL OFFENSIVE. 
L. BLIN DESBLEDS. 
NOTE— TWs Ariide has been 
By 
submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publicatioii as censored and takes m 
responsibility for the correctness of the statements. 
T might he an interesting theme for the military his- 
torian to discuss how the Napoleonic wars would have 
ended, had not the French, a hundred years ago, been 
AND 
■ defeated at Waterloo ; but thore can be no two opinions 
•^ that Wellington's crushing victory brought to its close 
a campaign which might have been very protracted 
bad it not 'been for the opportune intervention of the English 
contingent in supporFof their Prussian allies. Yet the result 
of the Battle of Waterloo— which has shaped the course of the 
tistory of the great nations for the last hundred years, and 
baa exercised a greater influence on the political history of 
the world than any other recorded event— in its last resort 
depended upon a timely participation of the English guard. 
It is a matter of pur© speculation to imagine what would 
bo the present relative position of the European powers had 
ihe Haye-Sainte been crushed and the English troops, which 
were under cover in the corn fields, been annihilated before 
they could take a timely part in the battle which dashed to 
the ground, for ever, the dreams of conquest of the great 
Buonaparta. 
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 
AIRCRAFT. 
Let us now consider the battle of Waterloo in the light 
of modern knowledge, and see how its result might have been 
affected by the employment of certain appliances which scien- 
*ifio progress has since brought to the service of war. Let 
us picture to ourselves the anxiety of Napoleon at his enforced 
ignorance of the position of Wellington's men and we shall 
then have no doubt that, if he had had air scouts at his dis- 
posal, he would not have failed to make good use of them. 
This is clear from a perusal of his military Manuel, especially 
that part dealing with the importance to a commander-in- 
chief of having exact information about the strength and posi- 
tion of the enemy. Let us assume that his air-scouts had 
located th« position of the English troops, waiting in con- 
cealment for orders to participate in the battle that was 
already engaged, and let us, merely for the sake of argument, 
suppose that he could not take from the general field of battle 
B sufi&ciently strong force to hurl against the British forces 
^ither to destroy them or to keep them in check, thus depriv- 
ing his enemy of a reserve which might be thrown against 
him, as, in fact, it was, at the critical moment. What 
would a Napoleon do in the hypothetical Waterloo we are 
considering? He would know that if he did not annihilate 
the English troops or succeed in keeping them away from the 
field of 'battle they would be employed against him at a well- 
timed moment; and yet he had no troops to use for the pur- 
pose without courting disaster from anotlier quarter. 
Let us exert our imagination a little more. Let us sup- 
pose that, at this grave moment, some daring airmen of the 
Napoleon's Imperial Flying Corps, realising their commander- 
in-chief's perplexity, hinted to him that their aircraft, besides 
being valuable for reconnaissance or kindred work, were also 
of groat offensive value, and that the worth of their suggestion 
was recognised by their oommnader. The question which 
would immediately present itself to the Napoleon for solution 
would be, how best to use his offensive aircraft to attain his 
special object — that is, either to annihilate the English troops 
or to prevent them from coming to the assistance of their 
Prussian allies. 
THREE KINDS OF AERIAL OFFENSIVE. 
Three methods of dealing with the problem would sug- 
gest themselves. Ho might (1) carry out an aerial raid over 
the ground occupied by the English ; (2) attack, from above, 
the English troops lying in the cornfields ; and (3) by destroy- 
ing the roads, bridges, etc., prevent the English contingent 
from participating in the battle. 
If the Napoleon possessed but a small numiber of aircraft, 
the first solution would be the only one capable of adoption. 
Its cffoct, if the operation were constantly repe.ited, would be 
either (1) to force the English troops to take up a new posi- 
tion nol exactly of their own choosing, or (2) to compel them 
to take part in the general action sooner than they had anti- 
cipated. In either case the aerial raid could not do more 
than alter tlie original plans of the English commander in 
some details, and would not influence, to any considcrabU 
degree, the issue of the battle ro.ging at that moment. 
If, however, the Napoleon had at his disposal a power- 
ful force of aircraft, consisting not only of a great number of 
machines but also of an adequate body of airmen, fitted and 
trained for offensive work, he would be in a position to adopt 
the second course open to him; that is, to malce a regular 
attack from the air on the English forces below. Thers 
would then bo a battle royal taking place in a vertical plane, 
and of such a novel character to those on the ground that, not 
only morally — ^because they would be unprepared for it — but 
also materially, they would be at a disadvantage to the aerial 
attackers. The fighters from the air would be provided with 
the equivalent of a great number of big guns, all placed in 
position, and ready to deal death and destruction, right and 
left, whilst the soldiers below, in replying to the attack, would, 
almost entirely, be relying on their rifles which they would use 
with astounding inefficiency, for all their training and prac- 
tice had been based upon a horizontal range. The result 
would have been that tho English reserve would have found 
themselves in such a difficult position that not even a dis- 
ordered retreat nor a precipitate flight oould save them from 
the aerial offensive. 
For certain reasons, some based on local and economic 
faclors and others on the psychology and training of his air- 
men, the Napoleon. of our hypothetical Waterloo might, how- 
ever, prefer not to engage the English force in a vertical 
battle, but, by directing his aerial attackers to destroy all the 
possible routes by which the English reinforcements could 
march to the support of their Prussian allies, he would pre- 
vent them from influencing the battle in progress. For the suc- 
cess of such a plan, it would be necessary that the aerial attack 
should result in the destruction of all the avenues whereby 
the enemy could receive timely reinforcement. Such an at- 
tack must be made in force, and the same bridge, or road, or 
passage should be attacked several times to ensure certain 
destruction. An aerial raid, of a small number of aircraft, 
made with the object of destroying avenues along which rein- 
forcements could be sent to the front, would not, however, 
lead to the moral certitude that the aim of the raid has been 
accomplished. 
Let us now turn from the hypothetical Waterloo which, 
as regards many details has, of necessity, been very imper- 
fectly and inaccurately examined, and let us see how, in the 
present conjecture a strong aerial offensive of the Allies might 
considerably curtail a campaign which, by the employment 
of the ordinary method of warfare only, promises to be a very 
protracted one. 
MUST THERE BE A WAR OF 
ATTRITION ? 
Almost all the foremost military critics of the world have 
repeatedly declared that the present great European War 
must be one of attrition. Must it, however, be so? Yes, if 
the Allies do not apply to their utmost all the legitimate 
means al their command. No, if they employ, on a compre- 
hensive scale, a method of attack which, as we have seen, 
might have reversed the results of Waterloo and which, as 
the writer has pointed out in his last article,* could prove of 
inestimable value in the present war, and especially in tha 
situation existing to-day at the front. 
Without taking into account the misery and poverty and 
grief of hundreds of millions of women and children, who, by 
no process of logic, can be made responsible for the war; 
witliout considering that every day that passes sees tho 
destruction of thousands of noble and valuable lives ; without 
being influenced by the fact that all tho scientific progress 
of tho world, relating to a true and well-understood civilisa- 
tion, is at a standstill, the writ-er contends, on purely tech- 
nical grounds, that it might be profitable to tho Allies, witli- 
out relaxing in any degree tho rigid application of the plan 
of campaign of their commanders, in whom they have full 
confidence, to enter upon a formidable aeriaJ offensive which, 
might render a war of attrition unnecessary after all. Think 
1916. 
"The Aeroplane on tho Offensive," Land and Water, January 23, 
