LAND AND WATER 
February 20, 1915. 
Railways 
M > I A ustnan 
I have already said in the remarks prelimi- 
nary to this that the political factor was here 
predominant. 
It will be seen in the accompanying sketch 
that there is nothing to prevent Russian and 
Roumanian forces from joining should Roumania 
shortly go into the war, because a common fron- 
tier between Russia and Roumania runs several 
huoidreds of miles. None the less a wedge struck 
in by and including the position of Czernovitz 
would cut the Russo-Roumanian effort in two, for 
it would cut the main railway which aSects aU 
the eastern Galician and Bukowina portions. 
The Austro-German advance in this region, which 
would be very serious, already threatens that 
railway. A mere gap or breach in the line, though 
serious, would not be fatal. But a thorough occu- 
pation by the eneniy of the v/hole of Bukowina 
would be a very different matter. There is no 
good railway system running through the western 
territory by which the Russian army in Galfcia, 
western and centtal, could act as one with an army 
in Northern Roumania. The above sketch show- 
Co 
I?; 
%\ 
'^::i^ 
frontier 
Showing importance cF Cxernowitz as a 
Railway Cmtrc. 
-»•—•—» Yrontiers. 
•'*■■* " * MaiaRaiJmnfs. 
Htiiii t' Secondary BdiJways. 
IV, 
ing the railway system' on either side of the fron- 
tier is sufficient to prove this. What the war's 
fortunes may be here in the next few days we 
cannot tell, but we can establish a criterion of the 
enemy's success. If he occupies Czernovitz in 
force he has in this region established his object :. 
for that tov.n is the axis of all the railways. 
Now, what about the Northern Carpathian 
Passes where the enemy originally intended to 
make his greatest effort, but from which he has 
been diverted to this new southern effort against 
Bukowina, and which are now in part held by our 
Ally? 
The position is very confused, and it is made 
none the easier to understand by the fragmentary 
nature of the Russian and of the Austrian com- 
muniques. 
Let us first state what we positively know. 
We know that the Russians are over the crest of 
the Dukla, we know that they are not yet debouch- 
ing from that wide and easy valley on to the Hun- 
garian plain below; they are not even yet at the 
southern mouth of the pass. We know that they 
were some days ago across the crest of the Lup- 
kow, and we have no ncv.'3 from the enemy (as we 
surely should have if things were so) to the effect 
that they have lost that advantage. But here again 
we know that they have not yet advanced beyond 
about half-way down the Hungarian slope, even if 
they have for so far. Our Allies do not, so far as 
I can gather, hold the crest of the Uszog. They 
are still fighting on the upper torrents of the San. 
They here claim certain successes, but their very 
mention of the district proves that they are there 
upon the wrong side of the hills. South of the 
LTszog they are certainly everywhere east of the 
crest until we get to the Bukowina,. where, as we 
haVe seen, they have fallen right back on to the 
plain. 
The general position is therefore to-day, or 
was last Sunday, as in this sketch. 
•--=—>— Approximate front of -^.j^^^:^.'-^ X-,'" 
Russuns m Carpathians, '^ ?i§^ -CL^ 
Sund^j^. Fcbruanj 1^'^J91S *"" ^^^""^-x 
J 
More than that we cannot say, but what v/e 
can gather both from the effort here and from the 
effort hundreds of miles away in East Prussia, is 
that the enemy, both Austrian and German, has 
now begun to use very seriously the newly trained 
men sent forv/ard as drafts to replace losses, and 
even the new formations with which we have so 
long been threatened. 
We further know that he is, for the moment 
at least, making expenditure of these last reserves 
of energy upon the eastern field. Let us turn, 
