LAND AND WATER 
February 20, 1915. 
railway and standing before it like a screen, shel- 
tering it from a German advance, consists in two 
rivers, the River Niemen and the Eiver Narew. 
In its detail it consists in the central part only of 
the River Niemen (from the point (a) near Jurburg 
to the point (b) near Grodno), of the Borbr, a tribu- 
tary of the Narew ; of the Narew down all its latter 
portion until it falls into the Bug, and of the Bug 
up to its junction with the Vistula at Novo 
Georgievsk. 
The weakness and the strength of (this con- 
tinued line are as follows : — 
Its weaknesses : 
First, its great length. It is in length from 
where the Niemen enters German territory to 
where the Bug, after receiving the Narew, falls 
into the Vistula, excluding the sinuosities of the 
rivers and taking olily the straight lines between 
one defensible point and another, more than 250 
miles in extent. 
Secondly, it does not, as does the Rhine, for 
instance, form a complete barrier, because (a) the 
last seventy miles or so of the Niemen run through 
German territory and both banks of this lower part 
of the river have been in German hands continu- 
ously, so that a crossing here and the turning of the 
line is easily effected, (b) There is a gap between 
that point, Grodno, where the Upper Niemen 
turns eastward and ceases to form part of the line, 
and the point where the Borbr becomes available 
as a line of defence. 
Thirdly, the strength of the line has been 
made to depend very largely upon permanent forti- 
fications, and we know from the experience of this 
war that permanent fortification has not the value 
which it was supposed to have. Kovno, Olita, 
Grodno, Osovwiecs and the string of fortresses on 
to the Vistula are so many local strongholds, the 
power of resistance of which it is now known will 
depend much more upon the number of men that 
can be spared for the defence of outer temporary 
works than the existing inner permanent works^ 
that has been the universal rule ever since the be- 
ginning of this war wherever a fortress has been 
in question. Verdun is proving it to-day and so 
almost certainly is Przemsyl. 
Fourthly, not all these fortresses are of similar 
value. The kst one. Novo Georgievsk, has the 
highest reputation, but many of them are of the 
second class, or at least are reputed to be of no 
greater strength. 
The strength of the line, on the other hand, is 
best seen when we examine it in detail. 
The Niemen where it leaves the Russian terri- 
tory is about 500 yards broad and a deep, navi- 
gable stream till quite half-way between Kovno 
and Grodno it retains this character to the full, 
and even as high as Grodno or rather in the reach 
which is below that fortress it is still a formidable 
obstacle. 
Secondly, just as the Niemen becomes 
narrower, more winding and therefore more open 
to an attack, the enemy finds himself in that con- 
fused and difficult country which is the continua- 
tion of his own Masurian Lake district. He is in 
the midst of all that tangle of marsh, lake and 
forest, the central town of which is Suwalki. 
Thirdly, to the south of this, again, where a 
small sc^le map suggests a mere gap between the 
two rival streams, the defensive line is admirably 
strengthened by nature in two ways. There 
is the great mass of forest several days* 
march in length and breadth, which takes its 
name from the town of Augustowo, and is con- 
tinued in another great mass of forest southward, 
while the V,alley of the Borbr, especially below 
Osowiec and before it falls into the Narew, is ex- 
ceedingly difiicult of passage; vast stretches of 
marsh, notably the Lafi and Wizna marshes, miles 
and miles broad, interrupt any passage west to 
east. 
Fourthly, though topographically the weakest 
part of the line, is the Lower Narew. This stream 
is, below Ostrolenka, a very appreciable 
obstacle, comparable in width, I believe, to the 
Lower Oise, or the Thames above tidal water, and 
having no natural passages. But, more important 
than this is the fact that this last portion of the 
line is within easy relieving distance of all the great 
forces concentrated round Warsaw, and depending 
upon the stores and the communications of that 
principal depot of Russian Armies in Poland. 
There is a good treble railway service to Ostro- 
lenka and Warsaw, and nowhere more than one 
day's march from the line or well within two days' 
march. 
Fifthly, and lastly, there should be noted 
in the whole character of the line a particular topo- 
graphical point which may very well prove of im- 
portance in the near future, and which has an 
element of strength in it against weakness due to 
the fact that it can be turned in German territory. 
That point is as follows : — 
In the neighbourhood of the fortress of Kovno 
the course of the Niemen turns a corner. It is all 
very well to command both banks of the river in 
the neighbourhood of the Prussian frontier, but 
you cannot turn the line, in spite of commanding 
the right bank, until you have fought your way 
round a long detour right round Kovno. It is 
strategically true to say that you must hold Kovno, 
or at the least invest it before you can have really 
turned the line of the Niemen. Therefore upon 
Kovno, by all deductions from thejnore obvious 
necessities of the case, the German offensive must 
be directed. Part of the present movement may 
be regarded as a direct advance upon Kovno, for 
there are forces moving along from Gumbinnen, 
which forces had got as far as Wilkovv}'Szki last- 
Sunday. There are other forces following along 
either bank of the Niemen itself, which forces had 
at the same moment got about ten miles inside the 
Russian border. 
The going here is tolerable. There are cer- 
tain local marshes of no great size across the 
northern paths from Tilsit to Tauroggen, where 
the northernmost German forces now are ; there is 
an excellent causeway, and all that country do^vn 
to the Gumbinnen-Kovno line, a front of fifty 
miles, is fairly well provided and tolerable in sur- 
face, though it must be remembered that the alter- 
nate frost and thaw of the season have rendered 
the roads worse than usual. Alternate frost and 
thaw, by the way, though more extensive this year 
than usual, are not unknown in Northern Poland : 
Napoleon's retreat of 1812, fot- instance, a little 
south of this point (which legend has transformed 
into an almost Arctic operation) proceeded, as a 
fact, two months earlier in the year, through 
exactly the same alternation of frozen roads and 
thawing slush. It would have been less disastrous, 
perhaps, had the frost always held. 
