February 13, 1913. 
LAND AND WATER, 
multiple, certainly not less than 7, is safe. Of 
8 men that fall on a large average but 1 is killed ; 
or again, if we know how many are killed, then to 
find less than seven times as many wounded may 
convince us that the lighter cases are not mentioned. 
This principle has been challenged by many 
critics, but I think it remains firm when one is 
considering great bodies of men, and averaging 
losses over many hundred thousands. It is a highly 
conservative estimate, as the British figures 
prove, and the fighting has not spared the British. 
Upon that basis the German multiple, which 
was under 4, and is still a good deal less than 
5, will not do ; it must mean that the Germans 
only note grave wounds (which the relatives of the 
wounded men should hear of), and death. 
Then Prussia admits in her lists just under a 
million casualties. Many of the entries appear- 
ing are so far back as August 20th, and the lack of 
any reports fi'om recent heavy fighting in Poland and 
the Carpathians justify us in turning that million into 
twelve hundred thousand. It is probably more. Next 
we must add to this 1,200,000 the lighter cases 
(for though these return, as do ours, they are 
necessaiy to the total which we are about to 
compare with ours), and add at least 50 per 
cent, for these — for if you add to a multiple of 
less than 5 in order to reach the very reasonable 
and certainly too low multiple of 7, you must add 
50 per cent, to the first figures — add that 50 per 
cent, for light wounds, and it turns your 1,200,000 
into 1,800,000 of Prussian hit and caught, apart 
from sickness. The reality is almost certainly 
nearer two millions or even beyond two millions, but 
we are here deliberately making what is called a 
"conservative" estimate, i.e., an estimate against 
our expectations or hopes. 
Here, then, you have 1,800,000 for the total 
Prussian lists if (a) all casualties whatsoever were 
included ; (h) all to the present day were collected. 
Now to these Prussian lists of all kinds you 
must add the lists of the non-Prussian parts of 
the army, which I now take to mean (though 
at first I believed it meant more — all who were 
not technically Prussian) the Saxon, the Wurtem- 
burg and Bavarian contingents alone. These are 
rather less than a quarter, but much more than 
a fifth, of the total armed population of the 
Empire. Supposing we add 400,000 for these 
unknown published extras (which is only just over 
22 per cent. — the real figure is nearer 23) and you 
get 2,200,000, excluding sickness in any form, for 
your grand total. 
Now what percentage is that of the men put 
under arms up to now by the German Government ? 
When we have discovered that we are in a position 
to compare our wastage with theirs. 
Our wastage, remember, we found to be about 
25 per cent. 
The men put under arms by the German 
GoA'ernment so far are certainly not less than five 
millions. If they have brought none of their new 
formations into the field save an insignificant 
number of volunteers, then their losses stand in 
the very high proportion of 44 per cent, of casualties 
of all kinds, excluding sickness, out of the total 
number of men they have up to now put under 
arms. But it is wise to weight the scales against 
one's own expectations and to allow a larger number 
than five millions armed to date and therefore a 
lower percentage of casualties. But the Germans 
have certainly not yet armed six million men. Let 
us suppose that they have armed as majiy as five 
and a half millions so far, then their losses in casual- 
ties of all kinds, excluding sickness, will be forty per 
cent., and that I believe to be not far from the true 
estimate. 
I believe that when the history of the war is 
written it will be discovered that of every hundred 
men put into uniform and given a weapon in the 
German Empire fi:om the outbreak of the war to the 
beginning of February, 1915, forty were hit or 
caught; and I equally believe it to be a just estimate, 
which the history of the war will prove when it 
comes to be written, that the casualties of the Allies 
(in the West at least) are, to the casualties of their 
opponents, in a proportion not very difierent fi'om 
that of twenty-five to forty. 
This great difference is one of the prime factors 
in the changed aspect of the war as It proceeds, and 
in the opportunity for the Allies' attaining an ulti- 
mate numerical preponderance. 
If it be asked why this difference in wastage 
should exist I think the answer is found both in the 
expectations with which the enemy forced this war 
and in the method by which he has therefore con- 
ducted it, as well as in the tactical traditions of hia 
service. 
To win rapidly, and therefore necessarily at a 
high expense of men, was at the very core of the 
German plan. To use tactical methods which were 
also expensive of men, was a tradition from which 
he neither could nor desired to escape, and we know 
by his quite recent action in front of Bolimow that he 
has not modified this tradition in the least, even 
after the exceedingly heavy lessons taught him, 
and even though the campaign has now endured 
long beyond his first expectations, and has cost 
him far more in men and in material than he had 
planned for upon his most extreme provision. 
Certain consequences follow from this tre- 
mendous rate of wastage in which, however, I have 
made no efibrt to estimate the corresponding margin 
of sickness. The first consequence is one which 
somewhat modifies our view of the enemy's in- 
creasing weakness through wastage. We must 
remember that about one-half of those who are 
wounded can return to some form of service. One 
half of the wounded, excluding the killed and the 
prisoners, is about three-eighths of the casualties. 
Now three-eighths of 40 per cent, is more than 
three-eighths of 25 per cent., and the total number 
of kUled, disabled or caught upon the enemy's side, 
is, therefore, not in so high a percentage compared 
with ours as on a first view one might conclude. 
When you have allowed for the returns of the 
lighter cases, you get only one quarter of the 
German forces permanently out of the running, 
while you get for the Allies on the West between 
15 and 16 per cent., or something rather less than 
one-sixth. 
The next inference from our figures is one that 
very closely touches the immediate fiiture of the 
war. 
We know from past calculations based upon 
ofiicial lists what indeed might have been expected 
fi-om the nature of Prussian fighting that the loss 
in officers has been particularly heavy, even heavier 
than it has been among the Allies in proportion, and 
we are fairly safe in estimating that not far short of 
one-half of this professional body upon which the 
enemy's service is utterly dependent for cohesion is 
now out of the field, that is, not far short of one-half 
of those ofiicers employed in the active line and in 
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