February 20, 1915. 
LAND AND WATER 
past, and to some extent may continue to happen; as, despite 
all vigilance, there are plenty of lonely places from which 
signalling is possible. On the oiher hand, a good many re- 
ports about signalling hare, on investigation, proved eus- 
cepttble of a simple " explanation "—though here, perhaps, 
the culprit would be particularly careful to arrange for that I 
The second group of theories is along the line that the 
Germans, foreseeing the possibility of land stores being un- 
earthed, have arranged a second string to their bow in the 
shape of stores sunk at certain easily-located shallow spots, and 
BO their submarines are enabled to keep the sea for practically 
indefinite periods— the limit being running out of torpedoes. 
There are no inherent diflBculties in the way of obtaining 
euch submerged stores. They are sure to be provided with 
epphanoes which will make grapnel fishing for them quite 
easy, and once they are brought to the surface their trans- 
ference to the submarine at night is a most simple proposition. 
Mr. Simoa Lake, U.S.A., inventor of the Lake sub- 
marine, has, however, been amplifying this matter bo an extent 
which— though no doubt useful to Mr. Lake as an advertise- 
ment—has discouraged a number of people in this country 
%o a totally unnecessary extent. 
One special feature of the Lake submarine is that it has 
two submerged trap doora in iis bottom. Through these doors 
mines can be laid, or a diver explore the bottom of the ocean 
quite as thoroughly as many a year ago Captain Nemo, of the 
Nautilus, did in the pages of Jules Verne. 
So far, 80 good. But Mr. Lake (or his interviewers for 
him) has made the further statement thai' the German sub- 
marines have adopted all his submarine trap-door devices. 
So far as I can ascertain, they have never had the prescience 
to do anything of the sort. Thotographs of the sections of 
the latest type of German submarine (presented by the Kaiser 
to a German museum) give no indication whatever of any 
such useful door. In any case, it is unnecessary for the 
obtaining of underwater supplies. For that matter, the Lake 
device, if I remember rightly, was originally advertised for 
the quite unmilitary object of recovering treasure from by- 
gone wrecks. To give a militant touch later on the obvious 
alternative of mine-laying was substituted. But, so far as the 
securing of previously laid under-water supplies is concerned, 
submarine trap-doors do not affect the question. 
The Great Air Raid. 
On February 12 a force of thirty-four British naval 
aeroplanes attacked Ostend, Zeebrugge, and district with a 
.view to destroying communications and the German naval 
base at Zeebrugge. Ostend railway station was more or less 
destroyed, and mischief inflicted on the railway in several 
places. It was, of course, impossible to ascertain the exact 
damage inflicted, and it is important to note the official state- 
ment that " no submarines were seen." 
Probably directly the aeroplanes were sighted any sub- 
marines at Zeebrugge promptly went below and remained 
thero till danger was past — their most sensiBle course. It does 
not follow, however, that the German submarine service sus- 
tained no damage. We may reasonably assume that there was 
B submarine or two being put together, or, if not that, at 
any rate, plant for the purpose which must have been con- 
siderably damaged. 
While it is wise not to exaggerate the importance of the 
raid, there are several points in connection with it which 
call for attention. 
Of these, the chief seems to be the complete impotence of 
the land fire. Seeing the large number of machines engaged 
it might have been expected that what missed one would have 
hit another on the principle of " firing into the brown." Also 
a fair number of aeroplanes have been brought down during 
the war by shell and rifle fire, and what has happened before 
might well have been expected to happen again. 
One inference is that the defenders were flurried with the 
numbers of the attack, and eo fired on no regular system : 
but as the force probably divided and attacked several spots 
simultaneously, this is a questionable hypothesis. 
So we cannot make much out of this point, saving that 
obvious onti-aerial gunnery is proved to be a very exact 
science indeed, needing a great deal of training and probably 
a good deal of natural aptitude as well. The ordinary " man 
behind the gun " seems more or less completely harmless 
•gainst aeroplanes. 
No dOiibt this will be remedied in time, but! the selection 
of suitable men and the necessary training is unlikely to be 
accomplished very quickly. 
Tlie lesson of most importance, however, is that the 
aeroplane is the correct reply to the aeroplane. The German 
offensive-defensive in this direction seems to have been ex- 
tremely feeble or else non-existent altogether. It is this cir- 
cumstance which robs the Ostend and district raid of its 
importance as a .#uide and lesson, and makes " Great Air 
yictory " sound ultra- Yellow Press. 
Of far more real importance probably was the foiled 
German attack on Dunkirk, which has been "chronicled merely 
in short paragraphs. Here the Germans retired on findinj; 
Allied aeroplanes prepared to fight ihem in the air. Their 
position was roughly "Everything to loss and nothing to 
gain." 
One swallow does not make a summer, but herein may 
lie the glimmerings of a new law which will eventually sharply 
differentiate between war in the air and war as we know it 
on land and water. 
On the ordinary elements of the past it has been abund- 
antly proved that victory is almost bound to go to the attack, 
because it is able to select its own time and place. At first 
glance this seems even more true of the air. We do not 
immediately recognise that the circle has perhaps been over- 
shot, that the attack is hampered by having two objectives : 
(1) Destruction of something on land; (2) Destruction of de- 
fending aircraft which intervene. The defence, on the other 
hand, has only the single objective of destroying the enemy. 
Hence as time goes on we may expect to see aerial warfare 
become more and more puzzling and intricate, and not im- 
possibly a diminution in the number of air raids as 
"counters " come to be more and more studied. 
This, at any rate, seems to be the outstanding lesson of 
Dunkirk; and, unless I am greatly mistaken, we may expect 
at no distant date to see aerial warfare resolve itself into 
something analogous to modern chess as played by the best 
masters, or fencing as displayed by its leading exponents. 
The surprise attacks of to-day will, in the future, come 
to be regarded as inexpressibly crude amateur eSorts, bear- 
ing about as much resemblance to what will bo evolved as 
the naval warfare of the early Plantagenet days bears to tlic 
naval warfare of to-day. 
This, perhaps, is the best illustration of any, for anyone 
who has read history even in the most cursory way. In those 
old days the French ships would casually sack an English 
town, and the English ships as casually sink a French one. 
Only very gradually was it discovered that the ship must 
fight the ship for any military asset to be secured. Takin;^ 
the stupid bombardment of Scarborough, the Hartlepools, and 
Whitby into account, it would look as though Germany has 
not yet succeeded in arriving at a true military perspective. 
If she turns out to be equally obtuse as regards the air, slio 
is asking for trouble as surely as Persano asked for it at 
Lissa nearly fifty years ago. 
Air power is governed by exactly the same immutable laws 
as is sea power, only a good deal more so. By evading our 
aerial defence it is perfectly possible for German aircraft 
to do quite a lot of damage to London or other places. By 
further evasion it is possible for them to return in safety. 
The risks, however, are great, and while the mastery of the 
air is in dispute, any such action is folly from the military 
standpoint. 
The Power which secures the mastery of the air will be 
in exactly the same position as that which secures the mastery 
of the seas — that is to say, able to bombard and destroy with- 
out let or hindrance. But the idea that the air admits of 
substantial results from surprises and evasions is entirely 
fncorrect. It is pleasing to record that the fact that v.e 
employed thirty-four aeroplanes to do to Ostend what could 
Lave been done by half-a-dozen or so proves that we at least 
have recognised the cardinal fact which governs aerial warfare. 
The obvious inference is that we were out for a fight and 
that the Germans declined action. If it means anything at 
all it means that we have learned the lesson of the Plantagenet 
Navies better than they. Which is all so much to the good. 
Grahame- White tumbled into the water ; Samson will prob- 
ably emulate him soon. After that we shall have no more 
air-deities, and the real business of aerial war will begin. 
It will be a war in which there is no place whatever for 
" heroes " — to be brutally truthful a war in which the bull; of 
those engaged hope that every " hero " will die an early death. 
I know the Naval Air Service pretty well. It is not 
afraid of anything that Germany can put up against it. But 
it is in deadly terror of adulation from the sensational Press. 
The only thing the Naval Air Service as, a whole desires is 
that whatever it achieves or docs not achieve should be put 
down to the Naval Air Service as a whole. In a general way 
their motto may be summed up as: — "Do your job, but be 
careful to keep out of the limelight." 
There is no one who hates the sensational Press quite so 
much as the successful "air bug" or the successful "sub- 
marine crab." By the time the eulogies on him are finished 
he feels a veritable worm, and even his best friends regard 
him in a somewhat similar light. It may sound strange: but 
I know of more than one flying man who has funked things 
for fear of being suspocted of seeking big headlines in the 
daily Press. 
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