February 20, 1915. 
LAND AND WATEE 
therefore, to the last point, which is a guess 
— it can only be a very rough one — of what he has 
to spend in this fashion, and of the proportions in 
which this reserve fund of human energy has 
already been drawn upon in the hope of an imme- 
diate decision in Poland, 
III.— THE ENEMY'S USE OF NEW MEN. 
UPON the two opposing sides, that of the 
Germanic Powers and that of the 
Allies, two contrasting elements of re- 
serve power have appeared. 
It is that contrast which lends the 
clue to all the later phrases of the campaign, and' 
the development of that contrast should decide the 
issue. 
iThat contrast is as follows : — 
Roughly speaking, upon the Germanic side 
there is a limited known reserve of man-power for 
which equipment was prepared in sufficient or 
nearly sufficient amount before Berlin forced the 
war upon Europe. That is the advantage Berlin 
obtains by choosing her hoxir for fighting and by 
having spent over two years in making all ready 
for the unexpected blow. The limitation of the 
human forces at the disposal of Berlin and its 
Allies is a necessary disadvantage. 
Roughly speaking, Russia, Britain, and, to 
a much less extent, France, have a certain elastic 
reserve of man-power. 
As to man-power France has some elasticity, 
because (a) she did not expect to use her elder men 
nor desire to do so, (&) she refused to use men 
below the military age, (c) men exempted were as 
a rule exempted wholly and not labelled for mili- 
tary but non-combatant office (for the most part), 
(d) she has a certain recruiting field in her colo- 
nies. 
Britain had a difficulty, but a much greater 
elasticity. Her difficulty was that her new recruits 
required lengthy training. 
The difficulty of Russia lay wholly in the 
tardiness of equipment. She had a large trained 
reserve of men ; young men and very apt. 
It must be remembered that the Germans, 
having control of the Baltic, and haying 
through their Turkish alliance control of the Dar- 
danelles, blockade Russia absolutely, save upon 
those ports, Archangel and Vladivostok, which 
are ice-bound at the critical period. The German 
Government is neither afraid of neutrals, nor too 
careful of financiers — who, for that matter, are 
still laying their money all over the world on its 
success. The German Government prevents any- 
thing from getting into Russia that it can prevent. 
This tardiness in equipment is the great han- 
dicap on the allied side. But it is a handicap 
which every day tends to remove. Therefore, the 
Germanic Powers are, more than ever, fighting 
against time. 
Next, note that when the numerical prepon- 
derance passes to the Allies, that moment will cor- 
respond more or less with the coming of better 
weather, which will permit of a vigorous offensive 
in the West, before it permits of a vigorous offen- 
sive in the East, and remember that this vigorous 
offensive in the West will, unless Germany gets a 
decision in the East, be begun by the people who 
have the initiative, who, in the West, are the 
Franco-British forces. Next note that unless a 
decision in the Eagt is reached before the spring 
the Germanic Allies are badly handicapped, espe- 
cially in the northern field of Poland, by the state^ 
of the roads in the general thaw that comes after 
the winter. 
Put all this together and you will remark that 
Germany and Austria have it in their interest to 
put as many men a^ possible into the eastern field 
just now. 
Now, how long does it take to train a new 
man, and in what way is he best used? 
It takes about six months, and after six 
months you can use your man with fair confidence 
even in large masses, but he makes very much the best 
material when he is mixed xoith existing units, and 
very much the \vorst when he has to act in large 
numbers upon his own account and under the 
leadership of his own officers, of whom but a small 
proportion can be professional. To all these con- 
siderations add the following and concluding 
one: (1) That Germany had everything ready 
for training a large untrained body espe-i 
cially earmarked as a recruiting ground, (2) thai 
Germany and Austria have lost very heavily — 
much more in proportion than the Allies, (3) that 
every factor in the struggle besides those men.- 
tioned (the factor of the imperfect blockade grow- 
ing more perfect, the factor of enormous wastage, 
the psychological factor of a populace dependent 
upon self-confidence, the factor of the wastage of 
cadres, the dynastic factor, the factor of the hesi- 
tating neutrals — all but one of them anti-German, 
etc.), makes it important for Berlin to impose an 
inconclusive peace as soon as possible; take all 
these considerations together, and it can only 
be reasonably concluded that the Germanic 
Allies have put into the field as many new men as 
they can have found in equipment (for the six 
months have passed), that they have drafted most 
of these in as new material to feed the existing, 
but heavily depleted units, that thev have equip- 
ment ready for such, and have therefore been able 
to put them forward the moment they thought 
them sufficiently trained, and, lastly, thatthey will 
be very chary of using wholly new formations; in 
other words, that they have already very seriously 
drawn upon the actual human material available. 
This new German and Austrian offensive in 
the eastern field, of which the present week has 
seen so striking a development, is, it may be 
reasonably conjectured, the first considerable 
effect of the new levies. It will be of the greatest 
importance to one's judgment of the campaign to 
see how those levies comport themselves, and in 
what numbers they would seem to have appeared 
The first of these elements lies in the future. 
The second is susceptible of a rough — but only a 
Very rough — speculation. 
Wc know that upon the West the enem/s 
numbers have been maintained : had they not been 
maintained a line of 400 miles, with quite 5,000 
men a mile, could not have been held. We are as 
certain as calculations can make it that the German 
losses, allowing for the slightly wounded already 
returned, or about to return, give us quite a 
million and a^quarter men of absolute loss 
and probably much more (the German Army- 
alone is here considered, because as the question 
is one of proportion, its sole example will suffice). 
Now, we are equally certain that numbers have 
been m.iintained in the East and even increased"; 
before this offensive movement was begun. Wo' 
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