LAND AND WATER 
Februarv 6, 1915. 
to fall right back from the crests of the mountains, 
as along the arrow, the original French line being 
A-B before the battle and C-D aft-er it. 
But we are supposing for the purposes of this 
Analysis a new German offensive undertaken with 
the fullest strength available against one sector of 
tlie line. If these new formations should attempt 
too wide an advance, if they should try at once to 
Attack the first sector from the cast and to turn it 
from the north they could not succeed. The main 
^jkttle would inevitably develop upon the northern 
"front, and the French from within the angle could 
<5pnccntrate there very much more rapidly than 
their opponents. The thing could only be done at 
the beginning of the campaign, and with the ad- 
vantage of complete surprise at this stage of the 
■war, where every party to it has learned by heart 
the nature of the fight, that surprise, where a large 
■body of men were concerned, would be absent. 
South of the obstacle of the Vosges the first 
-sector only consists in the narrow gap of Belfort, 
=and Belfort is not only among the strongest of the 
■fortresses, but has had six months of leisure in 
■which to develop the new character of siege work : 
to establish temporary and concealed batteries far 
outside the old permanent works, and to design a 
-covering trench work all along the eastern half of 
the circumference of greatly extended fortified 
^zone. 
Whether the enemy will think the advantage 
-of breaking the French line here great enough to 
counterbalance the vast difficulty of the task, and 
therefore v^orth while, only the future can show. 
2. The second sector, which may be called the 
-sector of Verdun, was already marked in these 
notes last week as that in which the principal 
German effort, when it came, might very probably 
be made. It has at first sight no conspicuous ad- 
vantages; it involves the reduction of what must 
have become in the course of the last few months a 
most formidable new system of defence, and pro- 
gress could not be rapid or dependent upon sup- 
plies. While it was taking place, moreover, the 
French should have ample time to concentrate. 
But when one looks a little more closely at ths 
problem one may well believe that the Verdun 
sector would especially attract the enemy. 
Apart from the general considerations men- 
tioned last w^eek, there are special points well 
worth remarking. 
(a) The enemy has here very short and very 
excellent lines of railway communications, as along 
A-A to Treves and Coblentz, along B-B to Spires, 
along C-C to Strasburg. Great depots advanced 
to within a stone's throw, so to speak, of his objec- 
tive, are available at Luxembourg, at Thionville 
and at Metz. Very numerous railway line'^ con- 
nect him in a couple of hours with the further bases 
on the line, and a netvrork of these running north 
and south, as well as east and west, permit him to 
mass men very rapidly upon any point of this 
sector. 
(b) The conformation of the line is already 
such that one particular and successful effort 
would complete the investment of Verdun. The- 
enemy holds the wedge ending at St. Mihiel, and 
the line to the north and east of this goes round in 
three-quarters of a circle. It is only the remain- 
ing quarter, or a little more, that has to be joined 
up to effect the enemy's purpose, and he would, did 
Qifmsirj 
St.Mihki 
j 
a* 
