February 13, 1915. 
LAND AND WATEB 
THE WAR BY LAND. 
By HILAIRE BELLOC. 
publication *i ctniorcd and tskci ■• 
BOTE,— Thli ArtltU bat been inbEittcd to the Presi Bureau, which doei not object to the 
responiibility for the eorrectncn of the (tatementi. 
la accordance with the regnlrcmenti of the Preu Enrean, the po.itioni of troopi on Place Illnitratlnr thli Artlcl. mitt only bt 
regarded ai approximate, and no definite ttrcngth at any point Ii Indicated. 
THE ATTACK ON THE SUEZ CANAL. 
HE movements upon either front, even 
upon the East, have been so slight this 
week up to the moment of writing (Tues- 
day evening) that there is little matter 
rip 
gics of the campaign is very high, and supposing 
that, from geographical circumstances of any kind, 
the crossing of the obstacle were manifestly impos- 
sible, while the molesting of it from the eastern 
side were easy, then it would still be the business 
of any wise commander to maintain a series of 
to analyse. But such as there halve been „++„„r ai, r^ ^ i^t, v. u 1.111 
we discover in the eastern field, and the most im- f ^ll'T^ • I ' ^^though.he should have 
TDortant n^rhnn^ nf tli. .r.\.nrU. L.r. . i,„t .... ,.;^. ».« ^opeoi crossmg it. For it is not the occupa- 
portant perhaps of the episodes over that very wide 
area is the attack upon the Suez Canal and the 
failure thereof on February 2nd. 
It seems that the total number of the enemy 
that reached the region immediately east of the 
Canal, in what the Turks call a Reconnaissance in 
Force, was not less than 12,000. 
No successful crossing was effected at any 
point, save by four men, who M'cre captured. The 
operation of bridging at one point (Toussoum, 
opposite the Sand Dunes, south of the Ismailia 
lake or Lake Timsah) was permitted up to a 
certain point and then attacked. The bridge was 
destroyed. Much of the bridging material fell 
IsmaUia 
.•^ 
pa- 
tion of Egypt that counts in itself so far as the 
mere progress of the campaign is concerned — 
though it would count, of course, heavily as a 
prize in the settlement after the Avar — it is only 
Egypt as the ground from which the Suez Canal is 
controlled that is material to the large operations 
of this campaign : and from the point of view of the 
enemy the complete control by themselves of that 
waterway, though valuable, would not be very 
much more valuable than its increasing interrup- 
tion. 
Germany and Austria and their Turkish Ally 
are already held by sea. Even if the Turkish in- 
vasion shouM succeed in obtaining control of the 
Canal that control would have, therefore, little 
positive value to the Germanic alliance. But the 
negative value of interfering with commerce 
through the Canal is exceedingly high. 
Much of this country's food, certain of its re- 
inforcements, a great mass of its general trade, 
is dependent upon that strip of water ; and so has 
come to be all that rapid communication with the 
vast, foundational, Indian Dependency which, in 
the last forty-four years, has grown to wholly re^ 
place the longer route by the ocean. 
There is here a parallel with the maritime 
strategy of the enemy in home waters. 
Thus, the submarine threat cannot, it is evi- 
dent, actually account for any very large propor- 
tion of the tonnage entering and leaving British 
ports. What is hoped from the submarine threat 
is that the sense of insecurity may be so nourished 
by occasional and unexpected disasters as to in- 
terrupt the regularity of our supply. It is evident 
into our hands. The enemy lost a considerable, that this feeling of insecurity can be more easily 
Tiisswiv 
UyenaHill 
\ake %nsak 
SandDimes 
12 3 4 s 
iO 
JEz^llshMle:^ 
though not very high, proportion of killed, 
wounded and prisoners, and has now so far retired 
that none of his troops (we are officially informed) 
is to be found within a belt of twenty miles from 
the eastern bank. 
effected in a highly circumscribed area such as this 
belt of communication between Port Said and Suez 
than upon the high seas. It is enough that first 
one point upon the Canal and then another should 
be rendered difficult of passage fairly frequently,' 
Now, the first point we have to seize in con- for all regular traffic through the waterway to be 
nection with the whole of this expedition against interrupted. It is this, I think, which accounts for 
Egypt is the strategical object in view. the experiment — for it was no more — of last week.' 
What was the motive of the enemy in prepar- It is probably this which accounts for the employ-' 
ing and conducting this attack? What will he ment of but a portion of the forces the enemy had 
intend when he knows it? 
It may, I think, be prudently suggested that 
his motive is not simply the occupation of Egypt 
and the driving of the British forces thence; nor 
his task only the obviously difficult one of sur- 
mounting the obstacle of the Canal. He has also 
at his disposal. And it is this which makes it 
fairly certain that the attempt will be renewed. 
It is evident that the chief instrument for 
merely molesting the users of the Canal would be 
heavy artillery. Heavy artillery concealed in the 
irregular land lying east of the Canal, dependent" 
a secondary and most important object, which is upon its long range for a certain immunity, and 
the rendering of the Canal unsafe in the opinion of occupied both in threatening the water and per- 
shippers for commerce. haps in lessening the depth by ruining portions of 
The value of this object in the general strate- the banks, would be a very serious menace. Only. 
