LAND AND W A T E K. 
February 27, 1U15. 
Jewahi 
MiUs 
of East Tiussia and a;:;aiust the line of the Nioinen 
and th.e Xarew is then developed and unniistak- 
afjle. They are on that line as I write. What con- 
clusions does the }X)sitiou lead us to as to the 
nature of their attack I 
The first thin;^' vse must attempt to settle is 
whether our original estinjate that the great 
movement was intended to pierce the defended 
line of the Nicmcn and Xavew and to reach the 
main railway Ivinj? bchi.'id that line was an accu- 
rate estimate or no. 
The next judgment T propose to reweigh is 
the conclusion that the new fortuations were cer- 
tainly present upon the German side. 
The tliird judgment which we may return to 
— a mucli less important niatter — is tue measure 
of the German success in this field so far. 
Ati to the first of these jxiints : 
It is clear that if the Gennan effort was not 
directed at the piercing of the Nieraen-Narew line 
and the seizing of the railway beyond it, it had no 
strategic object. 
It docs'not follow that the German move was 
either purposeless (which would be impossible) or 
ill-directed. It may have had no object but that of 
" countering." Just as a man; finding himself too 
Itard pressed by an enemy, may deliA-er a sudden 
blow exhausting to himself for the moment and 
neither intended nor expected to finish his oppo- 
nent, but at any rate sufficient to relieve the pres- 
sure for a time. If the Germans were acting in 
this way. then the conclusion to which so many 
critics of this campaign have come, that Germany 
feels herself besieged and is acting like one 
besieged, is doubly proved. For to expend so much 
energy on what is no more than a sortie, and was 
iK)t intended to be more than a sortie, with no 
definite object of final success in front of it, would 
lie a full confession, not only of assiegement, but 
of nearly hopeless assiegement. 
But it is not t-o be believed that the German 
General Staff as yet adopts that attitude. That it 
regards the forces of itself and of its ally as held 
in the East and West is certain, because that is 
a ])lain fact, obvious to every observer. But 
that it regards the position in the East as so 
desperate that a mere hca\y demonstration lead- 
ing to nothing is all that is left to do, 
cannot !« accepted. The Germans and 
Anstrians are still in superior numlx'rs upon 
this front. Tliey certaiidy have a concerted plan, 
and it is almost wearisomely obvious that the 
possession of Warsaw is the key to that plan. It 
is not to be credited that with the knowledge — 
common to anyone possessing a railway inaj:)^— of 
iWarsaw jjciag the capital point of the eampaigUy 
they would make a move like this round tikc nortli 
Hank of the War.saA\ position without meaning to 
threaten ^\'nrfaw. They may be checked in their 
front, and when they arc cliecked they may pre- 
tend, or de-^irc to Itclicve, that they never 
attempted the threat at all. But it will recjaii-c"a 
most cogent and exceptional proof to convince 
anyone tliat a move?nciit uj>on such a scale was 
undertakcii for nothing more than at the least a 
demonstration and at the test a counter blow. 
It may Ix" urged (as certain critics have 
already urged) that the enemy's object was merely 
to clear the invader out of German soil. That is 
surely quite incredible, for the simple reason that 
it is not war. Short of .sundry political inanities 
upon the defensive being moral and the offensive 
immoral, human speech cannot Ix; framed to cx- 
pi'ess the ineptitude of an ojieratioji which sliould 
consider mere political frontiers. An army goes 
into the field in order to defeat other annies 
strategically. That is, it goes into the field in 
order to render the opposing army, through losses 
of every kijid, wiiethcr of numbei's or coh.esion. so 
much inferior that it can no longer oi)nose with 
success. It decs not go into the field merely to 
clear certain geographical areas to which its 
leaders happen to be attached. If it did thof, 
it w^ould simply lie asking for defeat in the future 
and spending its strength in an object that was 
not military at all. 
Let us, then, take for granted that the enemy 
has the only conceiv.able strategic object the region 
affords, and that he is ti-vin"- to break the Zsiemen- 
Narew line; further, that he is trying to do thi.s 
in order to cut the railway k'hind that line. How 
do his chances of succcos look in the light of the 
latest nev, s ? 
We note, in the first place, that the Ihissian 
retirement, as a whole, Mas neither confused nor 
subject to the will of the enemy. The Russians 
have not retired in such, directions and such direc- 
tions only as the .superior forces before thein deter- 
mined. They have retired upon divergent Hues 
towards chosen bases — Kovno, Osowiec, Lomza. 
On one of these lines they have suffered a local 
disaster— the line through Augustowo. The others 
have been accurately followed. They have so 
retired that each of the fortresses defending the 
line of the rivea-s shall be at its maximum strength 
if or when the enemy reaches that line, and by 
this method of rctireiiient they have left the enemy 
the choice either of neglecting the remaining force 
upon the northern flank betw^een Grodno and 
Kovno — Avhich may then go south at their time 
when the issue is joined upon the Narew— or of 
following the retreat up to the Niemen betAveen 
Grodno and KoA'no and then, separating their 
forces, by the marshy district of forests tetwecn 
Grodno and Osowiec. 
It is important to note this character of the 
region of the retreat, not only because it shows 
that the retreat was, though rapid, in the main 
orderly, but also because it enables us to judge the 
accuracy of the German reports and the confidence 
the Eussians still jilace in their fortified line. It 
also permits us to be perfectly certain that the 
retirement was effected in the face of very greatly 
superior German forces. 
Next, let it be noted that the Germans are 
directing their principal effort, not toward the 
Niemen, but towards the Narew, and that is again 
w^hat would be expected of a force whose principal 
object was the railway line screening W»v.saw 
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