February 6, 1915. 
LAND AND WATEE 
along C-D numbering 5; then by massing the 
extra two units at either end tliey would begin 
pushing the corresponding ends of the enemy back. 
A would fall back to E, and B to F. The pressure 
would continue because there would always bo 
superior forces against the enemy on either horn 
of the crescent and the enemy could not reinforce 
either horn without danger of having his centre 
broken in because his numbers would be too small. 
He would be pressed back and back until with the 
advance reaching, say, G on the north he would 
be in peril for some one of his great lines of com- 
munication, such as M-M. Long before that hap- 
pened he would have had to fall back with his 
centre and with his other extreme as well. If he 
'did not fall back in time his centre would be cut 
off and at least one part of his line — ^perhaps the 
whole of it — would be swamped. 
But if things are the other way about, and if 
A-B counts as 4, while C-D as yet only counts as 3, 
b 
there can be no question of C-D acting in this 
fashion. By the time he had massed men at either 
extreme, C or D, leaving only just enough men in 
the centre to hold firm, he would yet not have men 
enough at either extremity to maintain a con- 
tinuous and successful advance indefinitely. The 
enemy could easily mass men to stop him by with- 
drawing forces from their own centre (which they 
can well afford to do), apart from the fact that 
their lines at the extremities are already stronger 
than his. 
Indeed, C-D upon a field of battle would be 
foolish indeed if he attempted any such movements 
upon the extremities in force. 
But a line a thousand miles long passing 
through very various political areas is not like the 
field of a single battle. It may offer political 
opportunities of which the weaker force can take 
advantage. This happens to be the case in the 
eastern field to-day. At A and C you have that 
province of East Prussia upon which German 
opinion is more sensitive perhaps than any other 
part of the national soil. It has already suffered 
invasion, and though the Germans won a great 
victory at Tannenberg five months ago, and drove 
the inVaders out, there is a lively recollection of 
the event throughout the Empire. fThe great 
estates were raided, the peasantry (who are half 
servile in condition) rose in revolt against the Prus- 
sian squires and looted the country houses ; there 
was a stampede of refugees to Berlin and very 
heavy material damage done. On the other end 
of the line at D-D you have two important con- 
siderations embarrassing the enemy. The first is 
that the presence of the Russian forces in what is 
nationally Roumanian territory more and more 
urges Roumania to move, and Roumania has half 
a million fresh men admirably trained and 
equipped. On what is politically Hungarian soil, 
and still free from invasion, at least three million 
men of Roumanian blood and speech inhabit the 
eastern slope of the Carpathians and naturally 
attract Roumanian interference. It must not be 
forgotten that here, as everywhere, the Germanic 
Powers as a whole stand for the principle of sub- 
jecting, populations to an alien Government ; the 
Allies stand as a whole for the reconstruction of 
the minor nationalities in Europe. 
The second consideration embarrassing the 
Germanic Powers at the southern extremity, B-D, 
is the peculiar position of Hungary. Hungary 
was as much the cause of the war as anyone, for 
Hungary claimed to keep subject Servians and 
Roumanians against their wills, but the Hunga- 
rians have no cause to sacrifice themselves for the 
Germans; they are something, quite apart, and, as 
was shown, in these notes some time ago, 
the gravest political weakness of the Germanic 
Allies consists in this necessity they are under 
of placating this outlier, the alieia, suspicious, 
and now actively discontented Hungarian element 
on the outer edge of their body. If Hungary went 
the remaining half of the Dual Monarchy "would 
be almost compelled to make peace, and when that 
had happened Germany certainly could not hold 
out. 
We talk continxially of the war as though 
" Germany " were the only enemy. We too often 
forget that the forces of our enemy are nearly 
doubled, their reserves more than doubled, by the 
alliance of Germany with Austria. 
Now, an invasion, though it were but partial 
and temporary, of Hungary by Russian forces 
through the extreme passes of the Carpathians, or 
by Russian and Roumanian forces combined, when 
Roumania enters the field, might just prove that 
extra straw on the camel's back which would de- 
tach Hungary from the alliance and break down 
the whole Germanic scheme. 
To sum up, then, Russia attacking at the two 
horns of the crescent cannot hope to envelop; 
she has not the men for it. ^e will not, during 
the winter months, have the equipment to provide 
the men for it. But she may perfectly well by 
causing alarm at both sides of the long line, under 
the political conditions of those extremities, cause 
grave embarrassment and division to her enemy. 
She may make Hungary so clamour for reinforce- 
ments that Germany, in terror of losing Hungary, 
will throw too many men towards the south-cast 
and w^eaken herself elsewhere. If, while that is 
happening there is a successful raid going on in 
Eastern Prussia she may well compel the Germans 
to reconsider their policy of helping Hungary and' 
fluster Germany into withdrawing troops from the 
south to secure the north. 
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