February 6, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
near Noyon are one-third more advanced into 
French territory than are the Russians in East 
Prussia even if they do occupy Lotzen — and there 
can, of course, be no comparison between the 
economic and political importance of the two belts. 
I have seen, by the way, in connection with 
this German advance into East Prussia, the crit- 
kism that it would be baulked by the line of the 
Niemen or Memel. I cannot see how this is the 
case ; that line is perpendicular to the general ad- 
vance, which is taking place on both banks and 
with sufhcient forces. Tilsit could just as well be 
occupied from the south as from the north, the 
only advantage of the attack from the north being 
that it further embarrasses the enemy and cuts him 
off by railway from the town of Memel and the 
sea. 
11.— THE CARPATHIAN FRONT. 
The effort at the Carpathian end of the line 
differs in every possible respect, political, geo- 
graphical and strategic, from the effort on the East 
Prussian front. 
^ fusion 
'Bases. 
Mi«>»-i Russian Zui^ 
aariaaiuu 
The length of the whole curve, which is the 
first element to consider, is from the Donajec to 
the Bukovina, not very far short of 300 miles. 
Next, the 300 miles are not a uni- 
versal front across which the general action may 
stray; they are, for strategical purposes, a series 
of defiles, which defiles are the passes over the 
mountain. There are six main passes from the 
Roumanian frontier to the basin of the Donajec, 
and the railway is carried across the range in 
no less than four. These main defiles are in their 
order the Dukla, the Lupkow, the Uzsok, the 
Volocz, the Delatyn, and the Borgo, which last lies 
in the knot of the mountain system, where Rou- 
mania and the Bukovina and Hungary meet. The 
reader will note upon this line the position of 
Przemysl. It lies about forty miles from the sum- 
mit of the range and about one-third of the way 
along the whole curve. It has long been isolated 
and its garrison blockaded by the Russian armies. 
The reader will also note the position of Bukovina, 
the situation of the Roumanian population under 
Hungarian rule (interspersed, it is true, with Mag- 
yar and German elements, which also form, as a 
rule, the wealthier portion of the community), 
and lastly he will note the way in which, these 
passes once crossed, the roads down them lead 
directly to the Hungarian Plain, which is wholly 
without natural or artificial defence. 
Lastly, it must be remembered that the whole 
of this fighting is taking place in deep snow, and 
under the most abominable conditions of weather. 
Now let us see what are the positions and the 
objects of the two combatants. As to position, 
the Russian line runs everywhere along the foot- 
hills of the mountains much as I have marked it, 
until the neighbourhood of the Bukovina, where 
the Russian line advances much more closely to the 
summit of the range, and has, at one moment, 
actually crossed that summit, though not holding 
any part of it at the present moment, the furthest 
point it ever reached being at Kirlibaba, where 
there is no good road. This means, of course, 
that the Russians have massed most of their troops 
(in proportion to what the enemy had to oppose 
to them) towards the south-east. It seems to be 
true conversely that the Austro-German attempt 
W'ould take the form of a special concentration to- 
wards the north-west. We cannot know, we can 
only guess, but the best guess to make under the 
circumstances is that the enemy will put stror^ 
forces in front of the Bukovina frontier to prevent 
its being crossed (indeed, those forces are already 
present) and will then make his chief effort across 
the Dukla, the Lupkow, the Uzsok, and the 
Volosc. It is obvious what such a swarming north- 
ward and eastward from the Carpathian ridge 
here would mean. It would mean the attempt 
to relieve Przemysl and (that eternal objective in 
all this fighting for months) the pushing of the 
Russians beyond the main railway, Lemberg- 
Przemysl-Tarnow, by which alone an army in 
Galicia — particularly in a winter campaign — can 
live. 
Which of the two forces has the better 
chance of success we cannot yet possibly deter- 
mine. We know that Germany has lent at least two 
corps; we know that Austria-Hungary has called 
up the heaviest force she can possibly spare; we 
can safely conjecture that pressure upon Serbia 
has been removed (I believe the information 
upon it to have been false, as I said in these 
columns a week or two ago); we know that so far 
the pressure has been strong enough to prevent a 
further Russian advance into the hills, and, up to 
the time of writing — Tuesday evening — that is all 
we know. The near future will tell us both whether 
Russia alone can force any of the passes and also 
whether Roimiania will come in, in time. But 
note this. If the Russians do force in any numbers 
any one of the passes they have done the trick, for 
in this field alone they have better lateral commu- 
nications by railway than the enemy, and the 
country beyond the hills is vulnerable in the 
extreme. Put a Russian Army, for instance, 
marching down the valley of the Szamos or the 
Bistritza, and quite certainly the enemy's forces on 
all the northern passes — leaving no more than just 
enough to hold them — will turn back south to chal- 
lenge the invaders of Hungary. 
5» 
