LAND AND W A T E E. 
February 20, 1915. 
The Blockade Thieat. 
By the lime these lines are ia print, the momentoua 
18Lh February will have come and gone. Whether it will 
be diSerent from the 18th January or the 18th December re- 
mains to be seen. Personally, I am inclined to think it 
will turn out to be a orude. attempt to induce Admiral 
Jeliicoa to alter his dispositions — hai-dly a promising scheme. 
In any case, and supposing the scheme of piracy to be em- 
Jtarked on in a larger measure than heretofore, the Germans 
will discover that, as Mr. Churchill hinted in bis sp««ch in 
the House of CJommons, the resources of the British Navy 
are by no means exhausted. The possibility of all German 
fc'od supplies being cut off as a retaliatory measure may 
make von Tirpitz hesitate as to the perfection of his scheme. 
Also, quite apart from what the Navy may be doing, 
ihe spirit of the British Mercantile Marine ia, as we have &eea 
in the case of Captain Propert of the LaerUs, hardly of a 
fiature to submit to the latest form of " Kultur." 
Furthermore, if von Tirpitz has studied the psychology 
cf our First Sea Lord, he must be well aware that Lord 
Fisher's " Huthless, Remorseless, Relentless," was and is 
far more than a mere alliterative phrase. 
A cleverly reasoned article in the Daily Mail this week 
suggested that Oermany'a best move is to compel the U.S.A. 
to make war on her, as that would give her the opportunity 
of offering peace while power remains to her, on the grounds 
that she could not fight all the rest of the world, and that 
any refusal of the Allies to make peace, which would enable 
Geimany to prepare for a further struggle, would put 
American sympathy on the side of €rermany. This may 
explain the "blockade." 
Meanwhile, however, several neutrals are painting their 
nationalities in large letters on the sides of their ships, and 
all no doubt will eventually adopt this form of protection. 
ITLis will render more or less inoperative any use of the 
neutral flag by us — and there would be difficulties in the 
way of adopting the neutrals' protective system. 
The psychological moment will come if and when the 
pirates sink without warning a British liner on board of 
which are American passengers. 
It is sometimes said that the ratio of "real Americans " 
to the entire population of the United States is small, espe- 
cially in voting power, and that immigrants of non-American 
ideals are in the majority. Personally, I doubt this, escept 
perhaps in the case of German-Americans. Otherwise, after 
a few years' residence, a high proportion of immigrants are 
apt to become more American than the Americans. And 
no real American is going to stand by unmoved and see his 
fellow-countrymen left to drown because some German has 
a, notion about " frightfulness." Nor, if the American 
nation be dragged into the conflict, does ft seem likely it 
win love its enemies to the extent of enabling them to repeat 
the performance on a more auspicious occasion. 
GENERAL MATTERS. 
G. P. (Oxford). — Aa the Germans have oflBcially stated 
that their fleet took the offensive in the North Sea action, it 
certainly looks on the face of it as though their oflScial 
announcement that three British destroyers were sunk was $ 
" deliberate lie." Personally, however, I am still of opinion 
that it was more' proBably an honest misconception on their 
part. They saw one of our destroyers hit, and the speed at 
which they were running away, coupled with the smoke, etc., 
would cause that destroyer to disappear almost instantly, and 
jf a couple of boats slowed down to stand by, they "would 
also seem to have disappeared and would be presumably sunk. 
This is an undramatic explanation, but, in all naval history, 
I believe that it is only the Turks and Chinese who have 
deliberately circulated false official stories of successes. The 
reasons for not doing so are not a love of the truth, but a 
consideration of the efiect on moral, should the lie be dis- 
ct.vered in the country of the liars. 
At first sight this seems discounted by the German state- 
ment that they " took the offensive," but tbaf, after all, is 
only our old friend's " strategic movement to the rear " ; and 
I suppose that Hipper has long since explained to Von Tirpitz 
that "offensive" meant endeavouring to draw Beatty into 
* mine field. What we would like to believe and what we 
Lave to believe are not always one and die same thing. 
W. B. J. M. (Kensington), H. R. (Hampstead), E. T. 
(Liverpool), G. H. (Bournemouth), and others. — You will note 
that I have dealt with the submarine matters to which you 
refer in the text this week. 
P. J. B. (London, W.). — I am afraid that I cannot acid any 
further conjectures as to why Hipper did not return to 
attack the Lion and Tiger. On page 15 of the issue of 
February 6 you will find that the attempt to draw across a 
mine field theory is the probable explanation. 
A. G. C. (Barnt Green). — 1 have not read the pamphlet to 
which you refer, but you may take it that the German official 
statement as to the loss of three cruisers and one destroyer 
in the action off the Bight of Heligoland is quite correct. 
There was so much fog about that it wa« impossible for \m 
to ascertain the exact strength of the Germans. The four- 
funnelled cruiser was probably the Roan or Yorck. Very 
likely she received a hit and hauled out of action. It has 
further to be remembered that a ship can easily get a funnel 
or two knocked out of her in action, and so subsequently be 
presumed to be another vessel. 
D. G. (Wales). — Your theory about a small coasting 
steamer being in communication with the German submarines 
is by no means improbable. As to the " well-dressed 
strangers " in your district, 1 should say that your best course 
is to pic£ a few private quarrels with them and learn what 
language ihey use when Ihey ore excited. 
T. W. (Manchester). — The lost German destroyer to which 
you refer is, of course, S90. The other matter I am referring 
to in the text, though, as nothing has appeared about it i|i 
the Press, it may come under the ban of the Censor. 
W. Y. (Athlone). — The idea of bullets containing phosr 
phoruB or something similar in the base being fired at 
Zeppelins is all right in theory, but, in practice, suffers from 
the fact that hydrogen is not an explosive unless mixed with 
air. Given enough such bullets ripping up one particular 
bag, it is possible that an explosion might occur, but I doubt 
if it is in the probabilities. 
A. H. A. (Glasgow). — I have forwarded your informatitta 
to the proper quarter. 
R. D. B. (Dorset) and H. W. R. (York).— Something 
similar to what you suggest is already in existence. 
L. F. S. (London). — I do not think that there is anything 
that our Navy does not know in the matter of locating mines 
and sweeping for them. The device to which you refer is soino- 
what similar to that employed by Farragut's monitors in 
the American Civil War. It was effective so long as it was 
merely a question of tie bow of the ship hitting the mine. 
In the Russo-Japanese V^ar it did more harm than good, aa 
this war saw the introduction of blockade mines — a couplo 
of mines fastened together in such a fashion that on the 
connecting cable being touched one mine would bo brought 
up against one side of the sEip and the other to the other. 
W. McC. (Cornwall). — 1 have forwarded your letter to 
the proper quarter. The story you tell me ia interesting, but 
you can trust the Navy to be very much on the look-out in 
the district you mention. 
L. L. S. D. (Leighton Buzzard).— The speed of 26.4 knots 
assigned to the Blucher as best speed in " fighting ships "■ 
merely indicated the maximum to which she reached for a 
minute or two; the 25.8 was her best on the measured mile. 
None of these fancy speeds go for much. 
You have more or less caught me tripping about the 
Torek. She ran on to German mines after the first attempted 
East Coast raid. The four-funnelled cruiser " was either the 
Boon or Torek," but the Torek having been previously dis- 
posed of, it was, of course, the Boon, or one of the new four- 
funnelled light cruisers still left in existence. 
C. (St. Leonards). — See answer to the above. 
H. M. (Hendon). — It is possible that the Brunton scheme 
about which a letter appeared in the correspondence columns 
last week, may have points about it, but I am afraid that 
would not apply to your proposed improvements. Apart 
from other questions the difficulties of fitting would be very 
great. With reference to your two questions, any reply 
would be censored. Your theory of detecting periscopes by; 
means of a masthead observation using a suitable colour 
screen is decidedly interesting, and has the advantage of pro- 
ceeding along a known basis. At any rate, it would be 
worth trying. 
J. T. 8. (Ballyhooly).— (1) All the text-books give the 
monitors engaged off Zeebrugge aa carrying two 6in. guns 
forvi'ard and two 4.7 howitzers aft. The draught is givea 
as 8^ feet. (2) The amount of ammunition carried in super- 
Dreadnoughts is ample for all needs, but it is not advisable 
to state the exact amount. It may console you, however 
to know that it is more than you estimate. 
F. C. H. (Liverpool). — Certainly if a merch.ant ship 
sighted a submarine, mado for her and let go an anchor at 
the same time, and the submarine, submerged, were hit by 
the anchor, something would undoubtedly happen. But as 
the submarine would be moving under water in the process 
of diving, the chances of success do not ssem very great. 
W. H. B. (Headinglcy). ^Experiments for the detection 
of periscopes are extremely interesting. I followed the 
rough examples with much interest, and would advise you, 
directly you have made a rough working model, to submit 
it to the Admiralty without delay. 
E. J. P. (Lowestoft). — Many thanks for your kind appre- 
ciation. 
(A large number of replies is unavoidably held ot«e 
until next week.) 
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