LAND AND WATER. 
February 6, 1915. 
handicap him in his purchase of this material from 
abroad. 
Lastly, there is a category of things necessary 
to war, which he either possesses only in small 
quantities or does not possess at all. We have 
already seen in these notes how he stands in the 
matter of copper. He is, perhaps, just beginning to 
feel the strain here. If the war be prolonged he must 
feel it, and even in the absence of a blockade, an in- 
secure financial position would hamper him in his 
purchase from abroad of a necessary factor in 
armament. He needs, also, antimony (which he 
does not possess at all) for the hardening of lead, 
and he needs rndiarubber acutely. It is in this last 
item that insecure finance would, perhaps, hit him 
worse if the war were prolonged to a second year. 
Even in the absence of a blockade, an unfavourable 
exchange would gravely afiect his power of purchase 
over an article which is tropical in origin, and 
nowhere obtainable within his frontiers. 
Quite apart from the blockade by sea and with 
reference only to their financial position the Germanic 
A]lies,[aa their position becomes unstable through the 
strain upon gold, this latter will not handicap the 
enemy in any of those things vital to the prosecu- 
tion of war save horses, petrol, rubber and certain 
metals, of which the chief is copper. All these 
materials, some of which must be purchased in large 
amounts, and notably horses, rubber and petrol, 
would be gravely endangered by a really unsound 
financial position of this kind. Petrol and rubber, 
which are necessaries for modern war, would be 
the most affected. 
But if we look on the situation as a whole it is 
not true that blunders or unavoidable trouble in 
mere financial arrangement will compel the enemy 
to peace within a suitable period, certainly not 
within one year, probably not even two. 
At Devonshire Park, Eastbourne, on February 8, at 3.30, 
Mr. Hilaire Belloo will give an illustrated lecture entitkd 
" The Progress of the War." 
Mr. Hilaire Belloo -will lecture at Guildford on Saturday 
afternoon, February 6, and at Queen's Hall on the afternoon 
of Tuesday, February 9, on "Material and Matters." His 
nest evening lecture, on "The Progress of the War," is on 
February 17. 
Mr. Fred T. Jane will lecture at Queen's Hall on Fridfty 
evening, February 26. 
Owing to great pressure on our space Mr. Belloc is unable to deal 
with'" Gbnespondence " this week. 
THE WAR BY WATER. 
By FRED T. JANE. 
■0TB,— Tkii ArtlcU hti bcfn tibmltttd to th* Prei» Boreaa, whld doei not obleet to tho publication ai ceniored, and tabei no 
rciponiibilltjr for tbe correctneu of the itatemeDti. 
THE NORTH SEA. 
The North Sea Action. 
ADMIRAL BEATTY'S further report puts a Bome- 
•wh»t different complexion on the North Sea fight. 
li was apparently not the two-toK)ne affair that 
it appeared on paper to have been, but a more 
or less equal fight which, had Hipper's tactics 
been good enough, oould comparatively easily 
have been a German victory — a victory mainly averted by the 
fact that Admiral Beatty was the superior tactician. 
Reporta are' atill not full enough for complete comment, 
but certain main facts emerge very clearly indeed; and no 
further information that we may ever glean ia likely to afieot 
these main facts one iota. 
Now, marshalling these facts in chronological order, the 
first is that tbe German battle cruiser squadron was accom- 
panied by light vessels. Since it certainly did not take these 
lesser vessels with it for the pleasure of their society, it 
fallows that tiiey were taken for some definite object. 
For the bombardment of an undefended British seaport, a 
light cruiser would be as efficient as a battle cruiser, and a 
good deal more economical. In this connection, by the way, 
it is important to remember that for many a year all German 
naval policy has been along the lines of getting a pennyworth 
of value for every penny expended. It is true that in the 
Trade War the reverse of this obtained; but the blame for 
that lies with unexpected British naval activity, not with 
errors of judgment on the German side, flimilarly, the first 
East Coast raid waa a wonderful waste of money without 
wsult— bnt they did not so regard it. To them it represented 
We nsk X. We stand to gain « + y. Under the head of 
[Rightfulness " y will be a valuable asset to us. Therefore 
at is worth risking a few Mght cruisers to obtain y." 
In the second and destructive raid, y having been pre- 
inmably easily secured before, they thought that a might also 
be incorporated, and they obtained such « as having killed 
tad wounded a number of non-combatants may represent. 
To us this does not seem a military asset, but the German 
mind is attuned differently to the British mind, and in a 
matter of this sort it is only the German mind that counts. 
Now, of the " baby-killer " raid we know two things. 
Of these it is fairly well established that it was a battle cruiser 
expedition pure and simple, carried out, apparently, without 
auxiliaries. "^ 
On the third egress the German battle cruisers were 
accompanied by a full complement of destroyeni and such 
other auxiliaries as would be required for a battle. From 
this the inference is that a battle was expected — to take 
destroyers out for what Mr. Churchill calls a " baby-killing ' 
expedition would be a waste of money along tlio linos of the 
economical German mind. 
I suggested last week that a possible Gennan objective 
was to get battle cruisers out on the trade routes, but I liave 
no desire to labour the- point. I will merely say that if that 
«'€r« their objective they had arranged for it in the smartest 
possible way. 
We now come to tho preliminaries of the action. Here, 
again, the Germans exhibited a very high technical ability 
to giasp things. When our light squadron found them and 
did not at once turn and run, the German admiral imme- 
diately deduced that a British force superior to his own was 
somewhere in the vicinity. 
I am somewhat inclined to fancy that the really correct 
thing for our light squadron to have done might have been 
to do a "cut and run." Perhaps they did. Equally, 
perhaps, that gave the show away. You never know. In 
chess, a knight that retreats is often more dangerous than 
one that advance.s, and in naval warfare you cannot sit down 
for an' hour and think iliings out like you can in chess. Thfe 
only possible thing to do is to act on the instant and along the 
viain idea. 
The action, whatever it was, of our light squadron is, 
therefore, a matter of minor significance; whatever they did 
was bound to be right or bound to be yrrong, according to 
the enemy's reply. 
Tlie enemy's reply was absolutely correct. It w.as to 
turn about and run for it, taking no chances. So swiftly 
and well was this accomplished by the Germans that only our 
two fastest battle cruisers, the Lion and Tiger, had any actual 
important part in the battle, other than the finishing off the 
rearmost and slowest German. 
The guns per broadside really engaged were as follows : 
BRITISH. GERMAN. 
Lioa 8 13. Sin. Derfflinger 8 
Tiger 8 13.5in.' 
12in. 
Soydlitz 10 llin. 
Moltke 10 ]lin. 
Bliicher 8 eitt. 
Omitting the BUidicr aa hopelessly outranged .and a sort 
of lamb sent to the slaughter^ this gives us 16 British big 
u* 
