LAND AND WATEK 
February 13, 1915. 
(2) What with German spies and other things, I do not 
tea how your suggestion could be got to work. 
(3) Your suggestion of electrically-driven pumps which 
should be employed to squirt water into the German trenches 
is more in Colonel Maude's line than mine. Fiom what I hear 
irom friends in the trenches the Germans are much more 
careful than we are in the matter of arranging their drain- 
age; but when you get out there I am certainly of opinion 
that you might do a great deal to make our trenches more 
eomfortable, if you got your idea adopted and could solve 
the mud problem. 
W. II. (London). — You ask why not hunt submarines as 
we hunt whales 1 This idea was promulgated by Lord Charles 
Beresford about eighteen months ago. The trouble is that, 
although the analogy between the whale and the submarine is 
correct, the whale is a silly sort of animal, entirely ignorant 
that it is in any danger ; the submarine, on the other hand, 
is a terribly intelligent whale. 
As regards your statement that as an " exciting, profit- 
able, and glorious sport it should surpass anything yet seen 
on land or water, and that there would be no lack of men 
to take part in it," if it could be got up as a new kind of sport, 
it is not impossible that — supposing enough participants — 
■ome results might he obtained, but I am rather afraid that, 
taking all circumstances into consideration, the odds are 
that amateur .sportsmen engaged in the job would be rather 
more dangerous to British submarines than to German ones. 
J. W. S. (Sanderstead). — It is quite true that if a sub- 
marine fires a torpedo at a ship at too close a range she is 
quite likely to be destroyed by her own action. I have noted 
your suggestion, and have forwarded it to the proper quarter. 
I do not think that it is novel. It is all right in theory, 
but certain technical difficulties seem in the way. Quite 
apart from the Press Censor, you may rest assured that no 
idea likely to give a hint to the enemy would be published 
in the columns of Lakd and Water. 
J. H. B. (Edinburgh). — The maximum draught of any 
battleship never exceeds more than about 30 feet. Any battle- 
•hip would be quite safe in eight fathoms. The Dogger Bank 
presents no obstacles to any warship. It is simply called 
" Dogger Bank " because it happens to be shallower than the 
rest of the water round about it. 
J. C. P. (London). — (1) See reference to neutral flag in 
article. 
(2) A certain number of our merchant ships carry a gun 
or two aft for protection, but that is against armed liners. 
The chances of a merchantman detecting a submarine sub- 
merged are practically nil. The latest German plan appears 
to be to torpedo without warning. 
(3) The U21 has returned to Germany after her Irish 
Sea exploits, so there is no more to be said. She probably 
achieved it lashed alongside some vessel flying the neutral 
flag. 
(5) The German battle cruisers returned to Heligoland 
by llie north entrance instead of by the usual southern routes. 
A submarine is not ubiquitous, and I think you should re- 
member before suggesting that our submarines are incompe- 
tent that if some time ago our battle cruisers managed to 
enter Heligoland Bight without being injured by German sub- 
marines acting in their own waters, it is only natural to 
assume that German warships under more favourable condi- 
tions should be able to maintain an equal immunity. It is 
true that the German battle cruisers had been knocked abou^ 
but the steaming capacity of all of them appears to havo 
been unimpaired. 
A. B. H. (West Hartlepool). — Unfortunately, your letter 
of December 24 has only just reached me. If the enemy had 
fired a hundred rounds they gave you a hundred shells. It is 
a matter of one round one shell. As regards the Germans 
having the range, they could work that out by chart with- 
out further knowledge, though I dare say that you, in common 
with the other towns visited, had some German fellow-towns- 
men who amplified the information. 
Z. E. P. — Something such as you suggest was first mooted 
in the Crimean War, and has figured in " future war stories " 
since. Presuming it to be feasible, there would be an ample 
supply of volunteers without occasion to call on you. I am, 
however, asked to convey to you an appreciation of your 
oiler. 
N. H. (Wales), and O. G. — I have personally forwarded 
the matters to which you refer to the proper quarter. It 
seems to be highly significant. 
THE VERTICAL BATTLE. 
INFLUENCE OF AERIAL ATTACKS ON TRENCH WARFARE. 
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS. 
IN its last analysis, tho meaning of the -word " victory " 
is ability to force an opponent to accept the views 
of his victor upon terms, or conditions, imposed by 
the latter. In every-day life victories are won, 
many times a day, by an individual who 
imposes his will upon another, or by the operation 
of the law when it forces the inhabitants of a country to 
follow certain lines of conduct laid down by the 
legislator. Just as the greatest possible victory for the 
legislator would be tho total absence of offenders against the 
laws he has laid down, so the greatest victory a commander 
could win would be the absence of the enemies he expects 
to encounter. Although this seems like enunciating an axiom 
which everybody knows, yet the necessity for the enunciation 
is not pleonastic, because for some there cannot be victory in 
the present war unless a great many of their enemies are 
exterminated, and for others a victory means a triumphant 
entry of the Allied troops into Berlin after hard-fought and 
bloody encounters. Again, victory to many means the destruc- 
tion of the German fleet and tlie capture of the German 
colonies; whilst to others it means the abdication of the 
Kaiser and his imprisonment for life in a fortress or on a 
desert island. Final victory for the Allies may be accom- 
panied by all these things, but, in essence, victory has nothing 
whatever to do with battles, or with the killing and maiming 
of a great nnmbor of the opponents, or with tho sinking of 
their ships and sailors, or with the capture of their colonies, 
or with the imprisonment of their commanders. It may be 
necessary to take one, or more, or all of eucli actions in order 
to ensure the permanency of a victory. But, essentially, the 
modern view of victory is the ability to impose upon nations 
opposing us our notion of right or wrong, in their relations 
with other countries, in at least the same degree as it is 
imposed upon the inhabitants of our country in their inter- 
course with one another. It follows, therefore, that the more 
easily, and the more promptly, we can force upon our oppo- 
nents tho adoption of a code of international ethics, accept- 
able to the Allies, and obtain the necessary guarantee that il 
will be kept by them, the greater will be our victory. 
Without in the slightest degree criticising what h^as been 
done by our commanders, to whom the State has entrusted 
the task of carrying out the operations to enforce our views 
and those of our Allies, the writer desires to press home tho 
point which he has already, on two occasions, brought forward 
in tliese columns, namely, that a strong, comprehensive, and 
sustained aerial offensive might result in a much earlier 
victory than would otherwise be the case. 
AERIAL OFFENSIVE AND TRENCH 
WARFARE. 
In its present stage the war is essentially one of trench, 
work, at least as regards the Western field. In his articles 
Mr. Ililaire Belloc has made tho character of this method of 
warfare very clear, even to the lay reader. The writer has. 
12* 
